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THE (NON)FINALITY OF SUPREME COURT OPINIONS 
Richard J. Lazarus∗ 
Remarking on the Supreme Court in his separate concurring opin-
ion in Brown v. Allen,1 Justice Robert Jackson famously quipped, “We 
are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only be-
cause we are final.”2  As the Court itself makes clear, however, its pub-
lished opinions are not immediately “final” at all.  Just the opposite is 
true.  The Court’s opinion in Brown itself was not final on the day it 
was announced, notwithstanding all the visible trappings and signa-
ture headings of the Court.  It takes not just days or months but sev-
eral years after the Court’s initial announcement and publication of its 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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 1 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
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ruling before the Court releases what it is willing to describe as its “fi-
nal” and “official” opinion. 
Hiding in plain sight at the top of a Supreme Court opinion when 
first issued is a formal notice that makes clear its nonfinal and nonoffi-
cial nature: 
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in 
the preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested 
to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, 
Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in 
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to 
press.3 
This notice appears on both “bench opinions,” distributed by the 
Court at the immediate conclusion of the opinion’s announcement 
from the bench, and “slip opinions,” which the Court releases several 
days later.4  A similarly worded notice appears on the “preliminary 
print” of the United States Reports, published several months after the 
original opinion announcement.5  The notice states that this formally 
published version of the Court’s opinion is likewise subject to revision 
before publication in the “bound volume[s]” of the United States Re-
ports and invites members of the public to notify the Reporter of Deci-
sions of errors so that corrections can be made.6 
According to the Supreme Court, “[o]nly the bound volumes of the 
United States Reports contain the final, official text of [the Court’s] 
opinions.”7  Those volumes are published several years after the origi-
nal opinion announcements.  For instance, the Court handed down its 
final merits decisions of the October 2007 Term on June 26, 2008.8  
The last volume of the corresponding set of United States Reports, in-
cluding those final decisions, was not published until five years later.9  
Five years is a long time to wait for the “final” and “official” version of 
a Supreme Court ruling.  Since modern technology creates a public ex-
pectation of receiving information at lightning speed, a five-year delay 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 3 E.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 30, 2014), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/13-354_olp1.pdf [http://perma.cc/B6YF-XZ32]. 
 4 See, e.g., id. at 1.  See generally Information About Opinions, SUPREME CT. U.S., http://www. 
supremecourt.gov/opinions/info_opinions.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 2014) [http://perma.cc/TAW9-
8LBF].  Notwithstanding the Court’s stated distinction between “bench” and “slip” opinions, the 
opinion the Court releases on its website immediately after the announcement of the Court’s opin-
ion from the bench is labeled “slip opinion.”  The “bench opinion” version is distributed by the 
Court’s Office of Public Information that same morning to the news media and members of the 
public. 
 5 561 U.S. i (2010) (prelim. print). 
 6 Id. 
 7 Information About Opinions, supra note 4 (emphasis added). 
 8 See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 724 (2008); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 
570 (2008); Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 527 (2008). 
 9 See 554 U.S. I (2013). 
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might well be the psychological equivalent of a decades-long delay a 
half century ago.10 
The origins and potential implications of these seemingly innocuous 
notices are fascinating and take us back through the Court’s history, 
long before the express acknowledgment was included in the Court’s 
opinions.  In what is unquestionably the most extreme instance, Chief 
Justice Taney in Dred Scott v. Sandford11 added approximately eight-
een pages to his majority opinion between the time of his original an-
nouncement of the Court’s ruling and the publication of the opinion 
several months later.12  And, as recently as Lawrence v. Texas13 in 
2003, striking down as unconstitutional a Texas law criminalizing sod-
omy, and EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P.14 in April 2014, 
upholding a major agency rule promulgated under the federal Clean 
Air Act,15 Justices have revised their opinions in significant, including 
highly substantive, ways prior to their final and official publication in 
the United States Reports.16 
Examination of the Court’s practice naturally raises a series of 
questions.  First, what does the Court mean by its suggestion that the 
initial slip opinions and preliminary prints are not “final, official” opin-
ions?  Unlike “proposed” rules that agencies publish in the Federal 
Register, Supreme Court opinions are legally effective as soon as they 
are first announced.  Further, the Court prints slip opinions on in-
house equipment; no unofficial third party is involved.17 
Second, what does the Court mean by “formal errors”?18  Are for-
mal errors merely typographical errors, including technical errors in 
citation forms and grammar?  Or does the term extend to factual mis-
takes?  Further still, do the Justices make substantive changes in the 
opinion under the rubric of a “formal error”?  How frequent and how 
extensive are the changes that the Justices make? 
Third, what notices are provided when Justices make changes?  
Are other Justices notified of changes before or after they are made?  
What about the parties to the case?  Or members of the public?  Is 
there an opportunity to comment on proposed changes?  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 10 See JAMES GLEICK, FASTER 9 (1999) (“We are in a rush.  We are making haste.  A com-
pression of time characterizes the life of the century now closing.”); Alex Kacelnik, The Evolution 
of Patience, in TIME AND DECISION 115 (George Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003). 
 11 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 12 See infra TAN 274–301. 
 13 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 14 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). 
 15 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012).  
 16 See infra TAN 351–367; TAN 379–403. 
 17 Information About Opinions, supra note 4. 
 18 E.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 30, 2014). 
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Finally, what problems does the Court’s current process of revising 
opinions create?  Do changes unwittingly introduce other errors?  Does 
the lack of transparency invite Justices to make changes that they 
would be less likely to make if a more public acknowledgment were 
required?  And, more particularly, do legal publications, lawyers, and 
judges sufficiently account for the Court’s revision process by ensuring 
that they are citing the “final, official” version?  By what authority can 
Justices today correct “mistakes” in opinions published years or even 
decades before?  Mistaken or not, those earlier opinions accurately 
state the words on which a majority of Justices, none of whom may 
currently serve on the Court, presumably relied in casting their votes 
at the time of decision.  
The purpose of this Article is to answer these questions by explor-
ing the history and significance of the Court’s practice of revising opin-
ions, which legal scholarship has largely ignored.19  The Article is di-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 19 Every sweeping statement that previous scholarship has “ignored” something has an excep-
tion.  And when it comes to legal scholars ignoring something significant, that exception invaria-
bly is my colleague Professor Mark Tushnet.  See Mark Tushnet, Sloppiness in the Supreme 
Court, O.T. 1935–O.T. 1944, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 73 (1986).  This exception is no exception in 
that respect, although Tushnet’s focus is very different and far narrower: he focuses on a relative-
ly brief moment between 1935 and 1945, when the Court utilized a wholly transparent practice of 
revising opinions, while this Article focuses on the strikingly different and nontransparent process 
that now dominates the Court’s practices.  Tushnet alludes to this modern practice in a single sen-
tence and does not consider the fuller implications of the scope of subsequent “corrections.”  See 
id. at 81–82 (“Today the Reporter’s office undoubtedly corrects opinions, with the agreement of 
the Justices, as a routine matter.”).  In addition, Tushnet expressly stops short of locating the orig-
inal slip opinions that had been revised, which made it “impossible to determine the exact signifi-
cance of a modification.”  Id. at 75 n.12.  This Article takes that additional step of comparing the 
final version to the original slip opinion in all cases.  Apart from Tushnet’s article, I have come 
across only three instances in which the practice has been acknowledged, but on each occasion 
only in application to a single, isolated case, and without any apparent awareness or discussion of 
the possibility or significance of a more widespread practice.  The first is an incidental acknowl-
edgment that the Court has made a technical correction in a particular case.  See Joshua Dressler, 
A Lesson in Incaution, Overwork, and Fatigue: The Judicial Miscraftsmanship of Segura v. Unit-
ed States, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 375, 407 (1985) (describing revision of slip opinion to correct 
the misattribution of a quote of Justice Frankfurter to Justice Jackson).  The second is a truly fas-
cinating case comment that describes how the Court mistook the date of a Court ruling decided a 
century earlier and then relied heavily on that erroneous date to support its reasoning.  See John 
P. MacKenzie, Comment, Hamm v. City of Rock Hill and the Federal Savings Statute, 54 GEO. 
L.J. 173 (1965).  The case comment includes at the very end a brief “Editor’s Note” informing the 
reader, without analysis, of the author’s subsequent receipt of correspondence from the Supreme 
Court Reporter that the opinion will be revised prior to publication in the United States Reports.  
Id. at 182 (citing Letter from Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, to John 
P. MacKenzie, Supreme Court Reporter, Wash. Post (Oct. 27, 1965)).  Finally, there is a short, re-
cently published essay that describes changes made in a separate opinion by Chief Justice Burger, 
speaking just for himself, concurring in the denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari.  See Doug-
las P. Woodlock, Chief Justice Burger Writes an Opinion on Palimpsest, 17 GREEN BAG 2d 37 
(2013).  The essay evidences no awareness that the practice is in fact far deeper and more wide-
spread than the author discusses, extending throughout the Court’s history, to the entire Court, 
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vided into three parts.  Part I places the practice of revising Supreme 
Court opinions in its broader procedural and historical context.  This 
includes a description of the formal stages in the Court’s opinion-
writing process and a survey of the varied formal and informal pro-
cesses for triggering and announcing revisions.  Part I also catalogues 
the types of revisions that the Court makes, which from the Court’s 
earliest days to the present have included significant substantive 
changes. 
Part II examines the actual practice of revising opinions.  Not sur-
prisingly, discerning this practice proved challenging.  Although the 
Court has long revised its opinions and disclosed the fact that it does 
so, the Court has done little to make clear what changes have been 
made in individual cases.  Instead, the Court deliberately makes dis-
covery difficult notwithstanding the public nature of the revisions.  
This Part of the Article illustrates the scope and potential depth of the 
revision process by describing examples of revisions, extending from 
the early nineteenth century to the present.  These examples do not re-
flect an exhaustive effort to discover all possible revisions.  They rep-
resent just a sampling of instances that I discovered based on my re-
view of several sources. 
Part III considers options for improving the process and practice of 
revising Supreme Court opinions.  This analysis requires identification 
of the advantages and disadvantages of the Court’s current process, 
and it discusses the contrasting processes that Congress and federal 
agencies use to revise statutes and regulations.  To the extent, moreo-
ver, that such analysis and discussion of current practices implicitly or 
explicitly criticize the Court’s practices, any such criticism is not at all 
directed at the Office of the Reporter.  At least since the early twenti-
eth century, the Reporter’s Office has steadfastly performed its respon-
sibilities, as instructed by the Court, with extraordinary skill, integrity, 
and professionalism.  It is instead those Court instructions that this Ar-
ticle questions and that warrant rethinking and reform.  The current 
Court did not itself create those instructions, which find their origins 
in practices that have persisted for decades if not centuries.  The Court 
today, however, can easily fix them. 
I.  THE PROCESS OF REVISING SUPREME COURT OPINIONS 
The process of revising Supreme Court opinions has changed con-
siderably since its early days and has become both more and less 
transparent over time.  Two fundamental reasons for the changing na-
ture of the revision process are that the process within the Court of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
and to the Court’s actual opinions on the merits, and not just to an individual opinion, of a single 
Justice, on an isolated occurrence, at the jurisdictional stage, and with no force of law. 
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drafting opinions has changed, and the amount of public and news 
media interest in the Court’s opinions has substantially increased.  In 
particular, the Supreme Court Reporter lost control over the decision 
of when opinions were to be published.  And outside pressures from 
the public prompted earlier publication before the Reporter had a full 
opportunity to review initial drafts.  In different but ultimately rein-
forcing ways, the changing Court procedures and increased public in-
terest thereby combined to produce multiple published versions of the 
Court’s opinions and greater divergence between the Court’s original 
and final versions. 
A.  The Court’s Earliest Years and the Supreme Court Reporter’s 
Practice of Revising Opinions 
During the Court’s earliest years, Supreme Court Reporters regu-
larly revised opinions after they were announced orally by the Justices.  
Indeed, that was essentially their job.20  The Justices would publicly 
read their rulings in open Court, but only “in a few instances” would 
they provide the Reporter with the text.21  Instead, the Supreme Court 
Reporter would create a written opinion based on his notes of what a 
Justice said and any notes that the Justice provided.  The Reporter 
would also secure notes from other attorneys who happened to be in 
the courtroom for the opinion announcement, especially if the Reporter 
had been absent.22 
Somewhat counterintuitively, the first Reporters were not govern-
ment employees and were essentially self-appointed, enhancing their 
ability to influence opinions.23  Nor was this a problem original to a 
then-new nation.  The same practice had long persisted in England.  
During the early seventeenth century, Sir Edward Coke was notorious 
for being “too fond of making the law, instead of declaring the law, 
and of telling untruths to support his own opinions” in his reports.24  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 20 See MORRIS L. COHEN & SHARON HAMBY O’CONNOR, A GUIDE TO THE EARLY RE-
PORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 4, 7 (1995). 
 21 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
1789–1800, at xxiv (Maeva Marcus ed., 1994). 
 22 Id. at xxiv–xxv; COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 7. 
 23 Gerald T. Dunne, Early Court Reporters, in 1976 SUPREME COURT HIST. SOC’Y,  YEAR-
BOOK 61, 62 (William F. Swindler ed., 1975). 
 24 JOHN WILLIAM WALLACE, THE REPORTERS 172 (4th ed. 1882) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting NICHOLAS HARRIS NICOLAS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ADULTERINE BAS-
TARDY 80 (1836)) (internal quotation mark omitted).  Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, originally published between 1765 and 1769, were premised on the notion that judicial 
opinions were not law itself but “evidence of the law.”  WILLIAM D. POPKIN, EVOLUTION OF 
THE JUDICIAL OPINION 13 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The emergence of more 
formal announcements of judicial opinions in the mid-eighteenth century reportedly reflected an 
effort by the courts to compete with the rising role of legislatures by making their declarations of 
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With no government salary, the Reporter’s sole source of income for 
this work derived from the sale of published volumes.25  The Reporter 
therefore had a strong interest in attracting buyers.  Although in theo-
ry that could mean making the written rulings more interesting, one of 
the most significant impacts in practice was that Reporters exercised 
great discretion in deciding which rulings to report.26  Such discretion 
both reduced the publication costs and made the resulting volumes 
more substantively attractive.27  In other words, the Reporter’s ability 
to revise extended to eliminating opinions entirely from the public rec-
ord based on his view that the rulings were too unimportant to merit 
the labor (and pages) required for their inclusion. 
The earliest Reporters — including in particular each of the first 
three, Alexander J. Dallas, William Cranch, and Henry Wheaton — 
had an established practice of not reporting all of the Court’s rulings.28  
Dallas may have omitted as many as one-third of the Court’s rulings 
from his volumes.29  When Dallas took on the Reporter job, entirely on 
his own initiative, his reporting of Supreme Court rulings was very 
much secondary to his reporting of Pennsylvania state court rulings.30  
His first volume included only Pennsylvania cases and no Supreme 
Court decisions; his second volume covered seventeen years of Penn-
sylvania decisions and was up to date, while that same volume cov-
ered only three years of Supreme Court rulings and was five years be-
hind.31  The Supreme Court rulings were also at the back of the 
volume,32 underscoring their secondary status.  In his sixteen Terms as 
Reporter, Dallas published fewer than seventy Supreme Court cases.33  
Not until an act of Congress in 1817 did the Reporter (then 
Wheaton34) become a government employee and an officer of the 
Court.35  Even then the stipend ($1000) was substantially less than the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
law more formal “as a parallel and legitimate form of law, side by side with statutes.”  Id. at 7; see 
also id. at 15.   
 25 See COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 2.  
 26 See POPKIN, supra note 24, at 66. 
 27 Because Reporters were frequently advocates in cases they reported, there may have been a 
natural tendency to highlight cases in which the Reporters participated as counsel.  See infra 
TAN 40–42. 
 28 See COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 4, 7; see also Preface, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) iii, 
iii–iv (1816) (acknowledging the omission of cases that were factbound and unimportant). 
 29 COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 4. 
 30 See id. at 17–18. 
 31 See 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) (1790); 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) (1798); COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 
17–21.   
 32 See 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 399–480 (1798). 
 33 COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 21. 
 34 POPKIN, supra note 24, at 77. 
 35 An Act to Provide for Reports of the Decisions of the Supreme Court, ch. 63, 3 Stat. 376 
(1817).  Justice Story reportedly prompted the federal legislation.  POPKIN, supra note 24, at 77. 
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cost of preparing and publishing the volumes, so the Reporter re-
mained dependent on sales.36 
The Reporter’s exclusive right to publish opinions was essential to 
the position’s economic viability.  The flip side, of course, was that nei-
ther the news media nor the public had access to written opinions until 
published by the Reporter.  When the Court announced its opinion in 
Marbury v. Madison37 on February 24, 1803, for instance, the market 
demand was great, but the public had to wait more than a year for 
Cranch to publish his first volume, covering the Court’s rulings from 
1801 to 1804.38 
The potential for divergence between the Court’s orally announced 
ruling and the Reporter’s subsequent written opinion was great, espe-
cially when the Justice did not provide the Reporter with a draft writ-
ten opinion.  The Court’s first reporter, Dallas, “exercised his own edi-
torial judgment” and “made changes in the language of the opinions.”39  
Exercising a professional duality that would inspire envy in today’s 
Supreme Court Bar, Dallas reported cases in which he had been the 
advocate for one of the parties, including the first significant case ever 
published in the United States Reports, Chisholm v. Georgia.40  Nor 
did other early Reporters view their responsibilities as a full-time or 
even primary focus of employment.  The second Reporter, Cranch, 
simultaneously served as “Chief Justice” of the U.S. Circuit Court of 
the District of Columbia, the forerunner to the D.C. Circuit.41  The 
third Reporter, Wheaton, argued more than twenty-five cases during 
his time in that position.42 
B.  The Rise of Justices Providing Written Opinions and Increased 
Pressure for Early Release of Initial Opinions 
The relationship among the Justices, the Reporter, and the Court’s 
published opinions, however, evolved during the first half of the nine-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 36 See COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 45 n.57, 46–47. 
 37 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 38 See id. (decided February 24, 1803); 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) i (1804) (providing the volume’s date 
of publication); COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 30. 
 39 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
1789–1800, supra note 21, at xxv. 
 40 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); see id. at 419; see also COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 
14–15.  Dallas’s second volume, the first to include federal Supreme Court rulings, published nine 
Supreme Court opinions in seventy-nine pages.  See 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 401–80.  Chisholm consti-
tuted sixty-one of those seventy-nine pages and included, as was the custom at the time, a descrip-
tion of the arguments of counsel.  See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 419–80.  
 41 COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 26. 
 42 Id. at 39.  The fifth Reporter, Benjamin Chew Howard, advertised his advocacy services in 
the United States Reports, available when it was “inconvenient or impossible for the counsel who 
argued [a case] below to” do so.  Id. at 82 (quoting A Card from the Reporter to His Professional 
Brethren and the Public Generally, 42 U.S. (1 How.) v, v (1843)). 
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teenth century.  The Justices increasingly began providing written 
drafts to the Reporter “in all cases of difficulty or importance”43 rather 
than relying on the Reporter’s doing so in the first instance.44  Draft 
written opinions by the Justices, however, eliminated neither the op-
portunity for friction between the Justices and the Reporter nor the 
opportunity for revision of the Court’s opinion between its initial an-
nouncement and final publication.  In certain respects, the potential 
for both increased, especially as the pressure for ever-earlier release of 
the Justice’s draft written opinion for the Court likewise increased.45 
The resulting rise in friction between individual Justices and vari-
ous Reporters over the latter’s role in drafting and revising the Court’s 
opinions was reflected in the challenging tenures many of those Re-
porters faced in their jobs.  On the one hand, the Justices were well 
aware that they needed the assistance of an able editor.  On the other, 
the Justices became increasingly critical of the job that many Report-
ers were doing, and coalitions of Justices regularly lobbied, successful-
ly, for the ouster of Reporters from their positions. 
For instance, with regard to “verbal and grammatical errors,” Jus-
tice Story strongly praised the role of the Reporter in correcting the 
opinions before their final publication in bound volumes.46  According 
to Justice Story, “it would be a disgrace to all concerned,” “mar the 
sense,” and “pain the author” not to correct such errors.47  And “[i]f a 
reporter do no more than acts of this sort, removing mere blemishes, 
he does all Judges a great favor.”48 
The Justices, however, also regularly complained about Reporter 
inaccuracy.  Justice Story complained about the (in)accuracy of 
Cranch’s reporting and helped push Cranch out in favor of Wheaton.49  
Wheaton, in turn, may have resigned under pressure amidst concern 
on the Court about the extent to which Justice Story collaborated with 
Wheaton in drafting opinions.50  Wheaton’s successor, Richard Peters, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 43 Preface, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) iii, v (1804). 
 44 Id. at iv–v. 
 45 Publication delays remained a constant complaint.  Dallas did not publish his last volume 
until 1807, three years after the second Reporter, Cranch, had published his first volume.  See 4 
U.S. (4 Dall.) i (1807); 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at i; COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 30.  When 
the third Reporter, Wheaton, took over in 1816, Cranch had not published volumes for cases re-
ported between 1812 and 1815 because of financial difficulties.  COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra 
note 20, at 47. 
 46 Alden I. Rosbrook, The Art of Judicial Reporting, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 103, 123 (1925) (quot-
ing Letter from Joseph Story, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to Richard Pe-
ters, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States (May 7, 1836), in 2 LIFE AND 
LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 231, 232 (William W. Story ed., 1851)). 
 47 Id. (quoting Letter from Joseph Story to Richard Peters, supra note 46, at 232). 
 48 Id. (quoting Letter from Joseph Story to Richard Peters, supra note 46, at 232). 
 49 POPKIN, supra note 24, at 76–80. 
 50 COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 52–53, 64. 
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ultimately fared no better.51  Peters had the advantage of the Court’s 
new rule, established in 1834, that Justices provide their opinions in 
writing.52  But a draft written opinion is still just that: a “draft” and 
“written.”  As a practical matter, it was frequently hard to read a Jus-
tice’s handwriting, and significant editorial assistance was needed to 
transition from draft to final published version.53  Peters, too, was ul-
timately forced out by a group of Justices, including Justice Catron,54 
who published a lengthy letter listing all the errors that Peters had 
committed in publishing Catron’s opinions in five recent volumes.55 
Once it became well known that the Justices were providing the 
Reporter with draft written opinions, the pressure naturally increased 
for earlier publication of those initial drafts.  The reasons for delay un-
til publication of the formal United States Reports seemed far less 
compelling once the Reporter was playing a less substantive role.  
And, even more important, with the rise of the national government 
during the mid-nineteenth century, the media and the public grew 
more impatient for a copy of the Court’s opinions,56 as did competing 
private publishers.57  The Court’s rulings were potentially big news 
and the nation’s newspapers, because of modern technology, were ca-
pable of publishing ever more quickly and distributing their product 
ever more widely.58 
For the Reporter, however, early publication of opinions was plain-
ly problematic.  First, such early publication would be potentially cat-
astrophic in terms of the basic economic viability of the job.  What 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 51 Controversy between Wheaton and Peters famously spilled over into litigation before the 
Court itself when Peters sought to republish Court opinions that had been handed down while 
Wheaton was the Reporter.  See id. at 53–57.  The Court rejected Wheaton’s claim of copyright 
infringement.  See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 667–68 (1834). 
 52 Order of Mar. 14, 1834, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) vii (1834). 
 53 COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 84–85, 85 n.38; see also 5 CARL B. SWISHER, 
THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 310 (1974). 
 54 COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 72–73.  An example of a Peters transgression was 
his misspelling of Justice Daniel’s name.  Daniel, as a result, favored his dismissal.  Id. at 72 & 
n.54. 
 55 See List of Errata in the Opinions of the Court as Pronounced by Mr. Justice Catron, or in 
His Dissentient Opinions, Contained in the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th Volumes of Peters’ 
Reports, 42 U.S. (1 How.) xv, xv–xix (1843).  In what appears to have been intended as pointed 
sarcasm rather than a formal injunction, Justice Catron justified publication of his lengthy list of 
Peters’s errors by referring to the inevitable delays before Peters would be able to publish a cor-
rected “second edition” of his reports.  Id. at xv.  Of course, no such “second edition” was ever 
forthcoming. 
 56 See, e.g., COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 85. 
 57 Id. at 68. 
 58 See generally, e.g., JAMES L. CROUTHAMEL, BENNETT’S NEW YORK HERALD AND 
THE RISE OF THE POPULAR PRESS (1989); SUSAN THOMPSON, THE PENNY PRESS (2004); 
Donald K. Brazeal, Precursor to Modern Media Hype: The 1830s Penny Press, 28 J. AM. CUL-
TURE 405 (2005). 
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made the Reporter position profitable, at least on a marginal basis, 
was the Reporter’s exclusive right to publish opinions in the first in-
stance.59  To be sure, the position provided significant professional 
stature, and Reporters routinely did more than just publish the Court’s 
opinions.  They would write headnotes, summaries of the arguments of 
counsel, commentaries, and indices that both added substantive value 
to the publication and, no less important, increased the price that 
could be charged for each volume.60  But release of the Justices’ writ-
ten opinions upon their initial announcement was perceived as a threat 
to the viability of the Reporter’s entire enterprise.61 
Second, early publication of a Justice’s initial opinion for the Court, 
before the Reporter had fully reviewed the draft for errors or otherwise 
had an opportunity to make or at least propose editorial modifications, 
would dramatically increase the potential for divergence between the 
original published version and the final version appearing in the Unit-
ed States Reports.  In the past, the revisions were all internal to the 
Court.  The Reporter would review and edit the draft.  The Justices 
would make changes upon further reflection, including based on 
statements made in concurring and dissenting opinions.  The differ-
ences between the opinion announced by the Court orally and the sub-
sequently published written opinion could be significant.62  But there 
was still only one written version: the opinion published by the Re-
porter in the United States Reports.  There were no competing written 
versions and therefore no hard evidence of the changes made. 
That would no longer be true if the Court were to change its prac-
tices and release initial opinions immediately after the announcement 
of the Court’s ruling.  Then, any subsequent revisions would result in 
contrasting written publications.  The potential for confusion would be 
considerable.  After a major battle between the Supreme Court Clerk 
and the Reporter,63 the Court ultimately sided with the Clerk and al-
lowed the Clerk, in response to demand from the news media and the 
public, to release opinions to the public prior to their formal publica-
tion by the Reporter.64 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 59 See COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 55. 
 60 See POPKIN, supra note 24, at 66–67. 
 61 See COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 68–69. 
 62 See, e.g., infra TAN 273–301. 
 63 The Court initially sided with the Reporter: the Court would provide its opinions to the Re-
porter, who would deliver them to the Clerk “for preservation; as soon as the volume of the re-
ports for the term at which they are delivered shall be published,” so the Reporter’s publication 
would take precedence.  Order of Mar. 14, 1834, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) vii, vii (1834).  
 64 COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 69 n.43; see also S. CT. R. 42 (1835), in 42 U.S. (1 
How.) xxxv (1843) (providing that the Court shall deliver all opinions to the Clerk, who will rec-
ord them and then deliver them to the Reporter). 
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 59 See COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 55. 
 60 See POPKIN, supra note 24, at 66–67. 
 61 See COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 68–69. 
 62 See, e.g., infra TAN 273–301. 
 63 The Court initially sided with the Reporter: the Court would provide its opinions to the Re-
porter, who would deliver them to the Clerk “for preservation; as soon as the volume of the re-
ports for the term at which they are delivered shall be published,” so the Reporter’s publication 
would take precedence.  Order of Mar. 14, 1834, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) vii, vii (1834).  
 64 COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 69 n.43; see also S. CT. R. 42 (1835), in 42 U.S. (1 
How.) xxxv (1843) (providing that the Court shall deliver all opinions to the Clerk, who will rec-
ord them and then deliver them to the Reporter). 
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To both allow for necessary revisions and reduce the potential for 
confusion, the Court appears to have taken three steps.  The first was 
to delay the announcement of the ruling until the written opinion had 
been more thoroughly drafted, edited, revised, and proofed within the 
Court.  The best evidence of this change, though indirect and therefore 
not incontrovertible, is that the Court takes far more time to decide 
cases than it used to, even though it currently hears far fewer cases 
than it used to,65 and even though each Justice enjoys far more assis-
tance from law clerks, whose presence was sporadic in the late nine-
teenth century, but standard at four per chamber today.66  For in-
stance, the average time between oral argument and opinion 
announcement for cases argued in February Term 1825 was nine 
days.67  For October Term 1875, the corresponding time period was 
thirty days,68 and for October Term 1925, it was forty-nine days.69  In 
more recent decades, the time it has taken to announce opinions fol-
lowing oral argument has been even greater still: often more than one 
hundred days.70  The number of pages of opinions (majority, concur-
ring, and dissenting) has significantly increased during this same time 
period,71 but that too could contribute to the length of time needed to 
review and revise opinions prior to announcement. 
Second, the Court developed formal procedures for releasing and 
publishing advance opinions prior to final publication in the United 
States Reports.  Potentially as early as the late nineteenth century, and 
no later than the early twentieth century, the Court was regularly re-
leasing copies of its opinions within a few days of the opinions’ an-
nouncements.  Private companies published both those original opin-
ions and, later on, the final opinions appearing in the bound United 
States Reports.  The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company be-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 65 The Court’s plenary docket has dramatically shrunk since the late nineteenth century: from 
just shy of 300 in the late nineteenth century, to closer to 200 in the 1920s, to around 140 in the 
1970s, and to around 75 in the past decade.  See David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Declining 
Plenary Docket: A Membership-Based Explanation, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 151, 152–53 (2010); 
David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the Certiorari Pro-
cess, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 964–68 (2007) (book review). 
 66 ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES 30–53 (2006). 
 67 Author’s calculations based on 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) (1825).  
 68 Author’s calculations based on 92 U.S. (1890) and 91 U.S. (1876).  
 69 Author’s calculations based on 271 U.S. (1927); 270 U.S. (1926); and 269 U.S. (1926). 
 70 Author’s calculations based on 428 U.S. (1978); 427 U.S. (1978); 426 U.S. (1978); 425 U.S. 
(1978); 424 U.S. (1977); and 423 U.S. (1977), as well as all slip opinions for October Term 2010. 
 71 Based on the author’s review of 428 U.S.; 427 U.S.; 426 U.S.; 425 U.S.; 424 U.S.; 423 U.S.; 
272 U.S.; 271 U.S.; 270 U.S.; 93 U.S.; 92 U.S.; and 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.), as well as the slip opinions 
for October Term 2010, the average total number of opinion pages per case was 11.5, 6.6, 6.7, 
26.9, and 30 during February Term 1825 and October Terms 1875, 1925, 1975, and 2010, respec-
tively. 
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gan publishing Lawyers’ Edition in 1882,72 and West Publishing Com-
pany commenced publishing its competing Supreme Court Reporter 
one year later in 1883.73 
Congress confirmed the established nature of these “advance” pub-
lications in 1922 when it enacted legislation requiring publication of 
Supreme Court opinions by the Government Printing Office (GPO).74  
This reform was part of a broader legislative effort, promoted by the 
new Chief Justice Taft, to improve the quality and efficiency of the 
Court’s decisionmaking.75  The 1922 legislation expressly provided for 
GPO’s publication of both the final bound volumes of the United 
States Reports, beginning with volume 257, and what the statute re-
ferred to as “advance copies” of opinions in “pamphlet installments.”76  
Chief Justice Taft also made slip opinions routinely available to the 
public, converting what had commenced as an idiosyncratic process in 
which page proofs were “obtainable only from the Court-selected pri-
vate printer or from a justice.”77  The Bureau of National Affairs’s 
United States Law Week began to publish slip opinions on September 
5, 1933.78  And, by October Term 1946, anyone could subscribe to re-
ceive slip opinions directly from GPO.79 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 72 See 1 L. Ed. (1882); COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 5 (describing the commence-
ment of the Lawyers’ Edition in 1882).    
 73 See 1 S. Ct. (1883); COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 5 (describing the commence-
ment of the Supreme Court Reporter in 1883).    
 74 See Act of July 1, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-272, § 1, 42 Stat. 816, 816.  The immediate impetus 
for the legislation was that the Reporter was unable to find a publisher for the United States Re-
ports because the statutorily established maximum price per volume deprived the publisher of the 
opportunity to make a reasonable return on its investment.  See H.R. REP. NO. 67-963, at 2 
(1922).  The statute provided that GPO should print, bind, and issue the United States Reports 
“within eight months after said decisions have been rendered by the Supreme Court.”  § 1, 42 Stat. 
at 816. 
 75 See Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and United States Supreme Court, Pay of Su-
preme Court Reporter: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. (1922) (state-
ment of William Howard Taft, C.J., Supreme Court of the United States), in 8 THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 395, 395–422 (David H. Burton & Francis Graham Lee 
eds., 2004) [hereinafter Testimony of Chief Justice Taft Before the House Judiciary Committee]; 
ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 88–120 (1965). 
 76 § 225, 42 Stat. at 816; see also § 4, 42 Stat. at 818 (noting that the number of “advance pam-
phlet installments” to be printed by GPO is to be determined by the Reporter); FREDERICK C. 
HICKS, MATERIALS AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 102 (2d ed. 1933) (describing 
GPO’s printing of “advance copies of the decisions in pamphlet installments” and slip opinions 
immediately after the opinion’s announcements). 
 77 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 933 
(Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005) (note by Professor Peter Fish). 
 78 See 1 U.S.L.W. 16 (Sept. 5, 1933). 
 79 Current Comment, Walter Wyatt Announces Availability of Supreme Court Slip Opinions, 
40 LAW LIBR. J. 102, 102 (1947).  The differences between the slip opinions and the preliminary 
prints are several.  The former are the Court’s opinions in individual cases, issued within a day or 
two of the opinion announcement.  Id.  The latter contain, in a single paperback volume, all the 
opinions with “syllabi, names of counsel, indices, tables of cases, and other editorial additions,” in 
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Third, and finally, the Court developed a series of pathways for re-
vising opinions after initial publication.  Some of these pathways are 
more transparent than others.  It is to these varied procedures that this 
article next turns.80 
II.  HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PATHWAYS FOR REVISING 
SUPREME COURT OPINIONS AFTER INITIAL PUBLICATION: THE 
QUESTION OF TRANSPARENCY 
A close examination of the Court’s opinions over the past 200-plus 
years reveals both that the Court makes a large number of revisions to 
its opinions following initial publication and that the process for revis-
ing Supreme Court opinions has changed considerably over time, espe-
cially since the early years.  With regard to the former, the Court 
makes all sorts of revisions, ranging from the most mundane to the 
most intriguing, with the vast majority not surprisingly falling into the 
former category.  With regard to the latter, several distinct pathways 
have emerged for revising opinions with varying degrees of transpar-
ency. 
Two are completely transparent.  The first is formal publication of 
errata in the United States Reports.  A list of errata typically singles 
out precise words or phrases as formal errors, along with correspond-
ing deletions, additions, and substitutions to correct the errors.  A se-
cond option, similarly transparent, is to publish an order in the United 
States Reports that formally revises a previously published opinion.  
The final pathway is the least transparent, apart from the formal an-
nouncement of its existence at the top of each slip opinion and prelim-
inary print.  Under this final pathway, the Reporter, in consultation 
with the Justices, corrects so-called “formal errors” in previously pub-
lished opinions.  The number of corrections made in this manner, 
through “change pages,” dwarfs those made under either of the other 
pathways, and the corrections range from the most precise technical 
changes to rewordings of plainly substantive import.81  But, unlike ei-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
addition to all of the Court’s orders and other contemporaneously published rulings.  Id.; see also 
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 
77, at 20–21, 932–33 (defining “advance sheets,” id. at 20, and “slip opinion,” id. at 932). 
 80 The Reporter remains an important officer of the Court, but the role is far different from 
what it was in the early nineteenth century.  See POPKIN, supra note 24, at 66, 79–82.  Substan-
tively, Justices draft their own written opinions, and the Court publishes early slip opinions.  See 
id. at 81–82.  Symbolically, the Reporter’s name no longer appears on the binding, a practice that 
ended when GPO assumed responsibility for publishing the United States Reports in 1922.  Id. at 
81. 
 81 The sheer number of changes made by the Court through “change pages” for each volume 
of the United States Reports is huge.  Almost every page includes numerous changes.  See infra 
note 109.  But, as described in more detail below, the vast majority of those changes are technical 
updates, for instance, to reflect changes in pagination in the Court opinion cited, correction of ci-
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ther the errata lists or the orders amending prior opinions, these 
changes are deliberately made hard to discover by the Court. 
Each of these three pathways, and their associated history, is de-
scribed below.  First, however, the varying institutional pressures for 
opinion revision are outlined and the differing types of changes made 
are more fully catalogued. 
A.  The Institutional Reasons for Revision 
The Court’s practice of revising its opinions is surprising to most 
people, including those who follow the Court, and naturally raises the 
question: Why?  Why does the Court make mistakes notwithstanding 
the talent of its personnel and the intensity of its internal review pro-
cedures?  Why does the Court not do more to eliminate mistakes prior 
to publication of the slip opinions?  And why does the Court insist on 
correcting all of its mistakes?  The answers to some of these questions 
are quite obvious, but to others far less so. 
One obvious answer is that everyone needs a good editor, and Su-
preme Court Justices are no exception, even those who are especially 
talented writers.  In internal Court correspondence, Chief Justice Stone 
described himself as “probably the most ineffective proof reader who 
ever sat on the Bench.”82  And the central role of the opinion, as the 
Court’s ultimate work product, makes it essential to write and edit 
carefully, which includes review and revision. 
Less obvious is why mistakes persist after publication of the slip 
opinion.  After all, the structure of opinion writing within the Court 
provides ample opportunity for close scrutiny that invites revision.  Af-
ter the Justices vote at conference, the senior Justice in the majority 
assigns the responsibility of drafting the majority opinion.  But that 
opinion becomes the opinion of the Court only if a majority of Justices 
subsequently join it.  The Court’s internal procedures involve drafting 
opinions within chambers followed by formal circulation for careful 
review and harsh criticism by other chambers.  Each chamber relies on 
suggestions made by other chambers — including Justices who have 
decided to join the opinion or are contemplating joining the opinion 
(and perhaps are conditioning joining on certain changes) — and, of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
tation form, or correction of truly incidental typographical errors.  Precisely because the changes 
made by the “change page” method lack transparency, it is not possible to know with any level of 
certainty to what extent substantive changes are made, but what is clear is that significant sub-
stantive changes can be and are made by this method.  See infra TAN 301–320; 350–367. 
 82 Letter from Harlan F. Stone, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to Ernest 
Knaebel, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States (March 6, 1931), Stone Pa-
pers B82.  
LAZARUS - PAGES 10/16/14 – 9:14 PM 
16 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 128:1 
course, responds to criticisms of the draft opinion in draft dissents.83  
The internal revision process also extends to the Reporter’s office, 
which scrutinizes opinions for errors in spelling, grammar, word usage, 
citation form, and cited authority before transmitting them for print-
ing, publication, and distribution.84 
The more elusive inquiry is therefore why, given all this exceeding-
ly intense and skilled scrutiny, revision is still necessary after the 
Court’s opinion is first announced and published.  As the Reporter 
himself acknowledged in private correspondence to the Chief Justice in 
1984, by making a “considerable number of corrections and editorial 
changes in the Court’s opinions after their announcement and prior to 
their publication in the United States Reports[] . . . we actually operate 
a system that is completely at odds with general publishing practic-
es.”85 
The most fundamental reason is that mistakes are inevitable and 
will persist even after the rigorous reviewing process.  The Justices and 
their chambers can, of course, reduce the number of mistakes by being 
more rather than less careful and by being more rather than less 
skilled.  But no matter how much time and skill are applied, the possi-
bility of mistakes cannot be eliminated. 
Of course, sometimes the case itself arises out of the kind of conflict 
that imposes a deadline on the Court, such as in Bush v. Gore,86 when 
the Court had to issue a ruling within days of granting review because 
federal constitutional procedures for deciding presidential elections 
would otherwise have begun to be triggered irreversibly.87  There are, 
however, far broader and more systemic reasons rooted in the Court’s 
structure, decisionmaking process, and governmental function for why 
these mistakes persist.  In theory, the Court can take as long as it 
wants to decide a case and can delay publication until every possible 
layer of review has been applied.  But there are costs to delay, which is 
why the Court instead has chosen to publish its initial opinions earlier, 
before they are reviewed to the full extent the Justices believe to be 
necessary for the “final” and “official” versions.  That is also why the 
Court has voluntarily embraced a series of internal rules designed to 
put pressure on its members to issue rulings sooner rather than later. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 83 See generally SUSAN LOW BLOCH ET AL., INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 574–635 (2d 
ed. 2008); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 252–66 (2d ed. 2001). 
 84 EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 30–32 (9th ed. 2007). 
 85 Letter from Henry C. Lind, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, to 
Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States 1 (May 11, 1984), White Pa-
pers BI:622/F5.  
 86 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 87 Notwithstanding these extraordinary time pressures, a review of Bush did not reveal any 
noteworthy changes in the opinions between the time of the publication of the original slip opin-
ions and the final bound volumes of the United States Reports. 
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The Justices know the obvious.  There is no substitute for a dead-
line of some consequence to promote closure in decisionmaking.  And 
there are significant institutional and societal costs to cases that drag 
on, which would likely happen absent an internal rule that admits of 
no exceptions.  With regard to the former, judicial chambers can 
quickly develop a backlog of work.  And that backlog naturally be-
comes increasingly difficult to overcome over time as the law clerks 
most knowledgeable about a matter are replaced by new clerks who 
need time to get up to speed and who were not there either when the 
case was argued or when the Justices deliberated and recorded their 
preliminary votes.  Broader societal interests also can be harmed by 
protracted judicial decisionmaking.  The longer it takes the Court to 
decide, the longer legal uncertainty persists on an important legal is-
sue, which necessarily undermines basic planning and investment, of-
ten in very personally profound and economically significant ways. 
For these reasons, once a sufficient consensus has been formally 
recorded to support a draft majority opinion, there is invariably signif-
icant institutional pressure within the Court to issue that ruling sooner 
rather than later, providing, of course, sufficient time for the prepara-
tion of dissenting and concurring opinions.  Those Justices in the ma-
jority have no interest in delays that promote waffling, further negotia-
tion, and possible shifts, let alone any unexpected changes in personnel 
that could occur the longer and longer it takes to issue the opinion. 
In January 1981, Justice Blackmun described these precise motiva-
tions in internal correspondence to the Reporter as part of an effort to 
explain why the Court operated “on a strange and ‘reverse’ basis, 
where the professional editing is done after initial public release. . . . I 
know of no other situation where delayed editing of this kind is the 
routine.”88  Justice Blackmun elaborated: 
  There is a natural, and understandable, inclination to “rush to judg-
ment” in the sense that every Justice, when all the votes are in, wants to 
get the decision down immediately and without delay.  He wants to get 
“on the scoreboard.”  I suppose, too, that he wants to guard against any 
last minute shifting of a vote, particularly in a close case.  I suspect, there-
fore, that an element of impatience will be evident and will be rationalized 
with the thought that editing, after all, is “secondary” and “those details 
can be ironed out later.”  I think that this attitude is wrong, but it is likely 
to be present.89 
One of the most significant internal rules the Court imposes to 
promote closure relates to the summer recess.  The Court’s practice is 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 88 Letter from Harry A. Blackmun, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to 
Henry C. Lind, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States 1 (Jan. 5, 1981), 
Blackmun Papers B1425/F13. 
 89 Id. at 2. 
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to reschedule for oral argument the following October Term any case 
that has not been decided prior to adjournment for the summer.90  
That tradition places a huge premium on ensuring that the Court 
reaches closure prior to adjournment.  And the Court very rarely car-
ries a case over to the next Term because of its inability to reach con-
sensus.  Reargument is generally reserved for instances in which the 
Justices want the parties to address an additional issue91 or when the 
Court lacks a full bench of nine Justices.92 
The deliberate upshot is substantial pressure to produce opinions 
during the closing weeks before the summer recess.  The Court’s prac-
tice is to require circulation of all draft opinions by the beginning of 
June.93 That timetable leaves relatively little time for revision.  Be-
cause, moreover, the opinions being announced immediately before the 
summer recess are disproportionately the cases that have generated the 
most conflict within the Court (and therefore have taken more time), 
the limited time for review is particularly problematic.  The Justices 
find themselves faced with simultaneously circulating majority, con-
curring, and dissenting opinions, each of which responds to language 
in the others and is subject to revision.  Reaching closure on the word-
ing of all opinions is not easy in a Term’s final days, hours, and 
minutes.  Each Justice authoring a competing opinion seeks the last 
word, so closure can be elusive.94  Last-minute changes are the most 
risky because there is less time for review and revision, so the chance 
of a mistake is great.  And as the final hours of the Term approach, the 
Supreme Court Reporter must struggle to keep up and carefully scru-
tinize each majority, concurring, and dissenting opinion. 
More than a half century ago, Justice Frankfurter was sufficiently 
concerned about the ability of the Justices to decide cases under this 
kind of time pressure that he recommended in a private memorandum 
to the other Justices that the Court change its internal procedures to 
eliminate the hard deadline of the summer recess: 
Changes in majority opinion and dissent, changes often fundamental to 
the theory of decision and certainly to its precise formulation, criss-crossed 
the Court in circulations that continued until almost the last minute before 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 90 See Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: It Happens Every Spring, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2012, 12:06 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/scotus-for-law-
students-it-happens-every-spring-sponsored-by-bloomberg-law/ [http://perma.cc/83PB-WXVZ]. 
 91 See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Kiobel to be Expanded and Reargued, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 5, 
2012, 2:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/kiobel-to-be-reargued [http://perma.cc/A9SA-
M5PU]. 
 92 See Linda Greenhouse, Mysteries of Tie Votes and Calls for Reargument, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
3, 1985, at A20. 
 93 See DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POL-
ITICS 206 (8th ed. 2008). 
 94 See id. at 275–87. 
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we went on the bench.  It surely cannot be denied that such an atmos-
phere is hardly conducive to the full and mature consideration by every 
member of the Court of the implications of an opinion to which he has 
formally subscribed.95 
Nor are the cases decided at the end of the Term a relatively small 
part of the Court’s docket.  Not only do they typically include some of 
the most controversial and high-profile cases, they also reflect a dis-
proportionately high number of the merits rulings.  For instance, on 
June 12, 2013, two weeks before the Supreme Court was scheduled to 
recess for the summer, the Court had decided fifty-four of the cases 
that had been briefed and argued during the October 2012 Term.  The 
Court had twenty-three cases yet to rule on, just under one-third of its 
total docket.96 
Those twenty-three cases included the Texas affirmative action 
case, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,97 argued in October;98 a 
constitutional challenge to the federal Voting Rights Act,99 Shelby 
County v. Holder,100 argued in February; two cases involving the sta-
tus of gay marriage under the U.S. Constitution, Hollingsworth v. Per-
ry101 and United States v. Windsor,102 both argued in March; and the 
application of the Indian Child Welfare Act103 to adoption by a non-
Indian parent under state law, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,104 argued 
during the Court’s last argument session in April.105  In addition to the 
considerable challenge of reaching closure on five extremely difficult 
and divisive cases, the Court had to resolve eighteen other cases in just 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 95 Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, 
to the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States 9 (Sept. 25, 1961), microformed on Felix 
Frankfurter Papers, at Part II, Reel 92 (Univ. Publ’ns of Am., Inc.) (on file with the Harvard 
Law School Library). 
 96 See KEDAR S. BHATIA, SCOTUSBLOG, STAT PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM 2012, at 2 
(2013), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/SCOTUSblog_stat_pack_06-
12-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/X25G-FTHP]; Kedar Bhatia, Merits Cases Remaining for October 
Term 2012, SCOTUSBLOG (June 10, 2013, 2:38 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/merits-
cases-remaining-for-October-term-2012/ [http://perma.cc/Z2MQ-GW88]. 
 97 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 98 Id. at 2411.  There was an obvious explanation for why Fisher had not been decided after 
eight months, related to the sheer difficulty of reaching closure should there be (as was then ex-
pected) many competing circulating opinions.  That the Court’s ruling in Fisher ended up being 
shorter and marked by far more consensus than anticipated is not inconsistent with this explana-
tion for the delay.  It instead strongly suggests that the Court ultimately was unable (or ran out of 
time) to garner a majority for a more specific ruling and therefore opted to achieve consensus by 
deciding less rather than more.  
 99 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1793bb-1 (2012). 
 100 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 101 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 102 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 103 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012). 
 104 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013). 
 105 See id. at 2552. 
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two weeks.  The Court’s accomplishments each June border on the 
Herculean.  But the risk of introduction of unintended error, as Justice 
Frankfurter indicated decades ago, is also high. 
Nor are the few weeks immediately prior to summer recess the only 
time such pressures exist.  The Court has internal expectations at other 
times, including in January, when the Justices are expected to have cir-
culated draft opinions from cases argued earlier in the Term.  In addi-
tion, a senior Justice responsible for assigning a majority opinion can 
fairly take into account the fact that a particular Justice is behind or 
slow in opinion production so far that Term.106  Justices who wish to 
receive more opinion assignments and more coveted cases have this 
additional incentive to demonstrate they are “moving” their assigned 
cases along. 
In addition to time pressures, the nature of the opinion can sub-
stantially reduce the opportunity for scrutiny prior to publication.  The 
Court’s docket is dominated numerically by lower profile, unanimous 
rulings.107  The Court no doubt reviews carefully the draft opinions in 
unanimous cases, too, but the incentives for review in such cases may 
be lower, so the resulting review might naturally be commensurately 
less demanding.  The other chambers are less motivated to provide as 
careful a review, and the chamber responsible for the opinion may an-
ticipate less exacting scrutiny and do the same. 
Another structural reason why the pressures for post-publication 
revision of Supreme Court opinions are great is because the odds of 
discovering an error are very high.  Most errors, like most trees falling 
in the woods, are never seen or heard.  But that is not true when the 
Supreme Court commits an error.  The number of people who read 
Supreme Court opinions carefully and the varied expertise of those 
readers are enormous.  Every word, every fact, every characterization 
of the facts, and every discussion of background legal doctrine is sub-
ject to close scrutiny.  Errors will be discovered and reported, if not 
immediately, then eventually, perhaps nearly a hundred years later.108 
Finally, one might fairly ask why the Court insists on correcting all 
errors.  As further elaborated below, the Court’s current and historic 
practices extend to correcting mistakes of all types, large and small, in-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 106 See REHNQUIST, supra note 83, at 260 (“I try to be as evenhanded as possible as far as 
numbers of cases assigned to each justice, but as the term goes on I take into consideration the 
extent to which the various justices are current in writing and circulating opinions that have pre-
viously been assigned.”). 
 107 During the past five Terms, the Court has decided — in reverse chronological order — 48%, 
49%, 44%, 48%, and 46% of its cases on the merits unanimously.  See KEDAR S. BHATIA, 
SCOTUSBLOG, STAT PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM 2013, at 5 (2014), 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/SCOTUSblog_Stat_Pack_for_OT13 
.pdf [http://perma.cc/V87Q-CNE5]. 
 108 See infra TAN 199. 
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cluding those made decades (or even a century) earlier.  Does the 
Court’s authority and stature truly require such an unrelenting drive 
to correct the record without temporal limitation?  No other lawmak-
ing institution seems similarly inclined to correct everything anytime.  
The short answer is that the Court clearly thinks that the stature and 
longevity of its opinions, and perhaps its own authority, ultimately re-
quire such an unqualified commitment to exactitude.  In this regard, 
the true significance of the Court’s practice may be what it under-
scores about the Court’s aspirations for itself. 
B.  Types of Revisions 
The types of errors that the Court corrects are many and varied.  
For analytical purposes, they can be grouped roughly into several cat-
egories, with the necessary caveat that specific revisions frequently fail 
to fall clearly within just one category.  Specific examples of all these 
changes are provided in section II.C, which further describes the 
pathways for making revisions. 
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1.  Typographical, Spelling, Grammar, and Citation Errors. — The 
Court routinely corrects errors of a strictly technical nature, such as 
typographical mistakes in spelling, duplicate words, punctuation, 
spacing, and citation form.109  In recent times, just as in the past, this 
category has extended to the misspelling of the name of a Justice.110  
And, while these kinds of errors are not the only errors that the Court 
considers “typographical and other formal errors,” they have 
traditionally been the most prevalent in sheer number.111 
Within this same general category, the Court further corrects errors 
in spelling and grammar that are unlikely to be merely typographical 
in the sense of inadvertent.  These errors are intentional in that the au-
thor intended to use the words or punctuation but was mistaken about 
their correctness.  Such errors in spelling, grammar, and usage are fre-
quently and generously referred to as “typographical,” though their or-
igins are more personal than mechanical.  No less than Justice Holmes 
misspelled “capital” as “capitol” due to his “deliberate ignorance,” as he 
confessed in an apologetic letter to the Reporter, further admitting of a 
“double blush.”112  Citation errors extend to correcting quotations of 
authority by adding words mistakenly omitted or deleting words mis-
takenly included.  The Court also has internal rules of style that it ap-
plies to promote a consistent institutional voice, including the spelling 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 109 The striking breadth of these kinds of routine proofreader’s changes, and the tremendous 
skill displayed by the Office of the Supreme Court Reporter, are best illustrated by a review of the 
official “change pages,” which detail all the changes to be made to the original before printing the 
final version.  See Letter from Christine L. Fallon, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Marianne Baylor, LexisNexis (Mar. 15, 2012) (on file with the Harvard Law 
School Library) (attaching Reporter’s official “change pages” for volume 557, part I of the United 
States Reports); Letter from Christine L. Fallon, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Marianne Baylor, LexisNexis (May 17, 2012) (on file with the Harvard Law 
School Library) (attaching Reporter’s official “change pages” for volume 557, part II of the United 
States Reports).  The author received from LexisNexis the change pages for one volume of the 
United States Reports, and then LexisNexis declined to send additional change pages after notify-
ing the author that it was the position of the Supreme Court Reporter that LexisNexis should not 
send the author further change pages.  See infra note 264. 
 110 See Errata, 483 U.S. II, II (1990) (correcting Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 
480 U.S. 136, 148 (1986) (“SEVENS, J., concurring in judgment”)); COHEN & O’CONNOR, supra 
note 20, at 72 n.54 (noting misspelling of Justice Daniel’s name as “Daniels”). 
 111 See, e.g., Letter from Henry C. Lind, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United 
States, to Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States 1 (Oct. 11, 1979), 
Brennan Papers BII:141 (describing a review of the three preceding Terms, determining that “89% 
of the 2,876 editorial corrections and changes suggested and approved for the preliminary prints 
fell within” the category of “typographical errors, misquotes, and errors in citations” as well as “all 
items that do not conform to the [Court’s] Style Manual”). 
 112 Interview by Paul R. Baier, Assoc. Professor of Law, La. State Univ. Law Ctr., with Henry 
Putzel, jr., Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, in Baton Rouge, La. 7 (Oct. 
1978) (transcript on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  (Author’s note: Putzel always 
used the lower case “j” in “jr.” as a personal expression of respect for his father.  And the United 
States Reports reflect his personal preference.  See, e.g., Note, 375 U.S. iv, iv (1964) (announcing 
the new Reporter of Decisions “Henry Putzel, jr.”).) 
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of certain words, such as “marijuana” with a “j,”113 and references to 
the Court itself as “we” rather than “the Court.”114 
2.  Word Additions, Deletions, and Substitutions. — Another cate-
gory of corrections involves the addition, deletion, and substitution of 
words and phrases.  This category is distinct from the first because 
these changes are not implemented to correct technical mistakes such 
as erroneous quotations.  These changes can be merely stylistic, or they 
can be substantive modifications triggered because the prior phrasing 
did not convey the Court’s (or the Justice’s) intended meaning. 
Sometimes the error is blatant, such as when Justice White’s opin-
ion for the Court in United States v. Fordice115 stated: “It is illogical to 
think that some percentage of black students who fail to score 15 do 
not seek admission to one of the historically white universities because 
of this automatic admission standard.”116  As pointed out by an aca-
demic in a letter to Justice White, “[t]he context suggests that the sen-
tence needs a negative, which is omitted” and should instead say, “It is 
[not] illogical to think . . . .”117  Subsequent Court publications of the 
Court’s opinion in Fordice rewrote the sentence to state “It is logical to 
think . . . .”118 
Quite often, however, these errors involve precision in word 
choice.119  For example, the Court has substituted “annexing” for “ad-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 113 See Memorandum from Henry C. Lind, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States, to the Conference (Apr. 22, 1986), in Tony Mauro, To the Bag, 12 GREEN BAG 2d 11, 
14 (2008) (“I have now received all votes but one.  There were four votes for ‘marijuana,’ one vote 
for ‘marihuana,’ and three Justices gave me their proxies, which I have cast for ‘marijuana.’  
Therefore, the spelling from now on should be with a ‘j.’  I hope that this will settle the matter.”). 
 114 See Edited Opinion, Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, No. 08-310, slip op. at 4 (U.S. 
June 15, 2009) (rev. n.d.), in Reporter of Decisions Office, Supreme Court of the United States, 
Change Pages: Volume 557, Part I 1661, 1667 (2009) (on file with the Harvard Law School Li-
brary) [hereinafter Change Pages: 557 U.S. Part I] (changing “the Court has” in two instances to 
“we have”). 
 115 505 U.S. 717 (1992). 
 116 United States v. Fordice, 60 U.S.L.W. 4769, 4774 n.9 (U.S. June 26,1992) (Nos. 90-1205, 90-
6855). 
 117 Letter from Michael H. Hoffheimer, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Miss. Law Ctr., to 
Byron R. White, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (July 7, 1992), White Papers 
BII:174/F8 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 118 Fordice, 505 U.S. at 735 n.9. 
 119 For instance, in Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding, No. 08-479 (U.S. June 25, 
2009), Justice Ginsburg revised her separate concurring opinion at the Reporter’s suggestion.  She 
added the words “on her” to avoid creating the misapprehension that the respondent might have 
hidden medicine “in her body.”  See Edited Opinion, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 
No. 08-479, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 25, 2009) (rev. n.d.) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part), in Reporter of Decisions Office, Supreme Court of the United States, Change 
Pages: Volume 557, Part II 2043, 2062 (2009) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) [here-
inafter Change Pages: 557 U.S. Part II].  To similar effect, Justice Ginsburg amended her 2009 
dissenting opinion in Ricci v. DeStefano, Nos. 07-1428, 08-328 (U.S. June 29, 2009), changing her 
wording from “[o]ne is left to wonder what cases would meet the standard and why the Court is 
so sure this case does not” to “[o]ne is left to wonder what cases would meet the standard and why 
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mitting,”120 “ensure” for “insure”121 (or “ensure” for “assure”),122 “has 
authority to watch” for “watches,”123 and “hawkers or peddlers” for 
“itinerant vendors of merchandise.”124  Not surprisingly, the Justices 
can have sharply contrasting views on the proper definition of some 
words and even their existence.  Justice Blackmun notified his col-
leagues he “would join no opinion this year which used the word pa-
rameter,”125 which he believed his colleagues and advocates were mis-
using.126  And Justice Harlan insisted on the use of the word 
“suppletive” in one opinion,127 which neither the Reporter nor future 
members of the Court considered a legitimate word at all.128 
Other times, the changes could have significant substantive import.  
For instance, in Perry v. United States,129 Chief Justice Hughes re-
vised his initial majority slip opinion to substitute the words “could 
have” for “has.”130  Without more, such a revision might appear merely 
technical in origins and import.  Not so in this instance.  Perry was 
one of four extremely significant and highly controversial cases that 
the Court decided on the same day in 1935 regarding the legality of re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
the Court is so sure cases of this genre do not.”  Edited Opinion, Ricci v. DeStefano, Nos. 07-1428, 
08-328, slip op. at 20 (U.S. June 29, 2009) (rev. n.d.) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), in Change Pages: 
557 U.S. Part II, supra, at 2239, 2311 (emphasis added). 
 120 United States v. Texas, 340 U.S. 848, 848 (1950) (amending United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 
707 (1950)). 
 121 Compare Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 673 (2007) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“ensure”), with Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
Nos. 06-340, 06-549, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 25, 2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“insure”). 
 122 See Edited Opinion, Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, Nos. 07-984, 
07-990, slip op. at 3 (U.S. June 22, 2009) (rev. n.d.) (Breyer, J., concurring), in Change Pages: 557 
U.S. Part I, supra note 114, at 1935, 1969; Edited Opinion, Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 
No. 08-310, slip op. at 9 (U.S. June 15, 2009) (rev. n.d.) (opinion of Breyer, J.), in Change Pages: 
557 U.S. Part I, supra note 114, at 1661, 1672. 
 123 Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 786, 786 (1942) (amending earlier version of 
Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942), to substitute “is subject to” for “comes 
under,” “has authority to watch” for “watches,” and “subject” for “subjected”; and striking the 
word “continuous”). 
 124 Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 607, 607 (1934) (amending earlier version of Healy v. Ratta, 292 
U.S. 263 (1934)). 
 125 Letter from Harry A. Blackmun, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to 
Henry Putzel, jr., Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States (Nov. 17, 1975), 
Blackmun Papers B1425/F11. 
 126 Id.; cf. Letter from Harry A. Blackmun, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, 
to Henry Putzel, jr., Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States (Mar. 29, 1976), 
Blackmun Papers B1425/F12 (discussing misuse of “parameter” by Assistant Solicitor General in 
oral argument). 
 127 Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 540 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 128 See Letter from Henry Putzel, jr., Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United 
States, to Byron R. White, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (Dec. 8, 1976), 
White Papers BI:366/F9. 
 129 294 U.S. 330 (1935). 
 130 Compare Perry v. United States, 2 U.S.L.W. 550, 552 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1935) (No. 532) (“has 
received”), with Perry, 294 U.S. at 357 (“could have received”). 
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strictions that Congress had placed on the ownership of gold.131  The 
Chief’s ex post facto revision affected “an integral part of the opin-
ion”132 wherein the Court justified its ruling against the plaintiff on the 
ground that although Congress lacked constitutional authority to ab-
rogate “gold clauses” in its own obligations, such as legal tender, the 
plaintiff had failed to establish that the congressional action had 
caused the plaintiff an actual monetary loss.133  In what was a limited 
victory for the government,134 the Court’s reasoning that the plaintiff 
had suffered “no damage”  was described as “confusing” even “at the 
hundredth” reading.135 
The Court’s original slip opinion had described the “question of 
value” for assessing damages as “requir[ing] a consideration of the pur-
chasing power of the dollars which the plaintiff has received,”136 while 
the subsequently published bound volume opinion shifted the inquiry 
to “requir[ing] a consideration of the purchasing power of the dollars 
which the plaintiff could have received.”137  The difference in phrasing 
does not reflect a simple typographical error, and the correction is 
plainly substantive in nature.  To make just such a substantive change 
is undoubtedly why the Chief amended the wording, albeit without 
formal notice. 
Finally, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc.,138 decided in 1976, Chief Justice Burger delet-
ed ten lines that appeared in the original slip opinion version of his 
concurring opinion, but which are not included in his concurring opin-
ion as published in the United States Reports.139  Virginia State Board 
of Pharmacy was the Court’s seminal case holding that commercial 
speech is entitled to First Amendment protection,140 and on that 
ground the Court struck down a state law that had made unlawful a 
pharmacy’s advertisement of prescription drug prices.141  What the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 131 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Gold Clause in United States Bonds, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1057 
n.2 (1935). 
 132 Id. at 1078. 
 133 Id. at 1077–78. 
 134 2 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY 677–78 (2d ed. 
2002). 
 135 Hart, supra note 131, at 1057; see id. at 1077–81. 
 136 Perry v. United States, 2 U.S.L.W. 550, 552 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1935) (No. 532) (emphasis added). 
 137 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 357 (1935) (emphasis added). 
 138 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 139 Compare Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 44 U.S.L.W. 
4686, 4693 (U.S. May 25, 1976) (No. 74-895) (Burger, C.J., concurring), with Virginia State Board 
of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773–74 (Burger, C.J., concurring).  This example was brought to my at-
tention by Professor Stephen Wasby. 
 140 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term — Foreword: Leaving Things Unde-
cided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 82 (1996). 
 141 See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 759–62. 
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Chief Justice apparently considered a “formal error” warranting dele-
tion was his extensive slip opinion discussion of the nature of the 
“tasks a professional pharmacist performs” in dispensing “dosage units 
already prepared by the manufacturer and sold to the pharmacy in 
that form.”142  According to the Chief’s concurring slip opinion, “it is 
clear that in this regard he no more renders a true professional service 
than does a clerk who sells lawbooks.”143  The Chief decided to elimi-
nate much of this discussion from the final bound version, perhaps be-
cause some in the pharmaceutical industry took umbrage at his char-
acterization of the profession.  If so, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy 
offers an example of a very different kind of “error”: words that some 
members of the public found insulting. 
3.  Erroneous Characterizations of Facts, the Record, the 
Positions of the Parties, the Positions of the Other Justices, 
Background Law, and the Court’s Opinion. — Supreme Court opinions 
are replete with statements of fact.  Those facts may be rooted in the 
record of the case, including assertions of the parties, or outside the 
record, including both commonly known facts subject to judicial notice 
and facts based on a Justice’s own research.  The Justices commit 
errors of all varieties in such factual assertions.  Examples include 
misstating who was President of the United States in 1799,144 
mischaracterizing the legal arguments of the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue,145 erroneously labeling a prior “indictment” as a 
“conviction[],”146 miscalculating the number of copyrighted works that 
had entered the public domain,147 describing someone as a “librarian” 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 142 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 44 U.S.L.W. at 4693. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Compare Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, No. 02-722, slip op. at 16 (U.S. June 23, 2003) 
(“Making executive agreements to settle claims of American nationals against foreign govern-
ments is a particularly longstanding practice, the first example being as early as 1799, when the 
Washington administration settled demands against the Dutch Government . . . .”), with Am. Ins. 
Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) (“Making executive agreements to settle claims of 
American nationals against foreign governments is a particularly longstanding practice, the first 
example being as early as 1799, when the Adams administration settled demands against the 
Dutch government . . . .”). 
 145 Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 602, 602–03 (1942) (amending earlier version of Helvering v. 
Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942)). 
 146 Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, No. 07-290, slip op. at 49 (U.S. June 26, 2008) 
(“convictions”), with District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 621 (2008) (“indictment”). 
 147 Compare Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618, slip op. at 21 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2003) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (“[O]nly one year’s worth of creative work — that copyrighted in 1923 — has fallen into 
the public domain during the last 80 years.”), with Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 241 (2003) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[W]ith the exception of works which required renewal and which were 
not renewed, no copyrighted work created in the past 80 years has entered the public domain or 
will do so until 2019.”). 
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rather than a “professor,”148 and misidentifying a legislator who made 
a particular comment.149 
The Justices have also misquoted other opinions in the same case, 
presumably because they were working off outdated drafts.  For in-
stance, in Missouri ex rel. Missouri Insurance Co. v. Gehner,150 decid-
ed in 1930, then–Associate Justice Stone and Justices Holmes and 
Brandeis omitted language because “a statement in the majority opin-
ion as originally circulated . . . was afterward taken out by the writer 
of the opinion.”151  Recent examples include Boumediene v. Bush152 
and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.153  Such errors can also reveal instances 
when individual Justices have changed their opinions and votes during 
the internal deliberations.  Working off an old draft, a slip opinion 
may mistakenly refer to another opinion as a majority, plurality, con-
curring, or dissenting opinion when, because of a vote change, it no 
longer has that same, precise status.154 
Closely related are misstatements about background law and about 
the Court’s opinion.  Here, too, there is no question that the change is 
substantive in nature and may have substantive import.  Quite often, 
the misstatement in question may be “mere dictum,” but even non-
dicta misstatements can be revised without a corresponding formal 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 148 Compare Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 05-1074, slip op. at 6 (U.S. May 29, 
2007) (“librarian”), with Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 626 (2007) (“pro-
fessor”). 
 149 Compare Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195, slip op. at 49 (U.S. June 12, 2008) (attributing 
quotation to Senator Graham), with Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 778 (2008) (attributing 
same quotation to Senator Kyl).  
 150 281 U.S. 313 (1930). 
 151 Letter from Harlan F. Stone, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to Ernest 
Knaebel, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States (May 6, 1930), Stone Papers 
B82.  
 152 553 U.S. 723.  Compare Boumediene, No. 06-1195, slip op. at 24, 25 (Roberts, C.J., dissent-
ing), with Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 823, 824 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (revising two different quo-
tations from majority opinion).  
 153 548 U.S. 557 (2006).  In Hamdan, the majority opinion was revised to change “jurisdiction-
stripping” to “jurisdiction-ousting,” and “jurisdiction-conferring” to “jurisdiction-creating,” in ap-
parent response to Justice Scalia’s change in his dissent, which the majority apparently did not 
spot until after the original opinion was issued.  Compare Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-184, slip 
op. at 17 (U.S. June 29, 2006), with Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 582. 
 154 My colleague, Professor Larry Tribe, identified for me just such a discrepancy in Justice 
Blackmun’s separate opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833  (1992).  The slip opinion version of Justice Blackmun’s opinion takes issue with “the 
plurality’s views of homosexuality as sexual deviance,” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 60 
U.S.L.W. 4795, 4825 n.11 (U.S. June 29, 1992) (No. 91-744) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (emphasis added), while the final 
bound volume of the United States Reports refers instead to “The Chief Justice’s views of homo-
sexuality as sexual deviance,” Casey, 505 U.S. at 941 n.11 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, con-
curring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).  The difference is con-
sistent with assumptions that vote changes in Casey changed the outcome in that case.  See Linda 
Greenhouse, Documents Reveal the Evolution of a Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at A1. 
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modification of the Court’s judgment or holding.  Examples include 
mischaracterization of the operation of federal and state statutes,155 
and of the Court’s own prior precedent.156 
The most substantive and potentially significant category of revi-
sions pertains more directly to the reasoning, ruling, and formal judg-
ment of the Court.  These kinds of changes are the least frequent but 
do not appear to be especially unusual.  The Court has not categorical-
ly shied away from adding and deleting words, phrases, and sentences 
of substantial import to correct erroneous characterizations of what the 
Justices intended to convey. 
For instance, in Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 
40,157 then–Associate Justice Stone subsequently added the critical 
word “not” to the first sentence of the final paragraph of the Court’s 
opinion, which summarized the Court’s holding: “It suffices to say that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 155 In Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942), the Supreme Court modified 
its description of the legal effect of the Clayton Act.  See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 
315 U.S. 788, 788 (1942) (amending earlier version of Morton Salt, 314 U.S. 488).  Compare Mor-
ton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 10 U.S.L.W. 4126, 4127 (U.S. Jan. 5, 1942) (No. 49), with Mor-
ton Salt, 314 U.S. at 490 (deleting statement that the Clayton Act “imposes criminal penalties for 
engaging in specified unlawful trade practices tending to monopoly and restraint of trade”).  In 
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357 (1942), the Supreme Court eliminated footnotes and 
significant text to delete an apparent mischaracterization of the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937.  
See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 788, 788 (1942) (amending earlier version of 
Cudahy Packing, 315 U.S. 357).  Compare Cudahy Packing Co. of La. v. Holland, 10 U.S.L.W. 
4252, 4253 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1942) (No. 245), with Cudahy Packing, 315 U.S. at 364–65.  In Hysler v. 
Florida, 315 U.S. 411 (1942), the Court struck five sentences that apparently mischaracterized the 
Florida Supreme Court’s responsibilities under Florida state law.  See Hysler v. Florida, 316 U.S. 
642, 642 (1942) (amending previous version of Hysler, 315 U.S. 411).  Compare Hysler v. Florida, 
10 U.S.L.W. 4236, 4238 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1942) (No. 64), with Hysler, 315 U.S. at 422.  In Texas & 
Pacific Railway Co. v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245 (1934), the Supreme Court deleted several sentences 
that had described the nature of government oversight of national banks and what activity consti-
tuted a federal crime.  See Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 649, 649 (1934) (amending 
previous version of Texas & Pacific Railway, 291 U.S. 245); see also Texas & Pacific Railway, 291 
U.S. at 259 n.15. 
 156 For instance, in Lapides v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613 
(2002), the Court revised its slip opinion to correct an error in its characterization of a case, Ford 
Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945), that it was overruling.  The question 
presented in both Lapides and Ford was whether a state that litigated a case in the lower courts 
on the merits, without raising an Eleventh Amendment defense, could invoke that defense in the 
Court.  Lapides, 535 U.S. at 616, 621–23; see also Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of 
Ga., No. 01-298, slip op. at 1, 7–8 (U.S. May 13, 2002).  Overruling Ford, the Court concluded 
that the state had waived its defense in those circumstances and could not invoke it later.  
Lapides, 535 U.S. at 623–24; Lapides, No. 01-298, slip op. at 8–10.  However, in doing so the 
Court mistakenly stated that the state in Ford had litigated and “lost” in the lower courts, a mis-
take the Court corrected by the time of publication of the preliminary print.  Compare Lapides, 
No. 01-298, slip op. at 7 (“Georgia adds that . . . in Ford a State regained immunity . . . even after 
the State litigated and lost a case brought against it in federal court.”), with Lapides v. Bd. of Re-
gents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 622 (2002) (preliminary print) (“Georgia adds that . . . 
in Ford a State regained immunity . . . even after the State litigated a case brought against it in 
federal court”).  This example was brought to my attention by Karen Cordry. 
 157 300 U.S. 515 (1937). 
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the Norris-LaGuardia Act can affect the present decree only so far as 
its provisions are found not to conflict with those of § 2, Ninth, of the 
Railway Labor Act . . . .”158  Likewise of clear substantive import, in 
Connick v. Myers,159 Justice White eliminated a sentence from a Court 
opinion he had authored that had asserted that because a particular 
inquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law, not fact, the 
Court is “not bound to the views of the District Court unless clearly 
erroneous.”160  Five years later, to similar substantive effect, Justice 
White changed his opinion for the Court in Monessen Southwestern 
Railway Co. v. Morgan161 to eliminate entirely the unambiguous 
statement of law in the originally published slip opinion that “there is 
no right to a jury trial in [Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation Act] actions.”162 
In Hamm v. City of Rock Hill,163 decided in 1964, the Court made 
and subsequently corrected a seemingly trivial mistake that in fact had 
substantive implications for the Court’s reasoning.164  Hamm was a 
major civil rights case involving the validity of the state trespass con-
victions of several civil rights protestors who, after being denied ser-
vice at store lunch counters, remained seated and refused to leave.165  
One of the legal issues raised in Hamm was whether the federal saving 
statute,166 originally enacted in 1871,167 which presumptively pre-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 158 Id. at 563 (emphasis added); see Letter from Harlan F. Stone, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court 
of the United States, to Ernest Knaebel, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United 
States (Oct. 14, 1937), Stone Papers B82 (requesting the addition). 
 159 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 160 Connick v. Myers, 51 U.S.L.W. 4436, 4438 n.7 (U.S. Apr. 20, 1983) (No. 81-1251); see Letter 
from Henry C. Lind, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, to Byron R. 
White, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (Mar. 13, 1984), White Papers 
BI:622/F5; Letter from Byron R. White, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to 
Henry C. Lind, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States (Mar. 13, 1984), White 
Papers BI:622/F5.  Compare Connick, 51 U.S.L.W. at 4438 n.7, with Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7. 
 161 486 U.S. 330 (1988). 
 162 Monessen Sw. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 56 U.S.L.W. 4494, 4497 (U.S. June 6, 1988) (No. 86-1743); 
see Letter from Byron R. White, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to Frank D. 
Wagner, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States (July 1, 1988), White Papers 
BII:83/F10.  Compare Monessen Southwestern Railway, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4497 (“Of course, because 
there is no right to a jury trial in LHWCA actions, the ‘trier of fact’ in Pfeifer was a judge rather 
than a jury.”), with Monessen Southwestern Railway, 486 U.S. at 341 (“Of course, because Pfeifer 
was tried to the bench, the ‘trier of fact’ in that case was a judge rather than a jury.”). 
 163 379 U.S. 306 (1964). 
 164 This example was brought to my attention by John MacKenzie, who served as the Supreme 
Court reporter for the Washington Post at the time of the Court’s ruling and who published a case 
comment on Hamm, including the Court’s error.  See MacKenzie, supra note 19.  The Court’s de-
cision to change the opinion in the United States Reports occurred after completion of the case 
comment and just before publication and is accordingly noted only in an “Editor’s Note” at the 
close of the comment.  Id. at 182. 
 165 See Hamm, 379 U.S. at 307–08. 
 166 Act of July 30, 1947, Pub. L. No. 278, § 109, 61 Stat. 633, 635 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 109 
(2012)). 
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served prosecutions under laws amended after the commencement of 
prosecution,168 limited the reach of the Civil Rights Act of 1964169 to 
invalidate the trespass convictions.170  The Court held that the federal 
saving statute did not limit the application of the Civil Rights Act be-
cause the 1871 law “was meant to obviate mere technical abatement 
such as that illustrated by application of the rule in [United States v. 
Tynen] decided in 1870.”171  The Court’s reasoning rested on its as-
sumption that Tynen172 was decided a year before Congress passed the 
saving statute and therefore that Congress had enacted the law in re-
sponse to Tynen.173  Tynen, however, was in fact decided in 1871,174 af-
ter Congress had already passed the federal savings statute.175  The 
Court subsequently corrected its error, changing the date to 1871 in the 
United States Reports.176  But the Court did so without any acknowl-
edgment that the sentence, as corrected, no longer supported its appar-
ent thesis that Congress had acted in response to Tynen. 
Other examples include modifying opinions to clarify what the 
Court “did not rule,”177 to explain what legal issues were remanded to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 167 Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 4, 16 Stat. 431, 432. 
 168 See 1 U.S.C. § 109. 
 169 Pub. L. No. 88-351, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 
(2012)). 
 170 See Hamm, 379 U.S. at 314. 
 171 Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 33 U.S.L.W. 4079, 4081 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1964) (Nos. 2, 5) (discuss-
ing United States v. Tynen, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 88 (1870)). 
 172 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 88. 
 173 See id. 
  174 MacKenzie, supra note 19, at 174 n.15.  The Court’s mistake was apparently caused by its 
mixing up the Term that the case was decided (December Term 1870) with the year the case was 
decided (1871).  Although not the kind of mistake one would expect of a Supreme Court Justice, 
this particular mistake was a bit more understandable because the Supreme Court Reporter dur-
ing the December Term 1870, John William Wallace, did not include the date of the decision in 
any of his volumes of the United States Reports.  He provided only the year of the Term of the 
Court at the outset of the volume and as a running header throughout the volume.  See 78 U.S. 
(11 Wall.) (1871) (volume for December Term 1870); MacKenzie, supra note 19, at 174 n.15. 
 175 See MacKenzie, supra note 19, at 174–75. 
 176 See Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 314 (1964).  The Washington Post’s Supreme 
Court reporter notified the Supreme Court Reporter of the error.  The Reporter announced the 
changes would be made in the United States Reports in correspondence back to the Post reporter, 
but there was otherwise no public acknowledgment by the Court of the change.  See MacKenzie, 
supra note 19, at 182 (Editor’s Note). 
 177 Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 327 U.S. 661, 666 (1946).  In Elgin, Joliet & Eastern 
Railway Co. v. Burley, 327 U.S. 661, the Court had granted rehearing for the sole purpose of clari-
fying its prior ruling to make clear what it had not ruled.  See id. at 666–67 (“[W]e did not rule, 
and there is no basis for assuming we did, that an employee can stand by with knowledge or no-
tice of what is going on with reference to his claim. . . .  No such ruling was necessary for their 
preservation and none was intended.”); Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 326 U.S. 801, 801–02 
(1945) (order granting rehearing); Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945). 
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the court below,178 and to “vacate” rather than “reverse” a lower court 
judgment.179  Additionally, the Court has deleted assertions that 
“[t]here was evidence to support this finding”180 and that the facts of a 
prior precedent of the Court were “practically on all fours with those 
of the present case.”181  And the Court has changed a characterization 
of “gross negligence” to one of just “negligence.”182 
The Court has even retreated from a clear conclusion of law that it 
claimed “[w]e do not doubt,” which concerned the result of a conflict 
between a federal statutory provision and a rule of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.183  Sufficient doubt plainly arose, however, and the 
claim was eliminated prior to publication in the United States Re-
ports,184 forcing the concurring opinion of four Justices to change as 
well.185  The Court has also added an entirely new paragraph of rea-
soning and citations weeks after the original opinion announcement.186  
Concurring and dissenting opinions have backed off on characteriza-
tions of the legal import of other Justices’ opinions in some of the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 178 See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 651, 651 (1942) (amending earlier version of 
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942), to make clear that certain legal issues were 
available for consideration on remand); see also Edited Opinion, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T. A., 
No. 08-305, slip op. at 16 (U.S. June 22, 2009) (rev. n.d.), in Change Pages: 557 U.S. Part I, supra 
note 114, at 1902, 1920 (adding words “and the case is remanded for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion”).  
 179 INS v. Lavoie, 389 U.S. 908, 908 (1967) (amending earlier version of INS v. Lavoie, 387 U.S. 
572 (1967) (per curiam), “to provide that the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit be vacated rather than reversed”). 
 180 Libby, McNeil & Libby v. United States, 340 U.S. 916, 916 (1951) (amending earlier version 
of Libby, McNeil & Libby v. United States, 340 U.S. 71 (1950)). 
 181 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 744, 744 (1943) (amending earlier version of 
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943)). 
 182 See Edited Opinion, The Iroquois, No. 200, slip op. at 4 (U.S. May 2, 1904) (rev. n.d.) (on 
file with the National Archives, Record Group 267, Entry 22, Box 81, Folders 18752–18803) (deci-
sion filed and announced on May 2, 1904, then revised and corrected on May 4, 1904). 
 183 Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 42 U.S.L.W. 4331, 4335 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1974) 
(No. 72-1566). 
 184 Compare id. (“We do not doubt that were there an actual conflict between § 1450 and Rule 
65(b), the statute would control.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1970).  But no such conflict exists in this 
case.”), with Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 435 (1974) (sentences 
deleted). 
 185 Compare Granny Goose Foods, 42 U.S.L.W. at 4339 & n.2 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the 
judgment), with Granny Goose Foods, 415 U.S. at 447 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(eliminating footnote 2 and accompanying text that appeared in the slip opinion). 
 186 In Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 
(1890), the Court announced the opinion on May 19, 1890, and Justice Bradley made significant 
revisions several days later, as confirmed by a copy of those changes dated May 28, 1890.  Among 
those changes were insertions, including an entirely new paragraph.  See Draft Opinion at 23,  
Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, Nos. 1031, 1054 
(U.S. May 19, 1890) (drft. May 28, 1890) (on file with the National Archives, Record Group 267, 
Entry 22, Box 65, Folders 13400–13497) (revising decision filed and announced on May 19, 1890) 
(adding a paragraph explaining a detail of Spanish property law). 
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Court’s most significant cases,187 added new characterizations,188 and 
significantly amended their own substantive reasoning.189 
On none of those occasions has the Court felt compelled to grant 
rehearing or provide public notice prior to modifying its opinion.  And 
while the Court has sometimes made clear that a particular amend-
ment had been made, such as through the publication of an order, the 
Court has not done so in many of these instances.  The same is true for 
the separate opinions of individual Justices.  In recent years and in the 
past, individual Justices, like the Court, have regularly made 
nonincidental, substantive changes in their opinions under the guise of 
correcting “typographical” and “other formal errors” without any no-
tice.  
C.  Pathways for Revising Opinions 
As described above, the Court revises its opinions following their 
initial publication in three different ways, only the first two of which 
are transparent: (a) a formal “erratum sheet” published in the bound 
volumes of the United States Reports; (b) a formal order, also pub-
lished in the United States Reports, modifying its opinions; and (c) 
changes correcting “typographical and other formal errors” pursuant to 
a generic notice that sits atop all slip opinions and preliminary prints 
that appear in the bound volume of the United States Reports.  There 
is no discernible pattern or justification for when the Court has used 
one pathway rather than another.  One can find roughly similar exam-
ples in each category.  Each pathway, and its historical use, is de-
scribed below. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 187 Compare Lawrence v. Texas, No. 02-102, slip op. at 3 (U.S. June 26, 2003) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“The dissent apparently agrees that if these cases have stare decisis 
effect, Texas’ sodomy law would not pass scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”) (cit-
ing Lawrence, No. 02-102, slip op. at 17–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting)), with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (statement about dissenting opin-
ion omitted); see also infra TAN 351–366. 
 188 Compare Williams v. Georgia, 23 U.S.L.W. 4297, 4304 (U.S. June 6, 1955) (No. 412) (Clark, 
J., dissenting), with Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 396 (1955) (Clark, J., dissenting) (adding 
two sentences relating to the majority opinion: “In this case, unlike Patterson, the Court deter-
mines the state law itself” and “Furthermore, I agree with Mr. Justice Minton that the majority 
has misconstrued Georgia’s law”). 
 189 Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, No. 07-290, slip op. at 39 (U.S. June 26, 2008) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“It is similarly ‘treacherous’ to reason from the fact that colonial legisla-
tures did not enact certain kinds of legislation an unalterable constitutional limitation on the 
power of a modern legislature cannot do so.”), with District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 
718 (2008) (“It is similarly ‘treacherous’ to reason from the fact that colonial legislatures did not 
enact certain kinds of legislation to a conclusion that an unalterable constitutional limitation on 
the power of a modern legislature cannot do so.”) (text with strikethrough supplied to highlight 
omission of language previously present in Heller, No. 07-290, slip op. at 39 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing)).  For a further example, see infra TAN 322–335 (discussing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)). 
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1.  Errata Lists. — The use of errata lists has the most enduring 
tradition at the Court.  Recent volumes of the United States Reports 
contain a list of errata,190 as do some of the earliest volumes.  The first 
Reporter, Dallas, included a list of “Errata, et. Addenda” in his third 
volume, published in 1799, which was the second volume to include 
Supreme Court opinions.191  The corrections were, according to Dallas, 
based on both his own review and “the liberal communications of the 
Bar.”192  Although not every subsequent volume has included an errata 
sheet, they do appear regularly.  Other early Reporters, including 
Cranch, Wheaton, and Peters, all included them.193 
In the early years, errata sheets tended to modify text in the same 
volume.  But, presumably because the changing nature and cost of 
printing technology allowed for last-second revisions in printed vol-
umes, errata sheets increasingly corrected prior volumes.194  Errata 
sheets have been used exclusively to correct prior volumes for more 
than a century.195 
The errata sheets make all kinds of corrections, including to cita-
tions, spelling, grammar, word choice, names, and facts.196  The correc-
tions address errors from decades earlier, or more.  A recent volume of 
the United States Reports, published in 2013, corrected an error in a 
volume published in 1991.197  A volume published in 2010 corrected 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 190 See, e.g., Errata, 555 U.S. II (2014); Erratum, 554 U.S. II (2013). 
 191 See Errata, et Addenda, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) v, v (1799) (unpaginated in original). 
 192 Id. 
 193 Errata, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 735 (1829); Errata, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) (1822) (errata sheet appended, 
unpaginated, to end of volume); Errata, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) Index 76 (1819) (errata sheet append-
ed, separately paginated, to end of volume); Errata, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) iv (1817); Errata, 11 U.S. 
(7 Cranch) iv (1816); Errata, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) vii (1812); Errata, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) viii (1812). 
 194 The earliest errata sheet I found that corrected a prior volume was in 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 
iv (listing errata from 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) (1816), as they “escaped notice until it was too late to 
correct them in the table of errata of that volume”), and the latest one I found correcting the same 
volume that the errata sheet itself appears in was in 1886, see Errata, 118 U.S. iv (1886). 
 195 See, e.g., Erratum, 551 U.S. II (2011); Errata, 528 U.S. II (2001); Errata, 500 U.S. II (1995); 
Errata, 440 U.S. II (1981); Corrections, 146 U.S. iv (1893). 
 196 See, e.g., Erratum, 551 U.S. at II; Erratum, 550 U.S. II (2010); Errata, 549 U.S. II (2010); 
Errata, 528 U.S. at II; Errata, 500 U.S. at II; 440 U.S. at II.  In 1980, Justice White acknowledged 
that a correspondent “has me cold” in suggesting Justice White had erroneously used the word 
“union” instead of “employer” in his opinion for the Court in NLRB v. Local Union No 103 (Iron 
Workers), 434 U.S. 335 (1978), and agreed that an erratum notice should be published in 437 U.S., 
Letter from Byron R. White, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to Henry C. 
Lind, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States (Feb. 28, 1980), White Papers 
BI:463/F9.  See Letter from Robert Scolnick, Attorney, to Michael Rodak, Jr., Clerk, Supreme 
Court of the United States (Feb. 22, 1980), White Papers BI:463/F9; Letter from Henry C. Lind, 
Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, to Byron R. White, Assoc. Justice, 
Supreme Court of the United States (Feb. 27, 1980), White Papers BI:463/F9; Letter from Henry 
C. Lind, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, to Byron R. White, Assoc. 
Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (Feb. 28, 1980), White Papers BI:463/F9; see also 
Iron Workers, 434 U.S. at 346. 
 197 See Erratum, 554 U.S. II (2013) (correcting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 226 (1988)). 
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an error in a 1933 opinion, changing “enabling” to “employing,”198 and 
a 1980 volume corrected an error in an 1888 opinion,199 further under-
scoring the Court’s commitment to error correction no matter how dis-
tant in time. 
The errata sheets have acknowledged the mistaken omission of the 
fact that Justices dissented200 and of an entire separate opinion of a 
Justice.201  The Court has even used the errata sheet to delete part of 
its rationale.  In Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indi-
ans,202 decided in 1998, the Court explained that it declined to consider 
a particular legal issue concerning the scope of the Indian 
Nonintercourse Act203 because “the parcels at issue here are not alien-
able — and therefore not taxable — under the terms of the Indian 
Nonintercourse Act.”204  In a subsequent volume of the United States 
Reports, the Court described that reason as erratum and added that 
“this issue is outside the question presented in the petition for certiora-
ri.”205 
2.  Formal, Published Orders Amending a Prior Opinion. — The 
second and equally transparent way that the Court revises a previously 
released opinion is by issuing a formal, published order amending the 
opinion, which includes the precise language to be added and deleted.  
The Court has sometimes done so in response to formal motions by 
parties.  For instance, the Court sometimes grants a petition for 
rehearing and decides to modify its opinion in light of that 
rehearing.206  The Court rarely grants rehearing, though it has done so 
because of a “single clause in the prior opinion.”207  The Court has 
even more frequently modified an original opinion while denying 
rehearing.  For example, in Kennedy v. Louisiana,208 which addressed 
the constitutionality of the death penalty applied to crimes against 
individuals in which no person was killed, the Court formally denied a 
petition for rehearing arguing that the Court had relied on erroneous 
statements in the Solicitor General’s brief about the availability of the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 198 Errata, 549 U.S. at II (correcting Conrad, Rubin & Lesser v. Pender, 289 U.S. 472, 478 
(1933)). 
 199 Errata, 436 U.S. II (1980) (correcting Freedman’s Sav. & Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U.S. 
494, 494 (1888)). 
 200 Memorandum by the Reporter, 48 U.S. (7 How.) vi (1849) (acknowledging erroneous omis-
sions in preceding volume of dissents in four cases). 
 201 See Errata, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) viii (1812). 
 202 524 U.S. 103 (1998).  
 203 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012).  
 204 Cass County, 524 U.S. at 115 n.5. 
 205 533 U.S. II, II (2002) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 206 See, e.g., Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 327 U.S. 661, 666–67 (1946); see also id. at 668 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 207 Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 167 (1960). 
 208 554 U.S. 407 (2008), reh’g denied, 554 U.S. 945 (2008). 
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death penalty under federal statutory law.209  While denying that 
petition, the Court simultaneously modified its prior opinion to make 
clear the Solicitor General’s mistake had not affected its reasoning or 
ruling.210 
Such a denial of review on rehearing, coupled with a modification 
of the Court’s prior opinion, is not historically unusual, although this 
practice has been narrowly concentrated within one discrete period of 
time.  There are thirty-nine additional instances in which the Court 
simultaneously denied a petition for rehearing and published an order 
amending its opinion, often in significant ways.  The practice dates 
back to 1928,211 with the vast majority (thirty instances) occurring be-
tween 1934 and 1944.212  The Court’s reports reveal only four instanc-
es in the Court’s history in which the Court simply granted a petition 
to modify its opinion.213  And in one of those instances, it did so only 
by formally treating the rehearing petition as a petition to modify.214  
Finally, on twenty-seven additional occasions, the Court amended its 
prior opinion by published order without any reference to a pending 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 209 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 946.  
 210 See id.; Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 426 n.*. 
 211 See New Mexico v. Texas, 276 U.S. 557, 557–58 (1928) (mem.). 
 212 See City of Va. Beach v. Howell, 411 U.S. 922, 922 (1973); Parks v. Simpson Timber Co., 
389 U.S. 909, 909 (1967); Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 351 U.S. 944, 944 (1956) (per curiam); 
Union Trust Co. v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 350 U.S. 962, 962 (1956); SEC v. Drexel & Co., 349 U.S. 910, 
910 (1955); Libby, McNeill & Libby v. United States, 340 U.S. 916, 916 (1951); United States v. 
Texas, 340 U.S. 848, 848 (1950); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 338 U.S. 808, 808 
(1949); Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 754, 754–55 (1944); L.T. Barringer & Co. v. United States, 
319 U.S. 729, 729–30 (1943); Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 602, 602–03 (1942); Seminole Nation v. 
United States, 316 U.S. 651, 651 (1942); Swift & Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 649, 649 (1942); 
Hysler v. Florida, 316 U.S. 642, 642 (1942); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 786, 786 
(1942); Toucey v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 585, 585 (1941); Detrola Radio & Television Corp. v. 
Hazeltine Corp., 314 U.S. 576, 576 (1941); Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 668, 668 (1941); Equitable 
Life Ins. Co. v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 312 U.S. 668, 668 (1941); Mo.-Kan. Pipe Line Co. v. United 
States, 312 U.S. 665, 665 (1941); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 655, 655 (1941); Schriber-
Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 312 U.S. 654, 654 (1941); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 
309 U.S. 642, 642 (1940); Morgan v. Comm’r, 309 U.S. 626, 626 (1940); Boteler v. Ingels, 308 U.S. 
521, 521 (1939); Bonet v. Yabucoa Sugar Co., 307 U.S. 613, 613–14 (1939); Elec. Storage Battery 
Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 613, 613 (1939); Eichholz v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 306 U.S. 622, 622 
(1939); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 618, 618 (1939); Schriber-
Schroth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 573–74 (1938); S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell 
Bros., 303 U.S. 625, 625 (1938); United Gas Pub. Serv. Co. v. Texas, 303 U.S. 625, 625 (1938); 
Groman v. Comm’r, 302 U.S. 654, 654 (1937); Stone v. White, 302 U.S. 639, 639–40 (1937); Ickes v. 
Parks, 300 U.S. 640, 640 (1937); Schwartz v. Irving Trust Co., 300 U.S. 636, 636 (1937); Helvering 
v. Ill. Life Ins. Co., 299 U.S. 516, 516 (1936); Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 
U.S. 522, 522 (1934); New Mexico, 276 U.S. at 557–58. 
 213 See Washington v. United States, 444 U.S. 816, 816–17 (1979); Mahan v. Howell, 411 U.S. 
922, 922 (1973); Swenson v. Stidham, 410 U.S. 904, 904 (1973); Elec. Storage Battery Co. v. Shi-
madzu, 307 U.S. 616, 616–17 (1939). 
 214 See Mahan, 411 U.S. at 922. 
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petition or motion.215  All but three of those orders were issued be-
tween 1934 and 1943.216  It is not clear whether the amendment in 
those instances was prompted by correspondence from outside the 
Court identifying a problem or resulted from the Court’s internal re-
view process. 
In all of these instances, both the fact of an opinion amendment 
and the substance of those changes were published by the Court.  Ac-
cordingly, one need not compare the final published opinion in the 
United States Reports to prior slip opinions or preliminary prints to 
determine what changes were made.217 
The types of modifications that the Court has made in amending 
prior opinions pursuant to published orders are varied in kind and 
significance.  They can, however, be roughly grouped into the same 
categories described in section II.B, above.  They run the full gamut 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 215 See Emich Motors Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 945, 945 (1951); Ala. Great S. R.R. 
Co. v. United States, 340 U.S. 926, 926 (1951); Frazier v. United States, 336 U.S. 912, 912 (1949); 
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 744, 744 (1943); Fisher v. Whiton, 317 U.S. 602, 
602 (1942); Miller v. United States, 317 U.S. 601, 601–02 (1942); Seminole Nation v. United States, 
316 U.S. 647, 647 (1942); United States v. New York, 316 U.S. 643, 643 (1942); Cudahy Packing 
Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 788, 788 (1942); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 315 U.S. 788, 788 
(1942); Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 550, 550 (1941); United States v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & 
Pac. R.R. Co., 313 U.S. 543, 543 (1941); Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 
668, 668 (1941); Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm’r. of the Wage & Hour Div. of the Dep’t of Labor, 
312 U.S. 657, 657 (1941); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 657, 657 (1941); Phila. Co. v. Dipple, 
312 U.S. 656, 656 (1941); Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Appeals, 307 U.S. 616, 616 
(1939); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 307 U.S. 609, 609 (1939); Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 
618, 618 (1939); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Texas, 304 U.S. 551, 551–52 (1938); Gen. Talking Pictures 
Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 546, 546–47 (1938); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 
304 U.S. 542, 542 (1938); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 672, 672–73 (1937); Legg v. St. John, 297 
U.S. 695, 695 (1936); Rowley v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 293 U.S. 532, 532–33 (1934); Healy v. Ratta, 
292 U.S. 607, 607 (1934); Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 649, 649 (1934). 
 216 See supra note 215. 
 217 On six occasions between 1945 and 1948, the Court inexplicably departed from this other-
wise routine practice by publishing orders that a prior opinion was being amended without any 
indication of the nature of those amendments.  See Woods v. Hills, 334 U.S. 856, 856 (1948) 
(amending earlier version of Woods v. Hills, 334 U.S. 210 (1948)); Schwabacher v. United States, 
334 U.S. 814, 814 (1948) (amending earlier version of Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182 
(1948)); Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 332 U.S. 752, 752 (1947) (amending earlier ver-
sion of Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 (1947)); United States v. Nat’l Lead 
Co., 332 U.S. 751, 751 (1947) (amending earlier version of United States v. Nat’l Lead Co., 332 
U.S. 319 (1947)); United States v. Beuttas, 325 U.S. 836, 836 (1945) (amending earlier version of 
United States v. Beuttas, 324 U.S. 768 (1945)); Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 825, 825 (1945) (amending 
earlier version of Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100 (1945)).  The reason, if any, for the Court’s distinct 
treatment in these few instances is hard to discern because of lack of explicit explanation from the 
Court.  But, a rough review of one instance, Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182, suggests 
that the changes were extremely minor and technical in nature, including substituting “was” to 
“were,” and “.” to “,” and the addition of an “&” to a citation of authority.  Compare Schwabacher 
v. United States, 16 U.S.L.W. 4378, 4380, 4381, 4382 (U.S. May 3, 1948) (No. 258), with 
Schwabacher, 334 U.S. at 182, 192, 194, 199.  None of these appears to be the kind of change that 
could plausibly require formal notice. 
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from the most insignificant and highly technical to the exceedingly sig-
nificant and substantively important.  Many orders include corrections 
of technical citations and words,218 word choice substitutions or dele-
tions,219 and revisions of factual statements or descriptions of back-
ground law.220  Closely related are corrections of how the Court char-
acterizes the record, including the positions of the parties.221 
Substantive changes include plainly significant matters such as 
whether the judgment below was affirmed, reversed, or vacated.222  
They also include clarification of the issues the Court had and had not 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 218 See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 340 U.S. 848, 848 (1950) (amending earlier version of Unit-
ed States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950)) (correcting a quotation and several citations). 
 219 See, e.g., id. (amending earlier version of Texas, 339 U.S. 707) (substituting “annexing” for 
“admitting”); Swift & Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 649, 649 (1942) (amending earlier version of 
Swift & Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 216 (1942)) (substituting “establish or become interested in” 
for “use”); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 786, 786 (1942) (amending earlier version 
of Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942)) (substituting “is subject to” for “comes 
under,” “has authority to watch” for “watches,” and “subject” for “subjected,” and striking the 
word “continuous”); Detrola Radio & Television Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 314 U.S. 576, 576 (1941) 
(amending earlier version of Detrola Radio & Television Corp., 313 U.S. 259 (1941)) (substituting 
the number “8” for “9”); Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 312 U.S. 668, 668 (1941) 
(amending earlier version of Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 312 U.S. 410 (1941)) 
(deleting the word “unsuccessful”); Healy, 292 U.S. at 607 (amending earlier version of Healy v. 
Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 (1934)) (substituting “hawkers or peddlers” for “itinerant vendors of merchan-
dise”). 
 220 See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 411 U.S. 922, 922 (1973) (amending earlier version of Mahan v. 
Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973)) (correcting a factual error); Morton Salt, 315 U.S. at 788 (amending 
earlier version of Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942)) (rewording the de-
scription of the legal effect of the Clayton Act); Cudahy Packing, 315 U.S. at 788 (amending earli-
er version of Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357 (1942)) (eliminating footnotes and sig-
nificant text to delete apparent mischaracterization of the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937); Hysler v. 
Florida, 316 U.S. 642, 642 (1942) (amending earlier version of Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411 
(1942)) (striking five sentences that apparently mischaracterized the Florida Supreme Court’s re-
sponsibilities under Florida state law); Lone Star Gas, 304 U.S. at 551–52 (amending earlier ver-
sion of Lone Star Gas v. Texas, 304 U.S. 224 (1938)) (substituting “intrastate” for “interstate” in 
describing nature of property with particular claimed value); Texas & Pacific Railway, 291 U.S. 
at 649 (amending earlier version of Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pottorff, 304 U.S. 224, 245 (1934)) (de-
leting several sentences that had described the nature of government oversight of national banks 
and what activity constitutes a federal crime). 
 221 See, e.g., Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 602, 602–03 (1942) (amending earlier version of 
Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942)) (rewording Court’s characterizations of arguments made 
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue); New York, 316 U.S. at 643 (amending earlier version 
of United States v. New York, 315 U.S. 510 (1942)) (substituting “the total of such claims” for “the 
sum of the assets available” in describing New York’s theory). 
 222 See, e.g., INS v. Lavoie, 389 U.S. 908, 908 (1967) (amending earlier version of INS v. Lavoie, 
387 U.S. 572 (1967) (per curiam), “to provide that the judgment of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit be vacated rather than reversed”); Elec. Storage Battery Co. v. Shi-
madzu, 307 U.S. 616, 616–17 (1939) (amending earlier version of Elec. Storage Battery Co. v. 
Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5 (1939)) (modifying opinion and judgment); Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. State 
Bd. of Tax Appeals, 307 U.S. 616, 616 (1939) (amending earlier version of Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. 
State Bd. of Tax Appeals, 307 U.S. 313 (1939)) (striking “The judgments in both cases are af-
firmed.”). 
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ruled upon, and what legal issues therefore were still available for con-
sideration on remand.223  The most substantive changes significantly 
alter the Court’s reasoning in support of its judgment.  The Court has 
done so by deleting language224 and by adding language, including 
words and phrases of precedential significance.225 
Cases in which the Court subsequently modified its decision, with-
out granting rehearing, extend to some of its most significant rulings.  
For instance, the Court amended its opinion in FCC v. Sanders Broth-
ers Radio Station,226 which has been fairly characterized as “the most 
famous of standing cases.”227  In revising Sanders, the Court added a 
key word and deleted an entire sentence in the portion of its ruling 
that defined the power of Congress to confer standing.  The excerpt 
below highlights the added word and the deleted sentence: 
Congress had some purpose in enacting § 402(b)(2).  It may have been of 
the opinion that one likely to be financially injured by the issue of a li-
cense would be the only person having a sufficient interest to bring to the 
attention of the appellate court errors of law in the action of the Commis-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 223 See, e.g., SEC v. Drexel & Co., 349 U.S. 910, 910 (1955) (amending earlier version of SEC v. 
Drexel & Co., 348 U.S. 341 (1955)) (adding a lengthy footnote to clarify that “[w]e do not preju-
dice” a particular argument available to a party in further proceedings); Seminole Nation v. Unit-
ed States, 316 U.S. 651, 651 (1942) (amending earlier version of Seminole Nation v. United States, 
316 U.S. 286 (1942)) (clarifying that certain legal issues were available for consideration on re-
mand). 
 224 See, e.g., Libby, McNeill & Libby v. United States, 340 U.S. 916, 916 (1951) (amending earli-
er version of Libby, McNeill & Libby v. United States, 340 U.S. 71 (1950)) (striking the words 
“There was evidence to support this finding”); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 744, 
744 (1943) (amending earlier version of Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943)) 
(deleting assertion that another precedent’s “facts are practically on all fours with those of the pre-
sent case”); Miller v. United States, 317 U.S. 601, 601–02 (1942) (amending earlier version of Mil-
ler v. United States, 317 U.S. 192 (1942)) (deleting more than nine lines of text in three places and 
adding further statement of the Court’s holding). 
 225 See, e.g., Frazier v. United States, 336 U.S. 912, 912 (1949) (amending earlier version of Fra-
zier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497 (1948)) (adding language); Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 754, 
754–55 (1944) (amending earlier version of Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253 (1944)) (adding lan-
guage explaining why a particular legal issue was not before the Court); L.T. Barringer & Co. v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 729, 729–30 (1943) (amending earlier version of L.T. Barringer & Co. v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 1 (1943)) (adding language to formally dispose of “appellant’s attack on 
the sufficiency of the evidence”); Mo.-Kan. Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 665, 665 
(1941) (amending earlier version of Mo.-Kan. Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502 (1942)) 
(adding new paragraph to respond to “[a] final contention in support of the order”); Fashion Orig-
inators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 668, 668 (1941) (amending earlier version of Fashion 
Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941)) (adding two sentences of support for 
the Court’s ruling); Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 312 U.S. 654, 654 (1941) (amend-
ing earlier version of Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211 (1940)) (adding 
language in support of Court’s reasoning). 
 226 309 U.S. 470 (1940), amended by 309 U.S. 642 (1940). 
 227 Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 255, 
257 (1961); see also Kenneth Culp Davis, Standing to Challenge Governmental Action, 39 MINN. 
L. REV. 353, 363 (1955) (describing Sanders as “the most prominent Supreme Court case recogniz-
ing standing in absence of violation of a ‘legal right’ of the plaintiff”). 
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sion in granting the license.  In this view, while the injury to such person 
would not be the subject of redress, that person might be the instrument, 
upon an appeal, of redressing an injury to the public service which would 
otherwise remain without remedy.  It is within the power of Congress to 
confer such standing to prosecute an appeal.228 
The substantive import of the changes is considerable.  The lan-
guage narrows the identified purpose of Congress to aid those “finan-
cially” injured rather than those injured in any sense at a time when a 
ripening issue, addressed years later, was whether noneconomic inju-
ries could support standing.229  And by deleting that single sentence, 
the Court significantly undercut Congress’s potentially sweeping au-
thority to eliminate the requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate a per-
sonal injury subject to redress to possess Article III standing.  The 
omitted language provided that, even without such personal injury, a 
plaintiff could serve as “the instrument . . . of redressing an injury to 
the public service which would otherwise remain without remedy.”230  
And because of the immediately following sentence, especially its ref-
erence to “such standing,” the Court would have made clear that “[i]t is 
within the power of Congress to confer such standing to prosecute an 
appeal.”231  Such a broad notion of congressional authority to confer 
standing is far different than the Court’s current standing jurispru-
dence, which describes the redressability of the plaintiff’s personal in-
jury as one of the “three elements” that constitutes the “irreducible 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 228 Compare FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 8 U.S.L.W. 542, 544 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1940) (No. 
499), with Sanders, 309 U.S. at 477.  Text with strikethrough is supplied to highlight omission of 
language previously present in Sanders, 8 U.S.L.W. at 544, while bolded text is supplied to high-
light additions made in Sanders, 309 U.S. at 477. 
 229 See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) (“That in-
terest, at times, may reflect ‘aesthetic, conservational, and recreational’ as well as economic val-
ues. . . . We mention these noneconomic values to emphasize that standing may stem from them 
as well . . . .”) (citations omitted) (quoting Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power 
Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (1965)). 
 230 Sanders, 8 U.S.L.W. at 544 (emphasis added). 
 231 Id.  Notwithstanding the Court’s deletion of this substantively significant language, both 
commentators and the Court itself have nonetheless sometimes characterized the Court’s holding 
in Sanders in ways that would have more force had the language not been deleted.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 193 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The Court has 
confirmed the power of Congress to open the federal courts to representatives of the public inter-
est through specific statutory grants of standing.” (citing Sanders, 309 U.S. 470)); Scripps-Howard 
Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942) (“[T]hese private litigants have standing only as repre-
sentatives of the public interest.” (citing Sanders, 309 U.S. at 477)); Elizabeth Magill, Standing for 
the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131, 1139 (2009) (“As these challengers [to administra-
tive action] had no cognizable rights of their own, they had standing — and the courts were ex-
plicit about this — to raise the rights of the public.  The case in which this approach was born 
[was] FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station . . . .”); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of 
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1731 (1975) (“Sanders construes statutory 
review provisions as affording standing to plaintiffs who have no legally protected interest so that 
they may act as surrogates for those who do.” (footnote omitted)). 
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constitutional minimum of standing” that Congress lacks authority to 
displace,232 although the legislature can “loosen” that “stricture[].”233 
What is even more remarkable than the large number of orders 
modifying the Court’s opinions in both very small and very large ways 
during the 1930s and the 1940s is that there are hardly any such orders 
beforehand or afterward.  The possibility that the Court was particu-
larly sloppy in its production of initial opinions during this timeframe 
seems clearly wrong.  The need to correct errors is a constant.  The 
anomaly is far more likely to reflect a shift in procedure for how the 
Court corrected errors.  In other words, during the 1930s and 1940s, 
the Supreme Court Reporter chose to embrace the most transparent 
approach.  But before that period and ever since, the Court has made 
changes, only in a far less transparent fashion.234 
3. “Printer Proofs” and “Change Pages.” — The third and final 
way that the Court has revised its opinions subsequent to their initial 
announcement and publication is the least transparent.  It is 
accomplished through what are sometimes referred to euphemistically 
as “printer proofs” or “change pages.”  This process of revising the 
Court’s opinion prior to final publication in the United States Reports 
has become the most common method for making changes in recent 
decades and has included extensive changes of all types. 
(a)  The Meaning of “Printer Proofs” and “Change Pages.” — The 
terms “printer proofs” and “change pages” are interchangeable.  They 
both refer to the marked up pages that result from editing and review 
within the Court following the initial opinion announcement (bench 
and slip opinions) and again after the publication of the preliminary 
print.  They are literally the pages that the Court sends to the publish-
er of the United States Reports to indicate what changes to make for 
the “final” and “official” version.235 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 232 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 233 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009). 
 234 In commenting on an earlier draft of this Article, Professor Bill Popkin has raised the intri-
guing possibility that the Court’s short-lived practice might somehow relate to the Court’s con-
demnation during that same time period of the executive branch for failing to have a regularized 
system, accessible to the public, of publishing executive orders, which led to the creation of the 
Federal Register.  See United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 320 (1953) (Jack-
son, J., concurring) (describing Court’s actions and oral argument in Panama Refining Co. v. 
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)). 
 235 See Email from Frank D. Wagner, Former Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to author (June 22, 2012, 8:51 AM) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) 
(“The Reporter’s Office compiles all changes suggested (whether by chambers, Reporter’s Office 
staff, or the public) on copies of slip opinion pages for the preliminary print and copies of prelimi-
nary print pages for the bound volume and sends these change pages to the authoring Justice for 
approval.  Chambers either accepts or exes out the suggestions and returns the change pages to 
the Reporter, who sends them to the Court’s Publications Unit to input the approved suggestions.  
Copies of the change pages are then sent to any print or online republisher of opinions (who is 
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Unlike the errata sheets or the orders amending opinions, these 
pages are not released to the public.236  The absence of any contempo-
raneous public record makes these changes hidden as a practical mat-
ter.  Without the change pages, the only way to discover changes is a 
tedious process of comparing prior versions of the opinion to the final 
version. 
As illustrated by specific examples below, the types of changes that 
the Court makes in this fashion are not categorically different from 
changes made through other pathways.  Every kind of example — 
large and small, technical and substantive — that is evidenced in one 
category can be found in the others.  Corrections made through change 
pages can also be prompted by errors discovered by the Court itself or 
by problems identified by outside commentators, which the Court sub-
sequently decides warrant amendment of a previously released opin-
ion.237 
(b)  The Origin of Printer Proofs and Change Pages. — As de-
scribed above, although the Court has long revised opinions following 
their initial oral announcement, the prospect of differing written opin-
ions in the same case did not arise until the Court began releasing ear-
lier written versions.  The historic record is not entirely clear regarding 
the precise timing, but by the mid-nineteenth century, the Court ap-
pears to have been releasing copies of its written opinions prior to pub-
lication of the United States Reports, at least when there was sufficient 
public and media demand for advance release.238  Before then, the on-
ly published version was the final version in the United States Re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
willing and able to pay the annual $600 copying fee) to allow the republisher to update its version 
of the opinions.”). 
 236 A former Supreme Court Reporter suggested that the change pages might be available fol-
lowing publication of the bound volumes but that no one had previously requested them.  See id. 
(“The original change pages that were returned by chambers are kept in the Reporter’s Office for 
several years, then sent to the National Archives for permanent storage.  The change pages are 
not separately available to the public prior to their implementation in the preliminary print or 
bound volume.”); Email from Frank D. Wagner, Former Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of 
the United States, to author (June 29, 2012, 11:22 AM) (on file with the Harvard Law School Li-
brary) (“No one ever asked to see them while I was Reporter.  The pages remain in the Reporter’s 
Office for several years, then are sent to the Curator, who forwards them to the Archives on her 
own schedule.  Neither my staff nor I ever dealt with the Archives.”).  According to the Archives, 
the Court has not transmitted to the Archives any additional records of change pages since 1913 
and according to Office of the Curator at the Court, any records they might have are commingled 
with records that are not publicly available.  See infra note 262 and accompanying text. 
 237 For instance, according to the Reporter’s official “change pages” for volume 557 of the 
United States Reports, Paul Wolfson — an attorney affiliated with the law firm representing the 
respondent in Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, but not himself listed as counsel — contacted the 
Reporter to suggest that the Court’s opinion contained a grammatical error.  See Edited Opinion, 
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, No. 08-453, slip op. at 5 (U.S. June 29, 2009) (rev. n.d.), in 
Change Pages: 557 U.S. Part II, supra note 119, at 2202, 2209 (referring to Paul Wolfson corre-
spondence dated June 30, 2009).  The Court subsequently corrected the error.  Id. 
 238 See supra TAN 63–64. 
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ports.239  Differences between what was orally announced in Court 
and the subsequently published written versions were sometimes great 
but were much harder to pin down.  
The need for formal procedures for revising previously printed and 
published versions became acute in the late nineteenth century once 
private publishers began routinely publishing both the original opin-
ions and the final opinions appearing in the United States Reports.  
The need became even greater in the 1920s when, as also described 
above, Congress assigned GPO the responsibility of publishing both 
the “advance copies” of opinions in “pamphlet installments” and the 
bound United States Reports.240 
Indeed, in justifying the legislation, Chief Justice Taft’s testimony 
before Congress underscored the extent to which the Reporter’s role 
included making “corrections” to the original opinion.  The Chief 
stressed that “the number of corrections he has to make, even in a 
careful judge’s opinion, you would hardly credit.”241  In what can be 
fairly assumed to be a not-so-veiled reference to some of his colleagues 
on the bench, the Chief further acknowledged that not all judges are 
“careful,” by adding: “And when you come to the opinion of a judge 
who is not so careful, who only tries to reach a conclusion, and is 
bothered with references, the number of corrections which the reporter 
has to make are [sic] very numerous and that adds greatly to the bur-
den of his work.”242  The Reporter would himself need to “prepare and 
furnish the references.”243 
As contemplated by the legislation, GPO began to publish the ad-
vance copies in paperback volumes entitled “preliminary prints,” 
which consisted in effect of advance sheets of what would later appear 
in the United States Reports.244  At least by their formal title — pre-
liminary print — and later by express notice, the Court made clear for 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 239 This includes the Reports compiled and published in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries by private individuals. 
 240 Act of July 1, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-272, § 1, 42 Stat. 816, 816. 
 241 Testimony of Chief Justice Taft Before the House Judiciary Committee, supra note 75, at 
411; see also 62 CONG. REC. 7756 (1922) (remarks of Rep. Walsh) (“He [the Reporter] has to veri-
fy every opinion which is written by the justices of that court.”). 
 242 Testimony of Chief Justice Taft Before the House Judiciary Committee, supra note 75, at 
411. 
 243 Id.  The Chief was referring to the need for the Reporter “to go through every opinion when 
written and run down every reference in the original opinions, and correct them.”  Id.  The term 
“reference” is susceptible to a narrow interpretation, nothing more than citation format, but it is 
also susceptible to a far broader application, consistent with the Court’s use of the term “formal 
error.” 
 244 The earliest citation I located to a “preliminary print” was in 1926, only four years after 
GPO took over the printing responsibilities.  See Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of Inter-
national Law, 20 AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 815 (1926) (reproducing L. Littlejohn & Co. v. United 
States (U.S. Mar. 1, 1926)) (citing as “Official Reports of the Supreme Court, Preliminary Print, 
Vol. 270 U.S., No. 2, p. 215”). 
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the first time that the initially published versions were subject to 
change.245  Only several decades later, in January 1970, did the Court 
begin its current practice of including an express notice in both its 
“bench opinions” (which the Court releases immediately upon the opin-
ion’s announcement) and its “slip opinions” (which GPO prints and 
makes available in greater numbers a few days later)246 that the opin-
ions are subject to formal revision.247  The change in practice was ap-
parently ordered by Chief Justice Burger on his own initiative.248  
(c)  The Internal Process for Preparing the Printer Proofs and 
Change Pages. — The Reporter has long been responsible for supervis-
ing the process of reviewing and modifying the initial, published ver-
sions of the Court’s opinions prior to publication of the final, official 
versions in the United States Reports.  The Reporter, moreover, works 
closely with the Justice who authored the opinion of the Court (or a 
dissenting or concurring opinion potentially joined by others) in seek-
ing that Justice’s approval prior to sending the final version to GPO 
for printing.  The Reporter regularly sends the proofs to that Justice, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 245 The original House version of the 1922 legislation used the word “preliminary” to refer to 
versions of Court opinions to be released prior to the bound versions, and the Senate, without ex-
planation, amended the bill to replace “preliminary” with “advance.”  See 62 CONG. REC. 8226 
(1922) (Senate amendment to H.R. 11450, 67th Cong. (1922)); id. at 9531 (House agreeing to Sen-
ate amendments).   
 246 The traditional difference between the “bench opinion” and the “slip opinion,” which is still 
reflected on the Court’s website, is that the former is produced within the Court and is made 
available in limited numbers to the public and media immediately upon the opinion’s announce-
ment, while the latter is printed in far greater numbers a few days later and is distributed to the 
public, judges, and government offices.  See Information About Opinions, supra note 4.  The slip 
opinions also include the first set of “corrections.”  KENNETH JOST, THE SUPREME COURT A 
TO Z 344 (5th ed. 2012); DAVID G. SAVAGE, 2 GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 999 (5th 
ed. 2010).  With the advent of electronic release of the Court’s opinion within seconds of the opin-
ion announcement, however, any difference between the bench opinion and the slip opinion seems 
moot.  See supra note 4. 
 247 The first bench opinion to include the notice was released in Wade v. Wilson, 396 U.S. 282 
(1970).  See Wade v. Wilson, No. 55, bench op. at 1 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1970), Brennan Papers 
BI:208/F7.  A memorandum from Justice Brennan’s clerk to the Justice describes “[t]he notice at 
the top of the opinion” as “new.”  Memorandum from Judicial Clerk, Supreme Court of the United 
States, to William J. Brennan, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (undated), 
Brennan Papers BI:208/F7.  The United States Law Week’s publication of the Court’s slip opin-
ions confirms this same timing.  Compare Wade v. Wilson, 38 U.S.L.W. 4071, 4071 (U.S. Jan. 13, 
1970) (No. 55) (containing the notice, like all Supreme Court opinions published on this date), 
with Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 38 U.S.L.W. 4059, 4059 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1969) (No. 33) 
(containing no notice).  
 248 Memorandum from Judicial Clerk to William J. Brennan, supra note 247 (“The notice at 
the top of the opinion is new; apparently it was ordered by the CJ.”).  According to handwritten 
notes on another copy of a draft opinion in Wade, Justice Brennan’s law clerk for that case was 
Richard Cooper.  See Annotated Draft Opinion at 1, Wade v. Wilson, No. 55 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1970) 
(Black, J., dissenting) (drft. Dec. 23, 1969), Brennan Papers BI:208/F7 (containing a note to Justice 
Brennan followed by the initials “RMC”); see also Email from Richard M. Cooper to author (Dec. 
2, 2013, 9:33 AM) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); Email from author to Richard 
M. Cooper (Nov. 30, 2013, 4:09 PM) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
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the first time that the initially published versions were subject to 
change.245  Only several decades later, in January 1970, did the Court 
begin its current practice of including an express notice in both its 
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ion’s announcement) and its “slip opinions” (which GPO prints and 
makes available in greater numbers a few days later)246 that the opin-
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ing the process of reviewing and modifying the initial, published ver-
sions of the Court’s opinions prior to publication of the final, official 
versions in the United States Reports.  The Reporter, moreover, works 
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dissenting or concurring opinion potentially joined by others) in seek-
ing that Justice’s approval prior to sending the final version to GPO 
for printing.  The Reporter regularly sends the proofs to that Justice, 
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 245 The original House version of the 1922 legislation used the word “preliminary” to refer to 
versions of Court opinions to be released prior to the bound versions, and the Senate, without ex-
planation, amended the bill to replace “preliminary” with “advance.”  See 62 CONG. REC. 8226 
(1922) (Senate amendment to H.R. 11450, 67th Cong. (1922)); id. at 9531 (House agreeing to Sen-
ate amendments).   
 246 The traditional difference between the “bench opinion” and the “slip opinion,” which is still 
reflected on the Court’s website, is that the former is produced within the Court and is made 
available in limited numbers to the public and media immediately upon the opinion’s announce-
ment, while the latter is printed in far greater numbers a few days later and is distributed to the 
public, judges, and government offices.  See Information About Opinions, supra note 4.  The slip 
opinions also include the first set of “corrections.”  KENNETH JOST, THE SUPREME COURT A 
TO Z 344 (5th ed. 2012); DAVID G. SAVAGE, 2 GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 999 (5th 
ed. 2010).  With the advent of electronic release of the Court’s opinion within seconds of the opin-
ion announcement, however, any difference between the bench opinion and the slip opinion seems 
moot.  See supra note 4. 
 247 The first bench opinion to include the notice was released in Wade v. Wilson, 396 U.S. 282 
(1970).  See Wade v. Wilson, No. 55, bench op. at 1 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1970), Brennan Papers 
BI:208/F7.  A memorandum from Justice Brennan’s clerk to the Justice describes “[t]he notice at 
the top of the opinion” as “new.”  Memorandum from Judicial Clerk, Supreme Court of the United 
States, to William J. Brennan, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (undated), 
Brennan Papers BI:208/F7.  The United States Law Week’s publication of the Court’s slip opin-
ions confirms this same timing.  Compare Wade v. Wilson, 38 U.S.L.W. 4071, 4071 (U.S. Jan. 13, 
1970) (No. 55) (containing the notice, like all Supreme Court opinions published on this date), 
with Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 38 U.S.L.W. 4059, 4059 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1969) (No. 33) 
(containing no notice).  
 248 Memorandum from Judicial Clerk to William J. Brennan, supra note 247 (“The notice at 
the top of the opinion is new; apparently it was ordered by the CJ.”).  According to handwritten 
notes on another copy of a draft opinion in Wade, Justice Brennan’s law clerk for that case was 
Richard Cooper.  See Annotated Draft Opinion at 1, Wade v. Wilson, No. 55 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1970) 
(Black, J., dissenting) (drft. Dec. 23, 1969), Brennan Papers BI:208/F7 (containing a note to Justice 
Brennan followed by the initials “RMC”); see also Email from Richard M. Cooper to author (Dec. 
2, 2013, 9:33 AM) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); Email from author to Richard 
M. Cooper (Nov. 30, 2013, 4:09 PM) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
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and only to that Justice, for review and approval in formal, internal 
correspondence, which ultimately characterizes the opinion of the 
Court as “your opinion[].”249  The revision process, therefore, contrasts 
sharply with the procedure followed prior to a slip opinion’s initial 
publication when all chambers are part of the formal review process 
and a majority vote is achieved only after the most exacting review of 
a draft opinion’s precise wording and detail. 
The Reporter follows the same procedure of forwarding only to the 
opinion’s author correspondence from persons outside the Court who 
write the Reporter to point out an error in an initial, published version 
of the Court opinion warranting correction in the United States Re-
ports (or, if too late for that, an erratum notice for a final published 
bound volume).250  This is true even if the Justice has since retired 
from the Court.  It is to the retired Justice that the Reporter sends the 
proofs for review and approval of “your opinion,”251 and the retired 
Justice can unilaterally make further suggested changes.252 
The “ground rules”253 for making editorial changes in initial, pub-
lished opinions prior to the final United States Reports publication are 
set forth in a letter from the Reporter to a Justice “[i]n connection with 
a Justice’s first opinion for the Court.”254  According to those ground 
rules as described in 1971, “[n]o changes are made in an opinion except 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 249 E.g., Letter from Henry Putzel, jr., Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United 
States, to Byron R. White, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (Nov. 2, 1964), 
White Papers, BI:52 (“On the attached copies of your opinions for that volume, . . . we have sug-
gested certain changes of a formal nature.”); see also, e.g., Memorandum from Walter Wyatt, Re-
porter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, to William J. Brennan, Assoc. Justice, 
Supreme Court of the United States (May 22, 1959), Brennan Papers BII:141 (“Please advise 
whether you desire us to make these changes in your opinions before publishing the bound vol-
ume of 358 U.S.”); Letter from Walter Wyatt, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United 
States, to William O. Douglas, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (May 24, 1949), 
Douglas Papers B1133/F2 (“Before going to press with the bound volume of 335 U.S., this office 
has gone through the preliminary prints with a fine-toothed comb . . . . [W]e have noticed a few 
minor matters of form in some of your opinions which you may or may not want to change.”). 
 250 See, e.g., Letter from Henry C. Lind to Byron R. White, supra note 196 (referring to a letter 
describing a factual error in Justice White’s opinion for the Court in Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335 
(1978)).  
 251 See, e.g., Letter from Frank D. Wagner, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United 
States, to Harry A. Blackmun, Assoc. Justice (Retired), Supreme Court of the United States (Nov. 
14, 1997), Blackmun Papers B1426/F6 (“On the enclosed copies of your opinions for that vol-
ume, . . . we have suggested certain changes of a formal nature.”).  
 252 See, e.g., Letter from Harry A. Blackmun, Assoc. Justice (Retired), Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Frank D. Wagner, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States 
(May 6, 1996), Blackmun Papers B1426/F6 (providing changes, described as a “few generally in-
significant suggestions,” to his opinions).  
 253 Letter from Henry Putzel, jr., Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, to 
Harry A. Blackmun, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States 1 (Jan. 21, 1971), 
Blackmun Papers B1425/F11 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 254 Id.  
LAZARUS - PAGES 10/16/14 – 9:14 PM 
2015] (NON) FINALITY OF SUPREME COURT OPINIONS 45 
 
those that are specifically approved or authorized by the author or the 
Court,”255 with the exception of incomplete citations and “obviously 
misspelled words.”256  It was up to the “author of each opinion to de-
termine whether the changes suggested require clearance with the 
Court and to obtain such clearance when needed.”257  That practice 
apparently changed sometime in 1994 when Chief Justice Rehnquist 
reportedly informed the Reporter and the other Justices that any sub-
stantive changes could in the future be made only after review and 
approval by the Court.258  It is not clear, however, how that then-new 
procedure has been administered, including how strictly it has been 
applied, if at all.259 
Even more fundamentally, the term “substantive” is a notoriously 
opaque and flexible term in discrete application.  And, for that same 
reason, it is no more obvious that Justices would agree on the affixing 
of that label to specific modifications of an opinion than on other mat-
ters about which they routinely disagree.  Given, moreover, the tight 
logic and extreme precision necessary in many Court opinions to 
achieve a majority, it is not at all speculative to posit that a change of 
a single word could prove significant.  Yet, as far as can be discerned, 
even under the procedures as modified by Chief Justice Rehnquist, it is 
up to the Justice authoring the opinion to decide what is sufficiently 
“substantive” to warrant consultation with other chambers.  No other 
notice is provided. 
(d)  Source Materials for Printer Proofs and Change Pages. — 
There is no single repository containing all the printer proofs and 
“change pages.”  Instead, the examples described below were derived 
from the identification and review of several different sources: 
(i)  National Archives Records 1808–1913. — While always retain-
ing ownership and control over its records, the Court has historically 
sent some of its records to the National Archives for storage.260  One 
set of boxes in those records includes the printer proofs that the Court 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 255 Id. (emphasis added). 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. at 2. 
 258 Telephone Interview with Frank D. Wagner, Former Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court 
of the United States (Feb. 27, 2012); Email from Frank Wagner to author (Nov. 30, 2013, 5:55 
PM) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); Email from author to Frank Wagner (Nov. 
30, 2013, 2:02 PM) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
 259 In October 1979, the Reporter proposed streamlining the process to allow for the vast ma-
jority of changes, such as typographical errors, misquotes, and citation errors, to be changed by 
the Reporter without the need for a Justice’s specific approval and having “[o]nly [certain] mat-
ters, primarily changes of a substantive nature” require submission to a Justice for approval.  Let-
ter from Henry C. Lind to Warren E. Burger, supra note 111, at 1.  
 260 See Email from Robert Ellis, Archivist, Fed. Judicial Records, Nat’l Archives, to author 
(July 16, 2012) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); Email from Frank D. Wagner to 
author, supra note 236. 
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used internally between 1808 and 1913 to revise opinions subsequent 
to their initial announcement.261  Sometime after 1913, the Court 
stopped sending those records to the National Archives.262 
(ii)  Change Pages in Possession of GPO and Private Publishers. — 
The Court provides GPO and private publishers, including Westlaw 
and LexisNexis, with change pages so they can make necessary correc-
tions and publish final versions of the Court’s opinions.  According to 
the Reporter’s Office, publishers pay an annual fee of $600 for this 
service.263  In response to a request, LexisNexis provided the change 
pages for one past volume but declined to send additional volumes af-
ter apparently learning that the Reporter objected to their release.264 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 261 See Email from Robert Ellis to author, supra note 260. 
 262 See id.  The Archives records are located in “Record Group 267, Records of the United 
States Supreme Court, Entry 22, Appellate Opinions, 1808–1913, with gaps.”  Id.  The author 
made several contacts with Court officials to try to locate the documents, including speaking to 
officials at the Supreme Court Library and the Curator’s Office, but was unable to discover 
where the documents are currently located or to gain access to them. 
 263 Email from Frank D. Wagner to author, supra note 235. 
 264 LexisNexis initially indicated that it would send more volumes, extending as far back as 
Volume 542.  See Email from Meg Kribble, Harvard Law Sch. Library, to author (Sept. 18, 2012, 
5:00 PM) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (“Are you looking for a specific starting 
point?  We have corrections starting with Vol 542 US and sometimes 2nd and 3rd corrections as 
the court sends them.”) (quoting email correspondence from LexisNexis to Meg Kribble).  The 
publisher subsequently changed its position a few weeks later, suggesting the author would need 
to “contact the ROD [Reporter of Decisions] directly for additional pages,” Email from Meg 
Kribble, Harvard Law Sch. Library, to author (Oct. 15, 2012, 6:30 PM) (on file with the Harvard 
Law School Library) (appending Email from Karen Gray, LexisNexis, to Meg Kribble, Harvard 
Law Sch. Library (Oct. 11, 2012, 8:55 PM)), and no additional volumes have been forthcoming.  
Several months later, LexisNexis formally wrote this author to describe more fully the reasons for 
its change of position: “Unfortunately,” it lacked the authority to release the volumes to this au-
thor; to do so required the permission of “the Reporter of Decisions for the Supreme Court” and it 
is “her position that [the author] would need to establish [his] own subscription to receive these.”  
Email from Marianne Baylor, Dir. of Content Analysis, LexisNexis, to author (June 10, 2013, 
10:45 PM) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  LexisNexis, accordingly, recommended 
that the author “contact her [the Reporter] directly to request a reduced cost or complimentary 
subscription.”  Id.  Conversations with GPO, which also receives official change pages from the 
Court, similarly failed to yield any documents, presumably as a result of the Reporter’s position.  
Consistent with the advice received from LexisNexis, the author wrote directly to the Reporter in 
April 2013, explained the difficulty he was receiving in securing the corrections from the publish-
er, asked if the Reporter had any objection to the author’s receiving the change pages directly 
from the publishers, and, in the alternative, expressly offered to pay the Court any necessary sub-
scription fee to receive the change pages.  See Email from author to Christine L. Fallon, Reporter 
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States (Apr. 25, 2013, 1:19 PM) (on file with the Har-
vard Law School Library).  The April 2013 correspondence also attached prior correspondence 
(dated July 25, 2012) from the author to the Reporter, in which the author described his plans, 
consistent with a then-recent telephone conversation with the Reporter, and the Reporter’s 
agreement “to inquire whether the Court would have any formal objection to [the author’s] gain-
ing access directly from the publishers of the Court’s opinions of the ‘change pages’ that the 
Court routinely sends to those publishers.”  Letter from author to Christine Fallon, Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States (July 25, 2012) (on file with the Harvard Law 
School Library).  The Reporter did not respond to either the July 2012 or the April 2013 corre-
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(iii)  The Official Papers of Former Justices. — There are refer-
ences to revisions of opinions in the official papers of former members 
of the Court, including Chief Justice Stone,265 and Justices 
Blackmun,266 Brennan,267 Douglas,268 Marshall,269 and White.270  The 
Library of Congress or academic institutions maintain these collec-
tions, depending on the instructions provided by the Justice.  Discover-
ing these references, however, depends largely on happenstance be-
cause they frequently appear only in files for particular cases and not 
in any central location. 
(iv)  Electronic Scanning and Comparison of Digitized Versions of 
Supreme Court Opinions. — A final way to identify changes is to com-
pare multiple versions of opinions electronically.  The susceptibility of 
opinions to such electronic comparison varies: the earlier slip opinions 
and United States Reports were not created electronically in the first 
instance, so any electronic versions derived from those print versions 
(for example, by scanning) are necessarily of lower quality and are 
more difficult to compare.  By contrast, the more recent versions since 
the 1990s of slip opinions, preliminary prints, and final, bound reports, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
spondence.  More than a year later, in response to the May 2014 online posting of a draft of this 
Article, the Reporter wrote an email to the author stating that “[o]nce the publisher takes posses-
sion of the ‘change’ pages, they belong to the publisher, which has the right to distribute the pages 
as it sees fit,” including providing the “pages to any interested parties, including [the author].”  
Email from Christine L. Fallon to author (Aug. 16, 2014, 7:09 PM) (on file with the Harvard Law 
School Library).  The author cannot square the Reporter’s most recent statement of her position 
about the publisher’s authority to release the change pages with the contradictory, express written 
statements made to the author by the publishers about the Reporter’s position against their re-
lease of the change pages.  In May 2014, the New York Times, in an effort to confirm that the 
Court was denying access to the change pages, made its own formal request of the Court to re-
ceive the pages, and was denied.  See Adam Liptak, Final Word on U.S. Law Isn’t: Supreme 
Court Keeps Editing, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2014, at A1.  In all events, the author wrote back to 
LexisNexis in September, appended a copy of the Reporter’s recent email statement to the author, 
and inquired whether the publisher might reconsider its position in light of the Reporter’s stated 
position.  See Email from author to Marianne Baylor, Dir. of Content Analysis, LexisNexis (Sept. 
16, 2014, 8:20 AM) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  The publisher responded that 
there had “apparently” been “a misunderstanding regarding the Supreme Court’s policy” and that, 
after checking directly with the Reporter, the publisher would not be able to “furnish [the author] 
with one additional set of change pages.”  Email from Marianne Baylor, Dir. of Content Analysis, 
LexisNexis, to author (Sept. 29, 2014, 11:58 AM) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  
Further email correspondence between the author and the publisher provided that only one set 
from one volume (volume 561, part 2) was available.  Email from Marianne Baylor, Dir. of Con-
tent Analysis, LexisNexis, to author (Sept. 30, 2014, 2:33 PM) (on file with the Harvard Law 
School Library).  The new information contained in that volume is not reflected in this Article 
because its availability was too late for inclusion prior to this Article’s publication. 
 265 See supra TAN 151. 
 266 See supra TAN 88–89, 251. 
 267 See supra notes 247–249. 
 268 See supra note 249. 
 269 See infra TAN 334–335.  
 270 See supra TAN 85, 117, 128, 160–162. 
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are initially published in a similar electronic format and are available 
on the Court’s website and other websites.  They are accordingly far 
more susceptible to electronic comparison for the identification of 
changes.  But the quality of even those more recent electronic versions 
has varied over time, and the comparison software proved in actual 
operation (in contrast to hypothetical explanation) not yet sufficiently 
sophisticated to identify the changes clearly and efficiently, even for 
recent opinions.  The results were often a puzzle to decipher and time-
consuming to compare.271  For this article, comparisons were made us-
ing electronic scanning and comparison software programs for a sam-
pling of cases decided during fourteen Terms between 1933 and 
2008.272 
(e)  Types of Corrections Made. — The best way to illustrate the 
nature and degree of revisions that the Court has made through 
change pages and printer proofs is through examples in individual cas-
es.  The examples described below were, like many of those discussed 
above, identified using each of the kinds of source materials just de-
scribed.273 
(i) Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857).274 — No doubt the most extreme 
and most notorious instance of the Court amending its opinion after its 
original announcement was in Dred Scott v. Sandford.275  But both 
because of the passage of more than 150 years and because the original 
reading of that opinion was not accompanied by simultaneous publica-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 271 Following significant media attention to a posting of a draft of this Article in May 2014, see 
Liptak, supra note 264, a service appeared on Twitter promising to “make[] it easy to identify when 
changes have been made” using computer technology no doubt far more sophisticated than within 
this author’s grasp, SCOTUS Servo, https://github.com/vzvenyach/scotus-servo (last visited Oct. 26, 
2014) [http://perma.cc/PGZ9-NTQM].  Yet even that new service acknowledged a few weeks later 
unanticipated difficulties: “Gosh, everyone, I’m so sorry.  The Supreme Court’s website is flooding me 
with false alarms.  None of the last tweets were valid.”  SCOTUS Servo, TWITTER, (Aug. 21, 2014, 
10:52 AM), https://twitter.com/SCOTUS_servo/status/489188709095337984 [http://perma.cc 
/ET7X-9FEE]. 
 272 I am most grateful to Professor Peter Martin, who co-founded Cornell’s Legal Information 
Institute and is an expert on uses of digital technology in law, for his comments on an initial ver-
sion of this Article posted in May 2014.  Martin described the history of the Court’s use of digital 
technology in the production of its opinions in ways that should make it easier for future re-
searchers to undertake the kind of research I performed for this Article.  Martin also published a 
thoughtful blog essay on the topic of revising court opinions roughly contemporaneous to my post-
ing of an initial draft of this Article and, by chance, on the very day of Justice Scalia’s error in 
EME Homer.  See Peter Martin, Judges Revising Opinions After Their Release, CITING LEGAL-
LY (Apr. 29, 2014), http://citeblog.access-to-law.com/?p=157 [http://perma.cc/7TJV-P27G]. 
 273 These examples are not exhaustive of all changes made during those Terms or even in the 
individual cases.  Some other changes have been briefly cited above in the general description of 
types of revisions.  See supra section II.B, TAN 109–189.   
 274 Ironically, the name “Sandford” is itself an error. The party’s actual name was “Sanford.”  
See infra note 410. 
 275 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
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tion, even this example has largely faded from memory for all but a 
very few. 
When Chief Justice Taney announced the opinion of the Court on 
March 6, 1857, he followed the Court’s then-typical practice and orally 
read the opinion.276  Justices Wayne, Nelson, Grier, Daniel, Campbell, 
and Catron each filed his own concurring opinion.277  And the next 
day, the last day of the Term, Justice McLean filed a dissenting opin-
ion,278 and Justice Curtis filed a separate dissenting opinion.279  That 
same day, Justice Curtis unilaterally provided a copy of his dissent to 
the Clerk of the Court and to a Boston editor for publication, even be-
fore the Chief had released the majority opinion to the public.280 
When Justice Curtis subsequently learned that the Chief was mak-
ing extensive and material revisions, he sought a copy from the 
Clerk.281  The Clerk referred the request to Chief Justice Taney, who 
responded by issuing an order imposing an embargo on the release of 
any more written opinions in the case.282  He also declined Justice 
Curtis’s request for a copy of his opinion, which he explained was un-
dergoing “accustomed”283 and “usual”284 revisions before publication.  
Justice Curtis complained that he needed to learn what revisions Chief 
Justice Taney was making in order to respond with revisions in his 
dissent “before my own opinion should be published by the reporter in 
a permanent form.”285  Chief Justice Taney asserted that the problem 
was Justice Curtis’s effort to disparage the Court by prematurely re-
leasing his written dissent without first allowing the Chief’s opinion to 
undergo the normal process of revision.  According to the Chief, Jus-
tice Curtis was the one who had “rendered it impossible that the opin-
ions could come out together” and had done so to “encourage attacks 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 276 GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, 1 A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, LL. D. 211 
(Benjamin R. Curtis ed., 1879). 
 277 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 454–56 (Wayne, J., concurring); id. at 457–69 (Nelson, J., 
concurring); id. at 469 (Grier, J., concurring); id. at 469–93 (Daniel, J., concurring); id. at 493–518 
(Campbell, J., concurring); id. at 518–29 (Catron, J., concurring). 
 278 Id. at 529–64 (McLean, J., dissenting). 
 279 Id. at 564–633 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
 280 VINCENT C. HOPKINS, DRED SCOTT’S CASE 156 (1967). 
 281 Id. at 157; CURTIS, supra note 276, at 212. 
 282 HOPKINS, supra note 280, at 157. 
 283 Letter from Roger B. Taney, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to Benja-
min R. Curtis, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (Apr. 28, 1857), in CURTIS, su-
pra note 276, at 213, 214. 
 284 Letter from Roger B. Taney, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to Benja-
min R. Curtis, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (June 11, 1857), in CURTIS, 
supra note 276, at 221, 222. 
 285 Letter from Benjamin R. Curtis, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to 
Roger B. Taney, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (May 13, 1857), in CURTIS, 
supra note 276, at 217, 219. 
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upon the court and upon the judges who gave the opinion, by political 
partisans.”286 
The Chief further denied that he was materially altering his opin-
ion from what he had read aloud in open Court.  Chief Justice Taney’s 
denial was categorical and sweeping.  He maintained that Justice Cur-
tis’s accusation of material alterations in the opinion “had no founda-
tion in truth”287 and that Justice Curtis would find “nothing altered, 
nothing in addition but proofs to maintain the truth of what was an-
nounced and affirmed in the opinion delivered”288: 
[N]ot one historical fact, nor one principle of constitutional law, or com-
mon law, or chancery law, or statute law, in the printed opinion, which 
was not distinctly announced and maintained from the bench; nor is there 
any one historical fact, or principle, or point of law, which was affirmed in 
the opinion from the bench, omitted or modified, or in any degree altered, 
in the printed opinion.289 
The Chief characterized his changes as no more than the addition 
of “proofs and authorities to maintain the truth of the historical facts 
and principles of law” that, until they were “denied in the dissenting 
opinions,” he would not have “thought it necessary” to include.290  In 
his memoirs, by contrast, Justice Curtis claimed that the Chief had 
added “upwards of eighteen pages,” and that “they are in reply to my 
opinion.”291 
A close review of the “printer proofs” for Dred Scott in the Nation-
al Archives, which include Chief Justice Taney’s handwritten changes 
to two versions of a printed opinion,292 generally supports Justice Cur-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 286 Letter from Roger Taney to Benjamin Curtis, supra note 284, at 224. 
 287 Id. at 221. 
 288 Id. at 222. 
 289 Id. at 221. 
 290 Id. at 222. 
 291 Benjamin Robbins Curtis, Some Observations on the Above Correspondence (undated), in 
CURTIS, supra note 276, at 229, 229. 
 292 The National Archives Records for Dred Scott, available at Record Group 267, Entry 22, 
Box 28, Case 3230, consist of three different versions of the Chief Justice’s opinion in the case, 
which show the changes from the original opinion read on March 6th, to the final version pub-
lished in the United States Reports.  The records include two sequential typed drafts that each 
have Chief Justice Taney’s handwritten changes in the margins and on attachments.  The identity 
of Chief Justice Taney’s handwriting was confirmed by an employee in the Office of the Curator 
of the U.S. Supreme Court.  See Email from Matthew Hofstedt, Assoc. Curator, Supreme Court of 
the United States, to author (May 7, 2013, 10:50 AM) (on file with the Harvard Law School Li-
brary) (“I don’t think there is any doubt that the major edits and insertions are in his hand.”).  
The first of these two drafts includes far more changes than the second.  The third version is a 
handwritten version of the entire opinion, which reflects changes made to the first two typed 
drafts.  The Court did have a practice of having a “scrivener” write up a draft provided by the 
Justice in order to promote legibility for the printer and reduce errors.  This version is somewhat 
paradoxical, however, given that it clearly was produced after the two typed drafts.  
  The Court records are incomplete in another significant respect.  Missing from the National 
Archives is any clear record establishing that the first typed draft upon which Chief Justice Taney 
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tis’s characterization of the extent and nature of the Chief’s changes.  
Although it is uncertain what kinds of pages — typescript or printed 
— Justice Curtis was referring to in his claim of “eighteen pages,” the 
archival records certainly reveal pages and pages of substantive 
changes made in the Chief Justice’s own handwriting or by his inser-
tion of additional typewritten text.293  Justice Curtis also seems correct 
that some significant substantive changes discuss issues raised in his 
dissent, although Chief Justice Taney’s changes also go far beyond that 
dissent. 
Chief Justice Taney’s changes begin with ordinary spelling correc-
tions (for example, correcting “arisen”)294 and word modifications (for 
example, changing “prove” to “disprove”)295 routinely seen in “printer 
proofs.”  The Chief Justice’s amendments also include numerous addi-
tions and deletions of single words, phrases, sentences, and paragraphs 
that shifted the opinion’s substantive emphasis.  For example, in his 
first set of recorded revisions, Chief Justice Taney extended his original 
contention that African Americans were not intended to be part of the 
political community created by the Constitution to assert the further 
claim that they were “not intended to be embraced in [it].”296  And the 
Chief deleted an entire paragraph that had embellished his argument 
that African Americans should not receive the protection of the Privi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
made his extensive handwritten changes was the original opinion he read in Court.  It is possible 
that Chief Justice Taney read an earlier version.  I have not discovered a different original opinion 
in any records of the Court, the Archives, or any of the Justices, but the records may have been 
destroyed in a fire in 1898.  See WALTER EHRLICH, THEY HAVE NO RIGHTS 229 n.8 (1979) 
(“The original opinions were all filed with the clerk but were destroyed in a file room fire in No-
vember 1898.”).  Indeed, there was a fire in November 1898 in the part of the Capitol then used 
by the Court.  See GLENN BROWN, GLENN BROWN’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
CAPITOL 494–95 (William B. Bushong ed., 2d ed. 2008).  Further corroboration is provided by 
the National Archives’ copy of the Dred Scott judgment, which evidences fire damage.  See Dred 
Scott v. Sandford, No. 7 (U.S. Mar. 6, 1857), available at Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857), OUR 
DOCUMENTS, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=29 (last visited Oct. 26, 
2014); see also Judgment in the U.S. Supreme Court Case Dred Scott v. John F.A. Sanford, March 
6, 1857, PRESERVATION AT THE NAT’L ARCHIVES (Mar. 6 2012, 1:44 PM), 
http://preservearchives.tumblr.com/post/18854832815/the-dred-scott-document-has-water-and-
soot-damage [http://perma.cc/JSP4-4G2Z]. 
 293 The first typed version in the Archives records consists of thirty-eight pages, and the final 
version in the United States Reports is approximately fifty-five pages long.  Compare Edited 
Draft Opinion at 1–38, Dred Scott v. Sandford, No. 7 (U.S. Mar. 6, 1857) (1st rev. n.d.) (on file 
with the National Archives, Record Group 267, Entry 22, Box 28, Case 3230) [hereinafter First 
Printer Proofs, Dred Scott v. Sandford], with Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 399–
454 (1857).  Two other commentators have analyzed the changes: Austin Allen more closely and 
Don Fehrenbacher more briefly.  See AUSTIN ALLEN, ORIGINS OF THE DRED SCOTT CASE 
(2006); DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE 320–21 (1978). 
 294 Edited Draft Opinion at 1, Dred Scott v. Sandford, No. 7 (U.S. Mar. 6, 1857) (2d rev. n.d.) 
(on file with the National Archives, Record Group 267, Entry 22, Box 28, Case 3230) [hereinafter 
Second Printer Proofs, Dred Scott v. Sandford]. 
 295 Id. at 3. 
 296 First Printer Proofs, Dred Scott v. Sandford, supra note 293, at 6. 
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leges and Immunities Clause on the ground that the Framers could not 
have possibly intended such a result.297 
But Chief Justice Taney’s changes were of a different order of 
magnitude still, not remotely as narrow and modest as he suggested in 
his contemporaneous correspondence to Justice Curtis.  In the final re-
ported version, Chief Justice Taney added two pages to the opinion’s 
justification for reaching the question of whether Scott was still a slave 
even after concluding that the Court lacked jurisdiction regardless of 
whether he was still a slave.298  Chief Justice Taney added more than 
four pages of discussion to contest dissenting Justice McLean’s reliance 
on a prior Court ruling regarding the constitutionality of the Missouri 
Compromise.299  And he added more than a page to contend that Scott 
had acted improperly, as a procedural matter, by not appealing his 
original loss in the Missouri State Supreme Court to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  According to Chief Justice Taney’s opinion, as revised, Scott 
knew that following the correct procedures would have made plain the 
Court’s lack of jurisdiction to second-guess the Missouri court’s ruling 
on whether Scott was a slave under Missouri law.300 
In light of the strikingly hostile tones evident in the correspondence 
between Chief Justice Taney and Justice Curtis, the exchange’s most 
important legacy may be the institutional necessity of settled under-
standings regarding the timing, revising, and final publication of opin-
ions of individual Justices and of the Court.  The contrast between 
then and now certainly gives credit to the Court’s current procedures 
and reportedly amiable relations between the Justices, notwithstanding 
the inevitable friction created in producing the final opinions each 
year.  Despite Justice Curtis’s denial,301 it would be easy to speculate 
that the tense relations that developed between Chief Justice Taney 
and Justice Curtis over the timing of opinions in Dred Scott played 
some role in Justice Curtis’s decision to resign from the Court soon 
thereafter. 
(ii) Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters (1974). 
— At issue in Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Team-
sters302 was the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1450, a federal statute provid-
ing that when a lawsuit is removed from state court to federal court, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 297 See id. at 21. 
 298 Compare First Printer Proofs, Dred Scott v. Sandford, supra note 293, at A1–A4, with Dred 
Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 428–30. 
 299 Compare First Printer Proofs, Dred Scott v. Sandford, supra note 293, at B1–B12, with 
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 442–46. 
 300 Compare First Printer Proofs, Dred Scott v. Sandford, supra note 293, at C1–C4, with Dred 
Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 453–54. 
 301 See CURTIS, supra note 276, at 243 (“The correspondence with the Chief Justice . . . had no 
influence upon the determination to which he finally came.”). 
 302 415 U.S. 423 (1974). 
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any injunction or order issued by the state court prior to removal 
“shall remain in full force and effect until dissolved or modified by the 
district court.”303  The district court had held the respondent labor un-
ion in contempt for violating the state court’s temporary restraining 
order.304  That order would have lapsed as a matter of state law, but 
the district court argued that § 1450 provided that only the federal 
court could lift it.305  The court of appeals disagreed,306 and the Su-
preme Court affirmed in an opinion by Justice Marshall.307  Justice 
Rehnquist filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, which 
three other Justices joined.308 
The majority held that Congress did not intend that § 1450 give 
state court injunctions greater duration than they otherwise would 
have had: “The ‘full force and effect’ provided state court orders after 
removal of the case to federal court was not intended to be more than 
the force and effect the orders would have had in state court.”309  The 
Court further held that once the case was removed, “federal rather 
than state law governs,”310 and the state’s order had lapsed under the 
applicable time limitation for temporary restraining orders established 
by Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.311 
The Court’s original slip opinion, published in the United States 
Law Week, included substantive language that was omitted in the 
United States Reports.  The slip opinion purported to reach the issue 
concerning what the result would be if § 1450 and Rule 65(b) were in 
conflict.  The Court was unequivocal: “We do not doubt that were 
there an actual conflict between § 1450 and Rule 65(b), the statute 
would control.”312  Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion sought to 
exploit the majority’s statement.  Justice Rehnquist stressed in the text 
of his opinion the majority’s concession that the statute would be con-
trolling.313  And the concurring opinion went on to include a lengthy 
footnote that used the majority’s concession as the primary basis for 
distinguishing a Court precedent upon which the majority had heavily 
relied.314 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 303 28 U.S.C. § 1450 (2012); see Granny Goose Foods, 415 U.S. at 425. 
 304 See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, No. C-70-1057, 1970 WL 720, at *1–3 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 1970). 
 305 Id. at *1–2. 
 306 Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 472 F.2d 764, 765 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 307 See Granny Goose Foods, 415 U.S. at 425. 
 308 See id. at 445 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 309 Id. at 436 (majority opinion) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1450 (1970)). 
 310 Id. at 437. 
 311 Id. at 437–40. 
 312 Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 42 U.S.L.W. 4331, 4335 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1974) 
(No. 72-1566). 
 313 Id. at 4339 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 314 See id. n.2 (citing Ex Parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713 (1885)). 
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In the final version published in the United States Reports, howev-
er, the majority’s strong statement about what it “[did] not doubt,” is 
gone.315  Some “doubt,” apparently, subsequently arose.  The majori-
ty’s deletion of a significant assertion, moreover, necessarily under-
mined Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence.  The final version of his con-
currence correspondingly eliminated both the textual discussion and 
the accompanying footnote.316 
Nor was this deletion substantively inconsequential.  Legal scholars 
have long debated the validity of the so-called “suppression clause” of 
the Federal Rules Enabling Act,317 which purports to provide the Su-
preme Court with the authority to “prescribe general rules of practice 
and procedure”318 for federal courts that render without legal “force or 
effect”319 inconsistent statutory provisions.320  The Court’s own opin-
ions oscillate between showing support for that provision and indicat-
ing that the Court could not promulgate rules in conflict with a stat-
ute.321  Had the Court retained the original language, it might have 
(even if unintentionally) resolved a conflict in its own precedent. 
(iii) Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n (1981). 
— In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n,322 the 
Court rejected a series of challenges to the constitutionality of the fed-
eral Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977.323  The 
challenges included allegations of violations of the Fifth Amendment 
Due Process and Just Compensation Clauses, the Tenth Amendment, 
and the Commerce Clause.324  Several Justices wrote separately,325 but 
none dissented.  Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment only.326  
The thrust of Justice Rehnquist’s opinion was that “there are constitu-
tional limits on the power of Congress to regulate pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause.”327  Justice Rehnquist stressed that the regulated 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 315 Compare id. at 4335 (majority opinion), with Granny Goose Foods, 415 U.S. at 435.  Also 
missing, more incidentally, was the majority’s claim that the temporary restraining order expired 
“by its [own] terms.”  Compare Granny Goose Foods, 42 U.S.L.W. at 4337, with Granny Goose 
Foods, 415 U.S. at 440. 
 316 Compare Granny Goose Foods, 42 U.S.L.W. at 4339 & n.2 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the 
judgment), with Granny Goose Foods, 415 U.S. at 447 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 317 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
 318 Id. § 2072(a). 
 319 Id. § 2072(b). 
 320 See Leslie M. Kelleher, Separation of Powers and Delegations of Authority to Cancel Stat-
utes in the Line Item Veto Act and the Rules Enabling Act, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 395, 398 
(2000). 
 321 Id. at 439 & nn.307–308. 
 322 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
 323 Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.). 
 324 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 273. 
 325 See id. at 305 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. (Powell, J., concurring). 
 326 See id. at 307 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 327 Id. at 309. 
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activity must have a “substantial effect”328 on interstate commerce and 
that congressional findings of such an effect are subject to judicial re-
view and must be supported by a “rational basis.”329 
Of course, the full import of then-Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence 
in Hodel was not realized until 1995, when Chief Justice Rehnquist 
authored the majority opinion in United States v. Lopez.330  In Lopez, 
his earlier concurring opinion effectively became the constitutional 
rule.  The Court applied the “substantial effects” and “rational basis” 
test to strike down, for the first time in decades, a federal statute for 
exceeding Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.331  Lopez remains 
one of the Rehnquist Court’s most significant and well-known rulings. 
What is not widely known is that Justice Rehnquist changed the 
wording of his opinion in Hodel after releasing the slip opinion, and 
the change became relevant to the Court’s ruling in Lopez.  In his orig-
inal slip opinion in Hodel, the future Chief Justice provided that 
“Congress must show that its regulatory activity has a substantial ef-
fect on interstate commerce.”332  In the final United States Reports, 
however, Justice Rehnquist’s proposed test became “Congress must 
show that the activity it seeks to regulate has a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce,”333 language consistent with that used in his later 
opinion for the Court in Lopez. 
The modification makes substantive sense.  As first drafted, the 
inartful use of “its” suggests that the activity that must have the sub-
stantial effect on commerce is Congress’s own.  As reworded, it is 
clearly the activity that Congress regulates that must have that sub-
stantial effect.  The official papers of Justice Marshall, moreover, in-
clude a document in which Justice Rehnquist formally seeks permis-
sion to make the change to his original slip opinion.  Justice Rehnquist 
was clearly amused that he was seeking to make a change to his con-
curring opinion in a case in which Justice Marshall wrote the majority 
opinion when, just a few years earlier in Granny Goose Foods, Justice 
Marshall had amended his slip opinion for the Court in a way that had 
compelled Justice Rehnquist to change his concurring opinion.  In a 
“Memorandum to the Conference,” Justice Rehnquist wrote to his col-
leagues: 
At the suggestion of a law professor who shall remain unnamed, I would 
like to change the penultimate sentence in my opinion concurring in the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 328 Id. at 310. 
 329 Id. at 311 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 330 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 331 See id. at 567–68. 
 332 Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 49 U.S.L.W. 4654, 4666 (U.S. June 15, 
1981) (Nos. 79-1538, 79-1596) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 333 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 313 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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Court’s judgment last Term to read: “Congress must show that the activity 
it seeks to regulate has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”334 
In a special plea directed to Justice Marshall, Justice Rehnquist wrote: 
Thurgood, I hope you will indulge me in allowing me to make this change; 
if you don’t, I will write for my memoirs the infamous account of your de-
letion of an entire paragraph in the “Granny Goose” opinion in one of the 
earlier Terms of the 70’s after the case had come down, after I had written 
a dissent directed largely at that paragraph.  Seriously, please let me know 
if you have any objection to my advising the Reporter of Decisions to go 
ahead with this change.335 
Justice Rehnquist’s memorandum may relate to a then-existing 
procedure, which assigned the author of the majority opinion some re-
sponsibility for overseeing proposed revisions in any of the opinions 
filed in the case.  If so, Justice Marshall apparently had no objection 
because Justice Rehnquist’s proposed change was made. 
(iv) International Paper Co. v. Ouellette (1987). — At issue in In-
ternational Paper Co. v. Ouellette336 was the extent to which, if any, 
the federal Clean Water Act337 preempted the application of a state’s 
common law of nuisance.338  The lawsuit had been brought by parties 
injured in a downstream state (affected state) by discharges of pollu-
tants originating in an upstream state (source state).339  The Court held 
that the affected state’s common law of nuisance was entirely 
preempted, that the source state’s nuisance law was not preempted, 
and that the Clean Water Act superseded otherwise applicable conflict 
of law rules, thus requiring that courts apply the source state’s nui-
sance doctrines in all lawsuits.340 
Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion.341  In describing the op-
eration of the Clean Water Act, his original slip opinion supported his 
view that the Act preempted application of the affected state’s nui-
sance law to interstate water pollution by stressing the extensive reme-
dies provided under the federal statute.342  That description included 
the statement that “[t]he CWA also provides its own remedies, includ-
ing civil and criminal fines for permit violations, and ‘citizen suits’ 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 334 Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United 
States, to the Conference (Sept. 3, 1981), Marshall Papers B273 (concerning Hodel v. Va. Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, No. 79-1538, slip op. (U.S. June 15, 1981)).  
 335 Id. 
 336 479 U.S. 481 (1987). 
 337 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012); see also 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1376 (1982). 
 338 Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 483. 
 339 Id. at 483–84. 
 340 Id. at 497–99, 499 n.20. 
 341 See id. at 483.  
 342 See Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, No. 85-1233, slip op. at 10 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1987) (attached 
with proposed edits to Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to the Conference (Mar. 5, 1987), Blackmun Papers B470). 
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that allow individuals (including those from affected States) to compel 
the EPA to enforce a permit.”343 
The majority opinion published in the United States Reports 
amends that sentence in significant respects.  As modified, the final 
version reads: “The CWA also provides its own remedies, including 
civil and criminal fines for permit violations, and ‘citizen suits’ that 
allow individuals (including those from affected States) to sue for in-
junctions to enforce the statute.”344  The Court’s opinion no longer 
provides that citizen plaintiffs can sue to “compel the EPA” to take an 
action, and it no longer provides that citizen plaintiffs can enforce the 
“permit” rather than just the “statute.” 
Here again, the official papers of one of the former Justices reveal 
the reasons for the substantive changes.  According to a memorandum 
to the conference prepared by Justice Powell, the Solicitor General 
wrote to the Reporter to suggest the change in the opinion.345  The gist 
of the correction was that the Court had addressed an issue that was 
not yet settled in the lower courts: “The Solicitor General is correct 
that it has not yet been decided whether the Clean Water Act author-
izes a ‘citizens’ suit’ to compel the EPA to enforce a permit.”346  The 
“formal error” that justified the revision of the opinion, therefore, was 
the presence of dictum in the Court’s opinion that unwittingly resolved 
a circuit split.  Justice Powell recommended that, “[a]bsent objec-
tion,”347 the changes be made, and they were made.348 
This example, known only because of historical happenstance,349 
may be particularly telling.  It cannot be gainsaid that the changes 
were intended to be substantively significant.  If not for their potential 
significance, the Solicitor General would not have asked the Court to 
make the revision, and the Court would not have agreed to the re-
quest.  If the Court widely applied the concept that uninformed dic-
tum constitutes a “formal error” within the meaning of the notice that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 343 Id.  
 344 Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 492 (emphasis added); see also Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell to 
the Conference, supra note 342. 
 345 Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell to the Conference, supra note 342. 
 346 Id.   
 347 Id. 
 348 See Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 492. 
 349 While serving as Assistant to the Solicitor General, I represented the United States in this 
litigation.  I authored the amicus brief on the merits filed, at the Court’s invitation, on behalf of 
the United States and EPA.  See Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 475 U.S. 1081, 1081 (1986); Brief for 
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (No. 85-1233) 
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  After EPA expressed concern about the substan-
tive import of certain language in the Court’s slip opinion, I drafted a letter on behalf of the Solic-
itor General to the Court identifying the language of concern and recommending a modification 
the Court ultimately adopted.  Because the records were, as required, left at the Department of 
Justice, I have no record of the letter drafted beside my own recollection. 
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an opinion is subject to revision, then opinions could undergo substan-
tial substantive revision without notice following the publication of 
slip opinions. 
The Ouellette example is also procedurally important because it 
highlights a problem, at least in appearance, with the potentially ex 
parte character of the procedures by which “readers” contact the Re-
porter to notify the Reporter of an error in a Court slip or preliminary 
opinion.  Under that established procedure, only the Reporter receives 
notice that the Court may be considering a possible “correction” to the 
opinion.  None of the parties receive such notice, even when, as in 
Ouellette, the reader notifying the Reporter is itself counsel for one of 
the parties, including amicus, appearing before the Court in the case.  
Wholly apart from any possible question of whether parties are always 
entitled to such notice under broad notions of due process — which 
seems highly remote — the absence of any notice to other parties from 
the Court when the “reader” is itself a party is at least troubling 
enough to suggest the need for rethinking.350 
(v) Lawrence v. Texas (2003). — The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Lawrence v. Texas351 is one of the most significant rulings in recent 
decades.  The Court dramatically overturned its prior decision in 
Bowers v. Hardwick352 and struck down on federal constitutional 
grounds a state statute that made it a crime for two persons of the 
same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct.353  According to 
the Court, the state law violated the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment by interfering with the liberty interests of homo-
sexual persons to engage in “the most private human conduct . . . and 
in the most private of places, the home.”354  Justice Kennedy wrote the 
opinion of the Court for a five-Justice majority.355  Justice O’Connor 
authored a separate opinion, concurring in the judgment.356  Justice 
Scalia filed a dissenting opinion that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice Thomas joined,357 and Justice Thomas filed his own dissenting 
opinion.358 
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence was significant because she de-
clined to agree that Bowers should be overturned and instead argued 
that the state sodomy law was unconstitutional on equal protection 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 350 See infra TAN 418. 
 351 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 352 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 353 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 354 Id. at 567. 
 355 Id. at 561. 
 356 Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 357 Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 358 Id. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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grounds.359  Justice O’Connor’s concurrence reviewed the Court’s 
equal protection precedent and described how the Court had “appl[ied] 
rational basis review . . . where, as here, the challenged legislation in-
hibits personal relationships.”360  Justice O’Connor then included the 
following claim about Justice Scalia’s dissent: “The dissent apparently 
agrees that if these cases have stare decisis effect, Texas’ sodomy law 
would not pass scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, regardless 
of the type of rational basis review that we apply.”361 
Justice O’Connor’s point about the dissent was sufficiently telling 
that judges and commentators singled it out.  In dissenting from a de-
nial of rehearing en banc a year later, a federal appellate judge agreed 
with Justice O’Connor’s characterization of Justice Scalia’s dissent, 
noting that “[a]n examination of these cases bears out Justice 
O’Connor’s point.”362  Recent editions of constitutional law casebooks 
excerpt this language from Justice O’Connor’s concurrence.363  And 
anyone who “Googles” the case will quickly find the same language, 
including in a highly regarded website administered by a leading law 
school.364  When, moreover, websites list the various opinions in a sin-
gle case separately, the Justice O’Connor concurrence does not include 
the notice from the first page of the majority opinion that slip opinions 
are preliminary and subject to revision.365 
The problem is that the “final,” “official” version of Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion no longer includes this sentence.  It has been de-
leted in its entirety.366  Without “Papers of the Justices” like those that 
exist for substantially older cases decided by Justices no longer on the 
Court, one can do little more than speculate about the reasons for the 
subsequent deletion.  Perhaps Justice Scalia complained, and Justice 
O’Connor agreed to make the change as a matter of accommodation.  
Or perhaps Justice O’Connor’s characterization of the import of the 
dissent was based on language contained in an earlier version of that 
dissent that was changed prior to the opinion announcement, but es-
caped the attention of Justice O’Connor’s chambers when she first 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 359 Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 360 Id. at 580. 
 361 Lawrence v. Texas, No. 02-102, slip op. at 3 (U.S. June 26, 2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (citing id. at 17–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 362 Lofton v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1292 (11th Cir. 
2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 363 See, e.g., JEROME A. BARRON ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 640 (8th ed. 2012); 2 
DONALD P. KOMMERS ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 363 (3d ed. 2010). 
 364 See Lawrence, No. 02-102, slip op. (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment), 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/pdf/02-102P.ZC [http://perma.cc/N5C8-RGPP]. 
 365 See Lawrence v. Texas, LEGAL INFO. INST., CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH., http://www.law 
.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-102.ZC.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2014) [http://perma.cc/62B4-QM74]. 
 366 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003). 
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published her concurrence.  Lawrence was decided on the final day of 
the October 2002 Term before the summer recess.367  The very end of 
the Term is when multiple majority, concurring, and dissenting opin-
ions are most likely to be crisscrossing, and therefore the possibility of 
such missteps is greatest. 
Whatever the precise nature of the behind-the-scenes cause for Jus-
tice O’Connor’s decision to change her Lawrence concurrence, this ex-
ample highlights one of the more significant consequences of the 
Court’s current practice of making such changes without meaningful 
notice.  Supreme Court opinions are cited and quoted frequently, and 
immediately: by lower courts, by other lawmaking branches, and by 
legal scholars and teachers.  And they are cited in this way and to such 
an extent for understandable institutional reasons, given the Court’s 
prestige and the tremendous weight of its precedential authority. 
But serious practical problems arise when the version of the 
Court’s opinion upon which lower courts, other branches of govern-
ment, and scholars and teachers rely can change, without notice, as 
many as five years after initial publication.  Not only do those relying 
on the Court’s opinions not know of the need to correct their own 
work, let alone have any practical way to discover the changes made, 
but their own writings — whether a judicial opinion, casebook, or 
treatise — can unwittingly perpetuate the error, long after the Court 
itself has changed its opinion. 
(vi) Clapper v. Amnesty International USA (2013) (potentially 
forthcoming). — In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,368 decided 
in February 2013, respondents had claimed that Section 702 of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act369 is unconstitutional.370  The 
Supreme Court ruled that respondents lacked Article III standing be-
cause they failed to establish the necessary “concrete injury” to them-
selves from the Act’s administration.371  Because the case was so re-
cently decided, it is too soon to know whether the Court will identify 
any “formal errors” in the opinion warranting revision prior to publica-
tion in the final United States Reports. 
Review of Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court, however, reveals a 
possible error and therefore a contemporaneous occasion to witness the 
Court’s current practices regarding the revision of its opinions.  One 
footnote in the Court’s opinion is especially important because it is 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 367 See Opinions, J. SUP. CT. U.S., Oct. Term 2002, at 1103–04, http://www.supremecourt 
.gov/orders/journal/jnl02.pdf [http://perma.cc/5VUQ-6SWL]. 
 368 No. 11-1025 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2013); see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 
(2013). 
 369 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012). 
 370 Clapper, No. 11-1025, slip op. at 1. 
 371 See id., slip op. at 2, 10. 
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where the Court seeks to distinguish its ruling in Clapper from a prec-
edent upon which the respondents had heavily relied.  In making that 
distinction, the Court reasoned: “But to the extent that the ‘substantial 
risk’ standard is relevant and is distinct from the ‘clearly impending’ 
requirement, respondents fall short of even that standard, in light of 
the attenuated chain of inferences necessary to find harm here.”372 
There seems to be an error in that crucial footnote.  The use of 
quotation marks on either side of “clearly impending” suggests that the 
phrase appears earlier in the opinion.  That exact phrasing, however, 
does not appear anywhere else in the Clapper opinion.  The phrasing 
that the Court uses elsewhere is “certainly” impending,373 not “clearly” 
impending, which are words of potentially very different substantive 
import.  Although the two terms have obvious overlap, their respective 
references to certainty and clarity can also be differently directed, de-
pending entirely on the precise context for their application.374  In Su-
preme Court opinions, perhaps more than any other, the precise mean-
ing of the words used by the Court matter. 
If this is in fact an error, there are two ways a correction could be 
made.  “Clearly” in footnote five could be changed to “certainly,” 
which would be consistent with the earlier phrasing.  Or the quotation 
marks around “clearly” could be deleted, which would eliminate the 
suggestion that the words appeared earlier in the opinion but would 
leave some ambiguity between the footnote’s phrasing of the applica-
ble test and the rest of the opinion.  Until the preliminary print is pub-
lished in a couple of years, or the United States Reports a couple of 
years after that, it will not be known for sure whether the Court has 
decided that this was an error and, if so, whether it warrants revi-
sion.375 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 372 Id., slip op. at 15 n.5 (citing id., slip op. at 11–15). 
 373 Id., slip op. at 2, 10, 11, 15, 17, 18, 24. 
 374 Compare WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 367 (1981) (referring 
to “certainty” in the primary definition of “certainly”), with id. at 420 (defining “clearly” as “in a 
clear manner”).  The application of Clapper to probabilistic injuries is one example where the dif-
ference in wording at least arguably makes a difference.  Cf. Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing’s 
Expected Value, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1283, 1297 (2013) (“In spite of the seeming hostility of the 
Clapper holding to less-than-certain harm constituting injury for standing purposes, there is much 
in the Clapper opinion that suggests that standing based on probabilities is far from foreclosed, 
and indeed that the holding in Clapper may be tied to the unique nature of the circumstances 
raised by the case.”).  
 375 Consistent with the notice on the slip opinion to notify the Reporter about any “formal er-
rors,” I sent an email to the Reporter regarding this possible discrepancy in the Court’s opinion.  
See Email from author to Christine L. Fallon, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States (May 14, 2013, 5:28 PM) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  The Reporter 
replied that she “will query Justice Alito about your suggestion when we prepare the opinion for 
publication in the U.S. Reports.”  Email from Christine L. Fallon, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme 
Court of the United States, to author (May 20, 2013, 3:16 PM) (on file with the Harvard Law 
School Library). 
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Until then, moreover, lower courts will continue to rely on language 
in a Supreme Court opinion that, because it appears likely to result 
from an initial drafting error, may be changed.  To date, nine courts 
have cited to Clapper’s “clearly impending” language,376 and one of 
those courts never once uses “certainly impending.”377  Unlike courts 
citing Lawrence, where the removed statement was a concurring opin-
ion’s characterization of a dissenting opinion,378 these courts relied on 
language from a majority opinion on the relevant standard of law.  
Moreover, the very subtlety of this potential mistake makes it possibly 
far more problematic than the full sentence excision in Lawrence.  
Even if the Court chooses to correct its apparent mistake in Clapper, 
there will be no ready occasion to correct lower court precedent, also 
published in official versions, that cites to and quotes from the Court’s 
original language. 
(vii)  EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. (2014). — In EPA 
v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P.,379 decided in April 2014, the 
Court upheld the validity of a major federal agency rule promulgated 
by EPA under the Clean Air Act,380 which was designed to curb air 
pollution from upwind states that interfered with the ability of down-
wind states to meet and maintain compliance with national ambient 
air quality standards.381  The Court agreed with EPA that the relevant 
statutory language was sufficiently ambiguous to allow EPA to consid-
er compliance costs in allocating the relative amount of reduction that 
was required of the multiple upwind states that were all contributing 
to a downwind state’s pollution problems.382  The Agency could, ac-
cordingly, decide to require greater emissions reductions from those 
upwind states that could achieve such reductions less expensively than 
could other upwind states.383  The majority rejected the contrary view, 
promoted by regulated industry subject to the rule and some States, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 376 See City of Rock Island v. United States, No. 4:13-CV-04047, 2014 WL 4748326, at *5 (C.D. 
Cal. Sept. 24, 2014); N.Y. Bankers Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 13 Civ. 7212, 2014 WL 
4435427, at *9 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014); In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., No. 13-CV-
05226, 2014 WL 4379916, at *7 n.7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2014); Wallace v. New York, No. 12-CV-
5866, 2014 WL 4243564, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2014); U.S. Hotel & Resort Mgmt., Inc. v. 
Onity, Inc., No. 13-1499, 2014 WL 3748639, at *4 & n.2 (D. Minn. July 30, 2014); Chevron Corp. 
v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 554 n.1257 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co., Nos. 2:13-CV-118, 2:13-CV-257, 2014 WL 689703, at *5 n.8 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2014); Taylor 
v. Bernanke, No. 13-CV-1013, 2013 WL 4811222, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2013); State Nat’l Bank 
of Big Spring v. Lew, 958 F. Supp. 2d 127, 162 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 377 See Chevron, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 376–644. 
 378 See supra TAN 351–366. 
 379 Nos. 12-1182, 12-1183 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2014); see also EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 
L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). 
 380 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012). 
 381 EME Homer, Nos. 12-1182, 12-1183, slip op. at 1–2. 
 382 See id., slip op. at 2, 25–28. 
 383 See id., slip op. at 25–28. 
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that the plain meaning of the Clean Air Act mandated a strictly pro-
portional-reduction approach without any consideration of which 
states could reduce their emissions more cost-effectively.384 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented on the ground 
that the Clean Air Act unambiguously requires EPA to pursue a strict 
proportional-reduction approach.385  The depth of Justice Scalia’s dis-
agreement with the majority in the case was underscored both by the 
rhetorical harshness of his slip opinion’s criticism and by his decision 
to announce the reasons for his dissent orally from the bench immedi-
ately after Justice Ginsburg announced the opinion for the Court.386 
Justice Scalia’s written dissent described EPA personnel as “une-
lected agency officials” and characterized EPA’s actions as seeking to 
exercise “broad lawmaking authority” not delegated to the Agency by 
Congress.387  According to the dissent, because EPA was “unsatisfied” 
with the way Congress had “specified quite precisely” how much up-
wind states should reduce emissions that contributed to downwind 
problems, the Agency had decided to replace, in effect, the congres-
sionally mandated approach with the Agency’s view of a better and 
“more efficient”388 approach, which of course is exactly what Justice 
Scalia made clear an agency cannot do.389 
As part of Justice Scalia’s narrative on EPA’s departure from its 
proper function, the dissent highlighted that “[t]his is not the first time 
EPA has sought to convert the Clean Air Act into a mandate for cost-
effective regulation.”390  The dissent placed this part of its discussion 
under the heading “Plus Ça Change: EPA’s Continuing Quest for Cost-
Benefit Authority.”391  And, in support of its narrative, the dissent de-
scribed how in a prior case, Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns,392 
the Court had “confronted EPA’s contention that it could consider 
costs in setting NAAQS” and rejected it.393 
Justice Scalia’s dissent correctly characterized the Court’s ruling in 
American Trucking, but erred in its characterization of EPA’s legal ar-
gument in that case.  In American Trucking, EPA had argued the exact 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 384 See id., slip op. at 2, 26. 
 385 Id., slip op. at 1, 3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined by Thomas, J.). 
 386 See Robert Barnes, Scalia v. the Blogosphere: Gaffe Sparks Partisan Outrage, WASH. POST 
(May 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2014/05/03/8629d9d8-d231-11e3-937f-
d3026234b51c_story.html [http://perma.cc/L9GU-B63V]. 
 387 EME Homer, Nos. 12-1182, 12-1183, slip op. at 1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 388 Id., slip op. at 1. 
 389 Id., slip op. at 1–2. 
 390 Id., slip op. at 12. 
 391 Id. 
 392 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
 393 EME Homer, Nos. 12-1182, 12-1183, slip op. at 12 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see id., slip op. at 
12–13. 
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 384 See id., slip op. at 2, 26. 
 385 Id., slip op. at 1, 3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined by Thomas, J.). 
 386 See Robert Barnes, Scalia v. the Blogosphere: Gaffe Sparks Partisan Outrage, WASH. POST 
(May 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2014/05/03/8629d9d8-d231-11e3-937f-
d3026234b51c_story.html [http://perma.cc/L9GU-B63V]. 
 387 EME Homer, Nos. 12-1182, 12-1183, slip op. at 1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 388 Id., slip op. at 1. 
 389 Id., slip op. at 1–2. 
 390 Id., slip op. at 12. 
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 392 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
 393 EME Homer, Nos. 12-1182, 12-1183, slip op. at 12 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see id., slip op. at 
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opposite of what Justice Scalia’s dissent claimed and upon which its 
narrative about EPA depended.  EPA had argued that it could not 
consider costs in setting national ambient quality standards.394  EPA’s 
opponents were the parties in that case that had argued costs could be 
considered.395  And the Court had therefore agreed with EPA’s view, 
not rejected it.396  EPA’s actual legal position in American Trucking 
was entirely inconsistent with the dissent’s narrative about the Agen-
cy’s history of overreaching. 
Justice Scalia was not the first Justice to make this mistake about 
what EPA had argued in American Trucking,397 but what made the 
dissent’s error especially remarkable was that Justice Scalia had him-
self authored the opinion for the Court in American Trucking that had 
upheld EPA’s reading of the Clean Air Act.398  The Justice’s error in 
EME Homer was therefore the opinion’s mischaracterizing at length 
aspects of Justice Scalia’s own prior Court opinion.  And he did so 
with much gusto, which made the mistake all the more problematic. 
Unlike on other occasions, however, this error was identified not 
months or years later, but only a few hours after the EME Homer slip 
opinions were released.  The Court was immediately notified through 
the formal procedures that the Court has established for notifying the 
Supreme Court Reporter of such “formal errors” and the Court re-
leased a revised slip opinion early the very next morning.399  The orig-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 394 See American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 468–71. 
 395 See id. 
 396 See id. at 464–71. 
 397 Justice Stevens similarly mischaracterized EPA’s argument in American Trucking in his dis-
sent in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009) (prelim. print).  See id. at 239 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (“In that case, the Court reviewed the EPA’s claim that § 109 of the Clean Air 
Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) (2000 ed.), authorized the Agency to consider implementation costs 
in setting ambient air quality standards.”).  The source of the common error, though not remotely 
an excuse, might be that the Court in American Trucking had granted review of EPA’s petition for 
a writ of certiorari to consider a nondelegation doctrine issue and a cross petition by industry to 
consider the cost issue, see American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 462–64, and therefore the most casual 
reader might wrongly assume, based on the case name, that EPA was the petitioner who had lost 
on both issues in the court below.  The relevant language in Justice Stevens’s Entergy dissent has 
since been corrected in the bound United States Reports.  Compare Entergy, 556 U.S. at 239 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (prelim. print) (“In that case, the Court reviewed the EPA’s claim that § 109 of 
the Clean Air Act . . . authorized the Agency to consider implementation costs in setting ambient 
air quality standards.” (citation omitted)), with Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 
239 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In that case, the Court reviewed a claim that § 109 of the 
Clean Air Act . . . authorized the EPA to consider implementation costs in setting ambient air 
quality standards.” (citation omitted)).  (The author of this Article was counsel of record for re-
spondent Riverkeeper in Entergy.) 
 398 See American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 462. 
 399 See EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., Nos. 12-1182, 12-1183, slip op. (U.S. Apr. 
29, 2014) (rev. Apr. 30, 2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  As it happens, the author of this Article was 
the first to identify the error within two hours after the opinion was first released.  I immediately 
reported the error to a listserv of academic colleagues (who broadcast the news more broadly 
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inal slip opinion heading that began with “Plus Ça Change” was 
changed to the more benign title “Our Precedent” in order to eliminate 
any characterization of EPA’s prior practices.400  And the prior refer-
ences to what “EPA” had argued before were changed to make clear 
that other parties and not EPA had made the argument about costs 
that Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court had rejected.401 
The absence of any significant delay before the correction was 
made contrasts greatly with past experiences, no doubt largely because 
of the speed of Internet-based communications.  The instantaneous 
availability of the slip opinions on the Internet, within seconds of the 
opinion’s announcement from the bench, allowed for immediate scru-
tiny by anyone with Internet access; and, once the error was spotted, 
the Internet further allowed for broad public dissemination of the error 
as well as for specific notification to the Court itself.402  Both the error 
and the correction were consequently quickly publicized throughout 
the nation and within the Court’s own judicial chambers, even if not 
at the instigation of the Court itself. 
The speedy correction is plainly an improvement over corrections 
that take years to be made.  But the risk of significant confusion still 
remains.  After the revisions were made to the slip opinions in EME 
Homer, there were two different versions of those slip opinions public-
ly available: the first released on April 29 and the second on April 30.  
Both have been widely disseminated through electronic media, and 
there is nothing apparent on the face of either one to indicate which 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
through blogs), to a few members of the news media who cover the Court, and within two hours 
emailed the Supreme Court Reporter a formal letter.  Pursuant to the Court’s established proce-
dures, the letter identified the “possible” error, suggested alternative ways to correct the error, and 
recommended the letter’s referral more immediately to Justice Scalia’s chambers because of the 
potential to correct the error in an expedited fashion.  See Letter from author to Christine L. Fal-
lon, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States 1 (Apr. 29, 2014) (on file with the 
Harvard Law School Library). 
 400 Compare EME Homer, Nos. 12-1182, 12-1183, slip op. at 12 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Apr. 29, 
2014) (“Plus Ça Change: EPA’s Continuing Quest for Cost-Benefit Authority”), with EME Homer, 
Nos. 12-1182, 12-1183, slip op. at 12 (rev. Apr. 30, 2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Our Precedent”). 
 401 Compare EME Homer, Nos. 12-1182, 12-1183, slip op. at 12 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Apr. 29, 
2014) (“This is not the first time EPA has sought to convert the Clean Air Act into a mandate for 
cost-effective regulation.  Whitman . . . confronted EPA’s contention that it could consider costs in 
setting NAAQS.”), with EME Homer, Nos. 12-1182, 12-1183, slip op. at 12 (rev. Apr. 30, 2014) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This is not the first time parties have sought to convert the Clean Air Act 
into a mandate for cost-effective regulation.  Whitman . . . confronted the contention that EPA 
should consider costs in setting NAAQS.”). 
 402 Both the initial error and the correction received substantial publicity.  See, e.g., Jonathan 
H. Adler, Justice Scalia Is Not the Only One Making Errors, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIR-
ACY (May 1, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/05/01 
/justice-scalia-is-not-the-only-one-making-errors/ [http://perma.cc/K8C7-RBX6]; Barnes, supra 
note 386; Sahil Kapur, Antonin Scalia’s Blunder Is Unprecedented, Legal Experts Say, TALKING 
POINTS MEMO (May 1, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/antonin-scalia-blunder-
unprecedented-epa [http://perma.cc/U4HT-4DBW]. 
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one is the “correct” version.  In particular, the second, more recent ver-
sion nowhere indicates on its face that it constitutes a “revision” of the 
prior opinion.  To that extent, the change is far less transparent, and 
for that reason even more problematic, than when changes are made 
between the original slip opinions, the preliminary print, and the Unit-
ed States Reports.  At least then, one can discern on the face of the 
document whether the version was produced earlier or later and there-
fore is authoritative.  The Court has notified the public ahead of time 
that changes may be made between the slip opinion and the prelimi-
nary print, and between the preliminary print and the United States 
Reports.  No notice is provided either that the Court may silently 
change its online electronic versions of its slip opinions or, as in EME 
Homer, that specific slip opinions have in fact been changed.403 
(f)  Frequency of Revisions. — The full extent and frequency of 
opinion revisions through printer proofs and change pages are, as a 
practical matter, unknowable.  They are nominally in plain sight be-
cause the Court does not shy away from acknowledging that it makes 
changes.  Indeed, the Court expressly invites readers to notify the Re-
porter of errors.  The changes themselves are in a strictly technical 
sense visible because they can theoretically be discovered by compar-
ing the original bench opinion and the final version published in the 
United States Reports.  Only relatively recently have technological ad-
vances both in the electronic digitization of legal information, includ-
ing court opinions, and in comparison-software technology combined 
to promise the potential for ready identification of revisions made in 
Supreme Court opinions.  Before then, the revisions were wholly invis-
ible as a practical matter.  That is perhaps why, until this Article, the 
public and academics have apparently assumed that only revisions of a 
technical, nonsubstantive nature were made under the banner of cor-
recting “typographical or other formal errors.” 
Based on the examples identified above, it is clear that any such as-
sumption would be mistaken.  The revisions that the Court makes 
through this pathway are categorically no different from the changes it 
has made through other methods.  And the decrease in errata lists and 
opinion-modification orders in recent decades is most likely explained 
by an increase in the use of change pages instead.  The revisions made 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 403 Nor is there any reason to presume that such unannounced slip opinion revisions are limited 
to only certain Justices.  A few weeks after Justice Scalia changed his opinion in EME Homer, 
Justice Kagan corrected a factual error in her slip opinion dissenting in Town of Greece v. Gallo-
way, No. 12-696 (U.S. May 5, 2014); see also Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).  
Compare Town of Greece, No. 12-696, slip op. at 23 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (May 5, 2014) (describ-
ing Newport, Rhode Island as “the home of the first community of American Jews”), with Town 
of Greece v. Galloway, No. 12-696, slip op. at 23 (U.S. May 5, 2014) (rev. n.d.) (Kagan, J., dissent-
ing) (describing Newport as “the home of one of the first communities of American Jews”). 
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through change pages have plainly included changes of substance, the 
examples of which reveal Justices changing opinions for the Court and 
for themselves individually for wide-reaching and potentially open-
ended reasons.  The Justices reconsider the strengths of legal argu-
ments made and revise language accordingly.404  They reword core le-
gal conclusions in light of further thinking.405  They make revisions in 
response to concerns about the possible import of unintended dic-
tum.406  And they make changes after reconsidering the accuracy of 
their initial characterizations of the published opinions of other Justic-
es.407 
It is no safer to assume that the Court is less likely to make signifi-
cant substantive changes in this manner because it lacks the transpar-
ency provided by errata lists and opinion-modification orders.  Indeed, 
precisely the opposite could be true.  The lack of transparency could 
make this pathway a more attractive option for making changes, in-
cluding some with substantive import, because it allows the Court to 
correct mistakes without any direct, public acknowledgment.  
Lending further support to the possibility that the Court is making 
more revisions than ever through change pages is the remarkably in-
creasing amount of time required to prepare the United States Re-
ports.  Notwithstanding huge advances in technology, the diminished 
role of the Reporter, and the marked decrease in the number of cases 
decided, publication of the United States Reports currently requires 
four to five times longer than it used to take.  In 1825, the Reporter 
published the United States Reports the same year the decisions were 
announced.  In 1875, they were published one year later; in 1925 with-
in a year; and in 1975, in fewer than two years.408  By contrast, in re-
cent years, it has typically taken at least four or five years after the 
original opinion announcement for the corresponding volume of the 
United States Reports to be published.409  The Justices seem to be try-
ing to have it both ways.  On the one hand, the Justices make no effort 
to hide the fact that they engage in the practice of changing opinions 
— they publicly announce it.  Yet, at the same time, they deliberately 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 404 See supra TAN 302–321. 
 405 See supra TAN 332–335. 
 406 See supra TAN 336–348. 
 407 See supra TAN 351–367. 
 408 Author’s calculations based on the dates of the publication for the United States Reports in 
428 U.S. (1978); 427 U.S. (1978); 426 U.S. (1978); 425 U.S. (1978); 424 U.S. (1977); 423 U.S (1977); 
271 U.S. (1927); 270 U.S. (1926); 269 U.S. (1926); 91 U.S. (1876); 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) (1825).  Omit-
ted from this analysis is Volume 92 for October Term 1875, only because of an apparent anomaly 
relating to the timing of its publication.  That volume says it was “entered” with the Library of 
Congress in 1876 but not “published” until 1890, suggesting some kind of oddity not representa-
tive of that time period.  See 92 U.S. i–ii (1890). 
 409 See, e.g., supra TAN 9. 
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make it hard for anyone to determine when changes are made, alt-
hough they could easily make that information public.  In short, the 
Court is simultaneously transparent and opaque.  Part III of this Arti-
cle next discusses whether such duality is sensible and appropriate. 
III.  ENSURING THE COURT’S INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY BY 
IMPROVING THE PROCESS AND PRACTICE OF REVISION 
The Supreme Court’s practice of revising its opinions is praisewor-
thy in its objective.  As the nation’s highest court, an unbending com-
mitment to precision and accuracy is plainly a good thing.410  A court 
that decides some of the nation’s most pressing legal issues should not 
have typographical, punctuation, or grammatical errors in its rulings.  
Nor should its rulings rest on or otherwise perpetuate significant fac-
tual errors.  The Court’s opinions are intended to have a long life and 
provide an unquestioned source of controlling authority even when 
ruling on controversial matters, including striking down actions taken 
by the executive and legislative branches on constitutional grounds.  
Opinion errors, even of the most seemingly innocuous nature, would 
seriously erode the Court’s prestige and authority. 
To its credit, the Court freely acknowledges the possibility of opin-
ion revisions to correct mistakes by providing a formal notice on every 
slip opinion and preliminary print, although the Court has never 
acknowledged that it makes changes in electronic versions of its slip 
opinions made available online.  The Court’s practice of revising its 
slip opinions and preliminary prints is also exceedingly impressive in 
application.  The kind of fundamental error made by the third Su-
preme Court Reporter in no less than McCulloch v. Maryland,411 mis-
quoting the Necessary and Proper Clause,412 would most certainly not 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 410 In some instances, however, the Court has allowed fairly fundamental factual errors about 
the names of parties in famous cases to persist, perhaps because the error has no substantive sig-
nificance, but the case name has become so well known that it would be too disruptive to correct.  
Examples include “Sanford” in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), “Tysen” in 
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), and “McCulloh” in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316 (1819).  See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL 
COURTS § 54 n.5 (7th ed. 2011); see also id. (discussing Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 
U.S. 555 (1980)) (“[T]he Court, in an introductory footnote *, says that the respondents spell their 
name ‘Millhollin’, but since it has been misspelled throughout the litigation and since ‘legal re-
search catalogs and computers are governed by the principle of consistency, not correctness, we 
feel constrained to adhere to the erroneous spelling.’” (quoting Ford Motor Credit, 444 U.S. at 555 
n.*)). 
 411 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316. 
 412 CompareU.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“To make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Con-
stitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”), with 
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 412 (mistakenly omitting the words “or Officer”).  This error 
does not appear to have been previously corrected, and an academic colleague recently notified 
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happen under the rigorous review procedures that the Court currently 
follows.  The Justices, their law clerks, and the Reporter today are 
painstakingly precise and rigorous at each stage.  A review of the 
“change pages” for one recent volume of the United States Reports 
makes that clear.413  It reveals a depth and breadth of review fitting 
for the High Court.  That is most likely why, notwithstanding the far 
greater resources now available in each chamber and the enormous 
advances in technology, it takes far longer to produce the final bound 
volumes of the United States Reports than it did decades ago.414 
The many examples described above, however, make a strong case 
in favor of the Court’s revising its current practices.  In particular, 
they demonstrate the considerable and potentially increasing cost to 
the Court’s lack of transparency.  Described below are some of those 
costs, some possible lessons from how the other branches of the federal 
government address similar mistakes, and some possible reforms for 
the Court’s consideration. 
A.  Weaknesses of the Court’s Current Revision Practices 
The Court’s current practices for revising its opinions fall short in 
at least two significant respects.  First, the Court lacks a coherent, sen-
sible set of procedures for determining when revisions should be made 
that is commensurate to the degree of procedural rigor applied prior to 
the initial opinion publication.  And, second, the Court makes it far too 
difficult for anyone to discover what corrections have in fact been 
made. 
Both problems warrant changes in the Court’s current practices.  
The first has led to seemingly haphazard revision of “formal errors” 
and to too few safeguards for determining when a revision is warrant-
ed.  The second simply makes no sense and disserves both the Court 
and the public.  Every piece of the puzzle is made public, from the fact 
that changes are made to the various versions of an opinion.  There is 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
the Reporter of the “formal error” and suggested its possible correction, presumably in a future 
errata listing.  See Letter from John F. Manning, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Christine L. 
Fallon, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States (Oct. 15, 2014) (identifying er-
ror in McCulloch for possible correction) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
 413 See supra notes 81, 109. 
 414 Of course, as all authors (and law review editors) know, it is frustratingly impossible to elim-
inate all errors.  The Supreme Court is no exception in this respect.  One amusing example relates 
to the Reporter’s apparently mistaken elimination of language from a concurring opinion.  In Lee 
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), Justice Souter’s concurring slip opinion included a footnote that 
ended with the acknowledgment that “Homer nodded,” see MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVID-
ED 60, 353 (2005), but that statement is missing from the bound volume, see Lee, 505 U.S. at 623 
n.5 (Souter, J., concurring).  The Reporter corrected the error in an errata page a decade later.  See 
Erratum, 535 U.S. II, II (2003) (“505 U.S. 624, n. 5, line 10: add ‘Homer nodded.’ after ‘. . . n. 3, 
supra.’”). 
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nothing remotely confidential about the information contained in those 
change pages and no good reason not to show the changes themselves.  
1.  Absence of Apparent Procedural Rigor. — One of the most strik-
ing aspects of the Court’s current and historic practices for revising an 
opinion is the apparent lack of procedural rigor within an institution 
known for such rigor.  There is no discernible pattern for how or why 
the Court has made different kinds of changes in different ways over 
time.  It seems almost haphazard.  The most incidental technical 
changes have been made in the most public way (for example, erratum 
notices and formal orders modifying opinions),415 and changes in 
wordings with obvious substantive import have been made in the least 
transparent way.416  The answers to basic questions — including what 
constitutes a “formal error,” the full extent to which it embraces sub-
stantive changes, and how the Justices are consulted about possible 
changes — are unclear.417  What is clear, however, is that substantive 
changes are made under the rubric of “formal error,” and that there are 
few, if any, procedural assurances that modifications are made with 
awareness of all chambers, let alone the approval of those whose votes 
were necessary in the first instance to render an opinion of a single 
Justice anything more than that. 
The role of the public and the parties in prompting these changes 
likewise lacks any clear structure.  Before a case is decided, there are 
strict rules that everyone must follow in any communications with the 
Court.  All parties must receive copies of any document filed by any 
other party or amicus.  Ex parte communication is strictly and appro-
priately forbidden.  But under the Court’s remarkably informal pro-
cess for revising its opinions, any member of the public — including 
any party, amicus, or counsel — may and apparently routinely does 
unilaterally write the Court about a “formal error” and seek its revi-
sion.418  No service or notice is required.  And the Court may revise its 
opinion in substantive ways without any opportunity for input from 
interested parties. 
2.  Absence of Appropriate Transparency and the Potential Under-
mining of Opinion Integrity. — The Court’s dominant method of mak-
ing changes to its opinions is the least transparent, and deliberately so.  
The costs, moreover, are considerable.  For instance, as described 
above, the lack of notice invariably perpetuates the Court’s initial er-
ror long after the correction has been made and risks considerable con-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 415 See supra TAN 190–234. 
 416 See, e.g., supra TAN 336–350. 
 417 As discussed above, in 1994, Chief Justice Rehnquist apparently notified the Court Reporter 
that, in the future, the Court would need to approve substantive changes in the Court’s opinions.  
See supra TAN 258–259. 
 418 See, e.g., supra TAN 237, 345. 
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fusion about what the law actually is.  During the five years between 
the time of the Court’s release of its original slip opinion and the 
Court’s publication of the final, official version in the United States 
Reports, lower federal and state courts, lawmakers from other branch-
es of government, legal scholars, and law teachers rely on, cite to, and 
quote from that initial language.  And those citations and quotations 
naturally persist long after the Court has changed its opinions. 
Not only do those relying on the slip opinions’ precise wording not 
truly appreciate its tentative nature, notwithstanding the formal notice 
attached to it, but the Court’s deliberately nontransparent procedures 
make it exceedingly difficult to discover the changes made even if 
those lower courts, lawmakers, scholars, and teachers tried to discover 
them.  Certainly, those textbook authors who, many years after Justice 
O’Connor changed her concurring opinion in Lawrence, continue to 
reproduce in their texts the prior language would immediately update 
their publications were notice of the Court’s changes more readily 
available.419 
Finally, the Court’s current policy also undermines the integrity of 
the Court’s central product: its written opinion.  It makes little sense to 
suggest, as the Court currently does, that its opinions formally an-
nounced in open Court are not “final” and “official.”  Perhaps that pol-
icy made sense a century ago, but it no longer does.  We are far from 
the early nineteenth century when the initial opinions announced from 
the bench were truly preliminary and the Supreme Court Reporter 
played a heavy hand in converting those oral opinions into written 
opinions.  The Court’s current process for drafting opinions is appro-
priately demanding and produces a written text that becomes law only 
when thoroughly reviewed by all chambers and when a majority of the 
Justices formally and expressly “join” in its endorsement.  That slip 
opinions and preliminary prints may be subject to change does not 
make them any less “final” or “official” than are the bound volumes of 
the United States Reports, which are always subject to possible subse-
quent correction through errata lists. 
B.  Lessons from the Other Branches 
The other two branches of the federal government provide con-
trasting examples of how a lawmaking entity can correct its mistakes 
in a more systematic, careful, and transparent manner.  To be sure, the 
judicial branch has different lawmaking responsibilities than the legis-
lative and executive branches.  Congress can enact a law only upon 
adherence to certain strict procedural requirements set forth in the 
Constitution, which circumscribes the legislature’s ability to correct 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 419 See supra TAN 363. 
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mistakes made in its initial lawmaking efforts.  So too, executive 
branch agencies must make and administer law pursuant to congres-
sionally mandated procedures, and those procedures invariably govern 
those agencies’ abilities to correct their mistakes.  Judicial opinion-
writing is not similarly circumscribed, and the courts, including the 
Supreme Court, are far freer to determine the best processes for draft-
ing and revising opinions.420 
A judicial opinion is also plainly different from both statutory and 
regulatory text in an even more fundamental respect.  The opinion ac-
companies and explains the judgment, but only the judgment has dis-
crete legal effect.  Judges possess tremendous discretion in using an 
opinion to explain the reasoning underlying the court’s judgment.  The 
practice of routinely including a written opinion to explain a judgment 
is one that emerged over time here in the United States in fits and 
starts during the nineteenth century, with some states even enacting 
statutes to require the issuance of written opinions.421 
While the distinction may be strictly true as a historical matter, the 
role of the judicial opinion generally today, and certainly the function 
of a Supreme Court opinion in particular, cannot be so easily cabined.  
The judgment, alone, has no precedential significance beyond the facts 
of the particular case.  It is the precedential effect of the Court’s opin-
ion that renders the High Court such an important lawmaking institu-
tion.422 
Of course, not all words in a Supreme Court opinion are of equal 
stature.  The Court’s opinions include extensive explanatory text, some 
of which is central to the ruling but much of which is dicta without 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 420 The Supreme Court has long embraced the inherent power of courts “to correct mistakes of 
the clerk or other officer of the court, inadvertencies of counsel, or to supply defects or omissions 
in the record.”  Gagnon v. United States, 193 U.S. 451, 456 (1904) (citing Gonzales v. Cunning-
ham, 164 U.S. 612, 623 (1896)); see In re Wight, 134 U.S. 136, 143–44 (1890); United States v. Vig-
il, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 423, 426–27 (1870)); see also Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Frisco Transp. Co., 358 
U.S. 133, 145 (1958) (“It is axiomatic that courts have the power and the duty to correct judg-
ments which contain clerical errors or judgments which have issued due to inadvertence or mis-
take.”).  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly authorize courts to correct “a clerical mis-
take or a mistake arising from oversight or omission” in a “judgment, order, or other part of the 
record,” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(a), and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure include a comparable 
provision, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 36.  The former provides that the court “may do so on motion or 
on its own, with or without notice” (until an appeal has been docketed), FED. R. CIV. P. 60(a), and 
the latter “[a]fter giving any notice [the court] considers appropriate,” FED. R. CRIM. P. 36. 
 421 POPKIN, supra note 24, at 93–95.  
 422 For this same reason, the text of judicial opinions cannot be fairly analogized to the legisla-
tive history accompanying a statutory enactment.  In all events, Congress does not (to my 
knowledge) revise the language of legislative reports after a bill has become law, and when indi-
vidual legislators subsequently revise or add to remarks made on a chamber floor, Congress in-
cludes (since 1978) a bullet or other explicit designation to make clear to readers that this lan-
guage was added later.  See Richard J. McKinney, An Overview of the Congressional Record and 
Predecessor Publications, L. LIBR. LIGHTS, Winter 2002, at 16, 20–21.  
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mistakes made in its initial lawmaking efforts.  So too, executive 
branch agencies must make and administer law pursuant to congres-
sionally mandated procedures, and those procedures invariably govern 
those agencies’ abilities to correct their mistakes.  Judicial opinion-
writing is not similarly circumscribed, and the courts, including the 
Supreme Court, are far freer to determine the best processes for draft-
ing and revising opinions.420 
A judicial opinion is also plainly different from both statutory and 
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crete legal effect.  Judges possess tremendous discretion in using an 
opinion to explain the reasoning underlying the court’s judgment.  The 
practice of routinely including a written opinion to explain a judgment 
is one that emerged over time here in the United States in fits and 
starts during the nineteenth century, with some states even enacting 
statutes to require the issuance of written opinions.421 
While the distinction may be strictly true as a historical matter, the 
role of the judicial opinion generally today, and certainly the function 
of a Supreme Court opinion in particular, cannot be so easily cabined.  
The judgment, alone, has no precedential significance beyond the facts 
of the particular case.  It is the precedential effect of the Court’s opin-
ion that renders the High Court such an important lawmaking institu-
tion.422 
Of course, not all words in a Supreme Court opinion are of equal 
stature.  The Court’s opinions include extensive explanatory text, some 
of which is central to the ruling but much of which is dicta without 
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 420 The Supreme Court has long embraced the inherent power of courts “to correct mistakes of 
the clerk or other officer of the court, inadvertencies of counsel, or to supply defects or omissions 
in the record.”  Gagnon v. United States, 193 U.S. 451, 456 (1904) (citing Gonzales v. Cunning-
ham, 164 U.S. 612, 623 (1896)); see In re Wight, 134 U.S. 136, 143–44 (1890); United States v. Vig-
il, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 423, 426–27 (1870)); see also Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Frisco Transp. Co., 358 
U.S. 133, 145 (1958) (“It is axiomatic that courts have the power and the duty to correct judg-
ments which contain clerical errors or judgments which have issued due to inadvertence or mis-
take.”).  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly authorize courts to correct “a clerical mis-
take or a mistake arising from oversight or omission” in a “judgment, order, or other part of the 
record,” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(a), and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure include a comparable 
provision, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 36.  The former provides that the court “may do so on motion or 
on its own, with or without notice” (until an appeal has been docketed), FED. R. CIV. P. 60(a), and 
the latter “[a]fter giving any notice [the court] considers appropriate,” FED. R. CRIM. P. 36. 
 421 POPKIN, supra note 24, at 93–95.  
 422 For this same reason, the text of judicial opinions cannot be fairly analogized to the legisla-
tive history accompanying a statutory enactment.  In all events, Congress does not (to my 
knowledge) revise the language of legislative reports after a bill has become law, and when indi-
vidual legislators subsequently revise or add to remarks made on a chamber floor, Congress in-
cludes (since 1978) a bullet or other explicit designation to make clear to readers that this lan-
guage was added later.  See Richard J. McKinney, An Overview of the Congressional Record and 
Predecessor Publications, L. LIBR. LIGHTS, Winter 2002, at 16, 20–21.  
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binding precedential effect on the lower courts or on the other gov-
ernmental branches.  And, therefore, the safeguards appropriate for 
the revision of such explanatory text are not strictly analogous to those 
necessary in revising statutory or regulatory language, all of which 
state legally binding law.  The inquiry here, however, is not what the 
Supreme Court must do, but what practices it should follow in revising 
its opinions to be consistent with both the rigorous procedures that the 
Court imposes on the advocacy that frames the Court’s 
decisionmaking and the exalted role the Court’s opinions serve in our 
nation’s laws.  And in addressing that latter question, the Court could 
learn from the experiences and practices of the other two branches. 
For instance, Congress has developed a host of procedural path-
ways for correcting errors, depending on when the mistakes are dis-
covered and corrected.423  If Congress identifies an error in an enrolled 
bill after its passage by both chambers, but before the President has 
acted, both chambers can correct that error by passing a concurrent 
resolution directing changes in enrollment.424  Such resolutions direct 
the House Clerk or the Secretary of the Senate to make specified cor-
rections needed to ensure that the bill’s language accurately reflects 
congressional intent.  If the legislative officers have already signed the 
bill, the resolution rescinds their signatures, and if the bill has already 
been presented to the President, the resolution requests that the Presi-
dent return the bill to Congress.425  Corrections can include typograph-
ical mistakes, substantive errors, and clerical errors that resulted in 
each chamber agreeing to a different text.426  If the mistake is not dis-
covered until after the President has signed the enrolled bill — which, 
therefore, is now enacted law — Congress follows a different proce-
dure, which requires Congress to pass and the President to sign a new 
statute that revises the prior law.427 
To this end, Congress has an entire office committed to correcting 
mistakes in its statutory enactments and the United States Code: the 
Office of the Law Revision Counsel.  One of the Office’s primary re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 423 WM. HOLMES BROWN ET AL., HOUSE PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO THE RULES, PRECE-
DENTS, AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE 772–76 (2011); VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL34480, ENROLLMENT OF LEGISLATION: RELEVANT CONGRESSIONAL 
PROCEDURES 3–5 (2013).  
 424 See HEITSHUSEN, supra note 423, at 3.  An enrolled bill is one that has been agreed to by 
both chambers, and enrollment occurs in the chamber where the bill originated.  Then the head of 
each chamber must sign the bill to authenticate that the text reflects what the chamber passed.  
Only then is the bill presented to the President.  Id. at 1–2. 
 425 Id. at 3–4.  For instance, Senate Concurrent Resolution 32 in the 112th Congress instructed 
the House Clerk to correct the enrollment of H.R. 470, the Hoover Power Allocation Act.  See 
Hoover Power Allocation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-72, 125 Stat. 777; S. Con. Res. 32, 112th 
Cong. (2011) (enacted). 
 426 HEITSHUSEN, supra note 423, at 3. 
 427 Id. at 4–5. 
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sponsibilities is to “remove ambiguities, contradictions, and other im-
perfections both of substance and of form” in statutory enactments and 
their initial codification, with the aim of having Congress pass the cor-
rected version as positive law.428  Routine changes include improving 
wording and revising errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar.429  
In addition, Congress routinely enacts narrowly directed “technical 
amendments”430 to correct unintended formatting and substantive er-
rors in specific legislation.431 
However loosely Congress might apply the “technical” label, its 
process for identifying and correcting errors that invariably creep into 
its work product offers lessons for the Court: Congress does not engage 
in the strange fiction of labeling its initial enactments as neither “final” 
nor “official.”  Congress publishes its procedures for making revisions.  
And Congress openly describes the changes that it has made, without 
mystery or embarrassment.  The ultimate safeguard is that Congress 
itself must approve, by formal passage, any proposed changes in the 
relevant statutory language. 
Federal executive branch agency procedures for making corrections 
are similarly far more coherent and transparent than the Court’s.  The 
Administrative Procedure Act432 (APA) generally governs agency exer-
cises of legislatively delegated lawmaking authority, supplemented by 
additional requirements and modifications set forth in specific laws 
under which agencies act.433  More specifically, the APA sets forth pro-
cedural requirements applicable to agency rulemakings and adjudica-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 428 2 U.S.C. § 285b(1) (2012). 
 429 See generally OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION COUNSEL, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENT-
ATIVES, POSITIVE LAW CODIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES CODE (2014), 
http://uscode.house.gov/codification/positive_law_codification.pdf [http://perma.cc/H4MY-HBSX]. 
 430 Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 576 (2007). 
 431 See, e.g., id. at 576 (“Nothing in the text or legislative history of the technical amendments 
that added the cross-reference to NSPS [new source performance standards] suggests that Con-
gress had details of regulatory implementation in mind when it imposed PSD [prevention of sig-
nificant deterioration] requirements on modified sources . . . .”); Lockhart v. United States, 546 
U.S. 142, 145–46 (2005) (holding it is irrelevant that Congress may not have foreseen all the legal 
consequences of the language it enacted in the Higher Education Technical Amendments); see 
also, e.g., 159 CONG. REC. H2169 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 2013) (regarding “Technical Corrections and 
Improvements in Title 36, United States Code”).  The Court considers the “technical” nature of 
these changes in construing their legal import.  See, e.g., Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 472 
(1975) (“[I]t would seem difficult at best to argue that a change in the substantive law could never-
theless be effected by a change in the language of a statute without any indication in the Reviser’s 
Note of that change.”). 
 432 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 
U.S.C.). 
 433 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–554 (2012). 
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tions, for which prior notice and public participation are central to the 
legitimacy of the agency’s exercise of authority.434  
Those same APA requirements generally apply to an agency’s ef-
forts to correct errors.  As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit explained, agencies possess no “‘inherent power’ to 
correct ‘technical errors[]’ . . . without complying with the APA’s pro-
cedural requirements.”435  Moreover, where the APA provides various 
avenues for correcting mistakes that do not require compliance with 
all the requirements that apply to original decisions, safeguards remain 
in place to ensure that the transparency inherent in the usual proce-
dures is not sacrificed.  For instance, there is a “good cause” exception 
applicable to agency rulemaking that allows an agency to forego prior 
notice and public procedure when it is “impracticable, unnecessary, or 
contrary to the public interest.”436  But, even under that narrow excep-
tion “limited to emergency situations,”437 the agency must publish an 
after-the-fact notice of specific changes made in the Federal Regis-
ter.438 
Agencies may forego prior notice and comment rulemaking using 
either “interim final rulemaking” or “direct final rulemaking.”439  With 
the former, the agency adopts a rule without prior notice and com-
ment, makes the rule effective immediately, and invites comment on 
whether the rule should be changed in the future.  With the latter, 
there is similarly no prior public notice and opportunity for comment, 
and the agency states that if it receives a “significant adverse”440 com-
ment, the final rule will be rescinded and normal notice and comment 
rulemaking requirements triggered.441  Interim final rulemaking is 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 434 See id. §§ 553–554.  A recent law review article ambitiously proposes that courts more fully 
embrace the administrative agency model by engaging in “notice-and-comment judicial 
decisionmaking” to reduce the likelihood of judicial error.  See Michael Abramowicz & Thomas 
B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965 (2009). 
 435 Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp. v. EPA, 236 F.3d 749, 752 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  In Utility Solid 
Waste Activities Group v. EPA, 236 F.3d 749, EPA sought “to correct language resulting from an 
erroneous use of the Word Perfect find/replace command in the drafting of the regulation.”  Id. 
 436 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B); see also Ellen R. Jordan, The Administrative Procedure Act’s “Good 
Cause” Exemption, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 113 (1984). 
 437 Utility Solid Waste Activities Group, 236 F.3d at 754 (quoting Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. 
Block, 655 F.2d 1153, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1981)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 438 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(E). 
 439 Ronald M. Levin, Direct Final Rulemaking, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995); see id. at 
1–4. 
 440 Id. at 32 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 441 See Adoption of Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,110–12 (Aug. 18, 1995); Michael 
Kolber, Rulemaking Without Rules: An Empirical Study of Direct Final Rulemaking, 72 ALB. L. 
REV. 79, 88–91 (2009); Levin, supra note 439, at 2–3, 4–7 (describing differences between “interim 
final rulemaking” and “direct final rulemaking,” id. at 2, and how EPA “invented direct final 
rulemaking in the early 1980s,” id. at 4); Ronald M. Levin, More on Direct Final Rulemaking: 
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used for important, urgent rulemaking, which may well therefore be 
controversial, while direct final rulemaking is designed for presump-
tively noncontroversial rulemakings, extending to corrections to prior 
rulemakings, which is why the receipt of a significant adverse com-
ment automatically triggers rule rescission and the need for full notice 
and comment rulemaking.442 
Finally, some agencies have occasionally published “Errata Notices” 
and “Corrections” to revise errors in prior Federal Register publica-
tions, including in the content of final rules.  Examples of corrections 
include typographical errors, misspellings,443 missing words,444 incor-
rect numbers,445 and even corrections to prior corrections.446  In all 
these circumstances, the federal agencies published the precise correc-
tions and changes being made. 
Notwithstanding the obvious differences between judicial opinions, 
statutory provisions, and agency regulations, there are potentially im-
portant lessons to be gleaned by the Court from the contrasting exam-
ples of how the legislative and executive branches correct their own 
errors.  Most important, their examples strongly suggest that the insti-
tutional costs to the Court of adopting a more rigorous and transpar-
ent process for error correction might be less than assumed by the jus-
tifications presumably underlying the Court’s current practices.  They 
further underscore the shared judgment of two other branches that the 
public can fairly expect a high level of transparency from its lawmak-
ing institutions. 
First, Congress and federal agencies have demonstrated that pub-
licly acknowledging revisions need not prove embarrassing or delegit-
imizing to a government branch.  Such error correction is embarrass-
ing only when one attempts to hide it, and it is discovered nonetheless.  
As soon as it becomes routine and appreciated as an ordinary and en-
tirely understandable part of an institution’s necessary practices, as 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Streamlining, Not Corner-Cutting, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 757, 759–61 (1999); Lars Noah, Doubts 
About Direct Final Rulemaking, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 401, 419–23 (1999). 
 442 Levin, supra note 439, at 2–3, 6. 
 443 Correction, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,961, 81,961 (Dec. 27, 2000) (correcting eight misspellings and 
typographical errors in prior NOAA guidance). 
 444 Errata Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 43,309, 43,309 (June 27, 2002) (adding words to make clear 
FERC’s obligation to consider and incorporate the views of “affected stakeholders” and not only 
state public utility commissions). 
 445 Errata Notice, 74 Fed. Reg. 22,773, 22,773 (Apr. 17, 2013) (changing time frame for filing 
modifications with FERC from forty-five to sixty days). 
 446 In 1979, the Department of the Interior published seventy corrections to an errata sheet that 
had corrected agency regulations and the accompanying preamble.  See Surface Coal Mining and 
Reclamation Operations Permanent Regulatory Program; Corrections, 44 Fed. Reg. 53,507, 
53,507–09 (Sept. 14, 1979) (correcting errata notice at Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Op-
erations, Permanent Regulatory Program; Corrections, 44 Fed. Reg. 49,673, 49,673–87 (Aug. 24, 
1979)). 
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has happened with the two other branches, the risk of any damaging 
stigma quickly disappears. 
Second, the legislative and executive branch examples demonstrate 
that there can be flexibility in the precise procedures adopted for cor-
recting errors.  Errors can be properly classified based on their nature.  
And different kinds of errors can warrant different kinds of correction 
procedures and levels of transparency, including potentially no trans-
parency at all for some types of errors given the different nature of a 
judicial opinion and the types of revisions frequently needed. 
Finally, the contrasting examples of the legislative and executive 
branches suggest the possibility that the absence of rigor and transpar-
ency in the Court’s own practices may be interrelated.  In particular, 
the existing absence of transparency may partly explain why the Court 
lacks any systematic approach for determining how and what changes 
are made.  Accountability can be a strict, even if indirect, disciplinari-
an.  A modicum of exposure would likely produce a more sensible pro-
cess of correcting Court opinions.  Once the Court routinely makes 
known the corrections, the Justices would invariably develop and ap-
ply more consistent and disciplined procedures in determining what 
types of corrections are warranted in specific circumstances. 
C.  Possible Reforms for the Court’s Consideration 
There are myriad ways that the Court could improve its existing 
procedures for revising its opinions following their initial publication.  
At a minimum, however, the Court should consider the following. 
First, the Court should consider clarifying what it means by claim-
ing that its slip opinions (and preliminary prints) are not “final” or “of-
ficial.”  The Court’s opinion is plainly “final” with reference to how the 
Court itself uses that term in describing the culmination of lawmaking 
processes.  It has “all of the hallmarks”447 of finality: it has immediate 
legal effect, has legal consequences for the parties, and ends the 
Court’s decisionmaking process.448  The Court can reserve the right to 
correct unintended errors without that inapt disclaimer.   
Nor is the notion that the Court’s opinion is not “official” until the 
publication of the bound United States Reports entirely correct.  The 
opinion that the Court initially releases is not some informal writing 
that the Reporter then takes and crafts into a finished work.  It is the 
result of extraordinarily careful and rigorous drafting, negotiating, and 
revising conducted within the chambers of the Justices.  The Report-
er’s job, by contrast, is ministerial.  The slip opinions are physically 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 447 Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1371 (2012). 
 448 Cf. id. at 1371–72. 
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produced within the Court and contain all the official imprimatur of 
the Court.  In short, it is about as “official” as one could possibly get. 
Second, the Court should consider providing more guidance on 
what constitutes a “formal error” and adopting different procedures for 
addressing different kinds of errors.  The inherent vagueness of the 
Court’s current notice accompanying slip opinions and preliminary 
prints invites arbitrariness.  Certain kinds of errors are obviously with-
in the Reporter’s purview, such as typographical and formatting errors.  
But, as demonstrated by the examples above, the Court’s application 
of the term “formal error” extends to plainly substantive changes that 
are far from obvious and are not of a comparably technical nature. 
The Court can fairly distinguish among different types of correc-
tions and the kinds of procedural safeguards and degrees of transpar-
ency they require.  Misspellings, typographical errors, and citation er-
rors or updates trigger, numerically, the vast majority of revisions and 
presumptively warrant no special safeguards.  The same would be true 
for almost all (but not all) grammatical errors — even something as 
mundane and incidental as a shift in punctuation could have signifi-
cant substantive import.449 
The addition, deletion, or substitution of words or phrases, by con-
trast, should presumptively trigger more procedural safeguards and 
transparency because of the greater likelihood of substantive import.  
Proposed revisions aimed at correcting erroneous characterizations of 
facts, the record, the positions of parties, the positions of other Justices, 
or background law likewise warrant greater safeguards because of 
their potential substantive import.  Corrections about background law, 
illustrated by the Court’s revisions of its description of the Clean Wa-
ter Act in Ouellette,450 are especially susceptible to unintended conse-
quences, making prior notice to and input from the parties more valu-
able. 
At the very least, the Court should reconsider its current practice of 
delegating the decision whether to make these kinds of word changes 
to the Justice who authored the opinion, including even when that Jus-
tice has since retired.451  Wholly apart from the legitimate threshold 
question whether such retroactive changes should be made at all, espe-
cially when the membership of the Court might well have since signifi-
cantly changed, it is far from obvious that the decision should be left 
to the Justice who authored the opinion.  As the Court’s own guidance 
to oral advocates underscores, “an opinion of the Court” is not the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 449 Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 450 See supra TAN 341–344. 
 451 See supra TAN 249–252. 
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opinion of the single Justice who writes it for the Court;452 it is an 
opinion of the Court.  For this same reason, it can be forcefully main-
tained that any such change in the wording of the Court’s opinion is 
presumptively substantive enough to warrant at least the opportunity 
for other chambers (at least those in the majority) to review. 
Third, the Court should also consider distinguishing among possi-
ble revisions based on the identity of the person proposing the change.  
The procedures need not be identical for suggestions proposed by those 
outside the Court, whether a party, amicus, or third person, and those 
proposed within the Court.  For the former, there should be a thresh-
old presumption that such communications are public or, at the very 
least, made known to the parties in the case (and typically to the Solic-
itor General in light of his extensive involvement with the Court’s 
merits docket).453  The Court could implement formal service require-
ments applicable to parties and amici, but the Clerk of the Court 
would ultimately be responsible for ensuring that the parties received 
prior notice when the impetus for the revision originated outside the 
Court from a nonparty or amicus.  
The procedures could fairly be different if the initial impetus for 
the correction came from one of the Chambers or an officer of the 
Court, including the Reporter.  In that circumstance, a presumption 
against prior notice to the parties could fairly apply, consistent with 
the strictly confidential nature of the Court’s deliberative process once 
a case is submitted.  Even then, however, the Court might decide to 
provide prior notice of its consideration of such changes to the parties 
(and to the Solicitor General as an amicus).  The Justices are well 
aware of the value that briefs and oral arguments provide.  The Court 
is highly dependent on effective advocacy in its initial decisionmaking 
and opinion writing, and there is no obvious reason why such input 
would not be similarly valuable when the Court (or an individual Jus-
tice) is contemplating a revision.  The parties and their counsel are 
frequently aware of aspects of the case and the possible consequences 
of rewordings not readily anticipated by the chambers.  That is espe-
cially true when changes are being made long after the opinion was 
originally announced, so the clerks who worked on the opinion are no 
longer there.  Without the assistance of the parties, the Court risks 
substituting one kind of error for another. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 452 See CLERK OF THE COURT, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, GUIDE FOR 
COUNSEL IN CASES TO BE ARGUED BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 11 (2013), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/guideforcounsel.pdf [http: 
//perma.cc/D968-LMES] (“Do not refer to an opinion of the Court by saying: ‘In Justice Gins-
burg’s opinion.’  You should say: ‘In the Court’s opinion, written by Justice Ginsburg.’”). 
 453 See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s Changing 
Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1338–60 (2010). 
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Fourth, the Court should provide after-the-fact public notice of any 
revisions made, just as Congress does in revising its legislation and 
federal agencies do in correcting errors in regulations.  This could be 
easily accomplished.  All the Court would need to do is post to its 
website the same change pages that it already provides to publishers. 
Further, because the Court’s revisions occur in the context of litiga-
tion where there are individual parties with concrete stakes, the Court 
should provide specific notice to those parties.  As with “direct final 
rulemaking,” a significant adverse comment might prompt the Court 
to reconsider its revision, albeit in rare instances.  Of course, any no-
tice requirement (whether before or after the revision) may chill post-
publication changes of a substantive nature simply because the Court 
would prefer not to contact the parties and their counsel.  But that 
possibility counsels in favor of notice because any such chilling might 
well be warranted. 
The Court should likewise make clear when it is has revised a slip 
opinion available on its website before the issuance of a preliminary 
print.  At the very least, the slip opinion itself should include an inci-
dental notation of the fact of a revision and the date of the revision, 
making clear that the version currently up on the website differs from 
a prior version that the Court had made available.  Otherwise, as has 
occurred with EME Homer described above,454 there will invariably 
be competing electronic versions available on various websites and 
readers will be unable readily to discern from the slip opinion’s face 
whether the version they have is an earlier version that has since been 
corrected or the updated, corrected version. 
To be sure, a posting of change pages or the formal acknowledg-
ment of the fact of a revised slip opinion will publicly acknowledge 
that the Court, too, makes mistakes.  That should hardly come as a 
surprise given that the Court already says just that in the notice on 
slip opinions and preliminary prints.  Nevertheless, public acknowl-
edgment that the Court makes some mistakes not just in theory, but in 
reality will no doubt generate some initial headlines and uneasiness 
with the Court.  So too, of course, may this Article by describing the 
Court’s past practices so fully.  But those headlines will quickly dissi-
pate and the advantages of such a posting moving forward are consid-
erable.  The posting should substantially reduce the likelihood of reli-
ance on language that has been superseded.  It may also prompt 
websites that reproduce slip opinions to change that practice or at the 
very least include revision postings for their readers. 
Even more important, such public postings will invariably prompt 
the Court to be more careful and systematic in deciding when and how 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 454 See supra TAN 379–403. 
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to make revisions.  Transparency might also encourage the Justices to 
think twice before venturing in their opinions into areas that are out-
side the record and beyond their own areas of expertise.  Justices and 
their law clerks are exceedingly smart, but even they have their limits, 
and a few public corrections can be an effective reminder of the pit-
falls of making unilateral assumptions about facts not grounded in the 
actual record.455  Publicity is not always a good thing, but in this con-
text, it should and can be.  
Finally, in considering all of these reforms, the Court can fairly 
conclude that the same procedural rules and degree of transparency 
that apply to revising majority opinions need not apply to revising 
concurring and dissenting opinions, at least where the votes in support 
of the concurring opinion in no manner limit the precedential effect of 
the majority opinion.  The “opinion of the Court” alone has force of 
law and precedential effect, so revisions to that opinion are of an en-
tirely different character and import than revisions to opinions of indi-
vidual Justices.  The case for greater procedural safeguards and trans-
parency is accordingly far more compelling. 
That is not to suggest that there should be no safeguards and no 
transparency applicable to revisions of concurring and dissenting opin-
ions.  The public interest in such opinions and their precise wording is 
very high.  They play a major role in interpreting the Court’s opinion 
and in future discussions and litigation.  At the very least, there should 
be public, after-the-fact notice of such changes.  And, when a Justice is 
considering a correction to a concurring or dissenting opinion suggest-
ed by someone outside the Court, the Court may well change its cur-
rent practices by providing prior notice to the parties (and the Solicitor 
General).  As before, confidentiality concerns would not be implicated, 
and the rules against ex parte communication would strongly favor 
such notice and opportunity for input. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s traditions are a source of the institution’s 
great strength and durability.  Such traditions provide a useful and 
visible reminder of the Court’s commitment to the institutional 
framework for lawmaking established by the Framers more than two 
centuries ago.  They enable the Court to issue enormously controver-
sial rulings while maintaining its essential stature and respect, not-
withstanding commentators’ frequent predictions that the Court has 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 455 See, e.g., Jacob Gershman, Alito’s Statistics Lesson Misses the Mark in Death-Penalty Dis-
sent, Experts Say, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (May 28, 2014, 2:43 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014 
/05/28/justice-alitos-statistics-lesson-misses-the-mark-in-recent-dissent-experts-say/ [http://perma 
.cc/YH46-3BJD]. 
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irreversibly squandered its authority.  Unlike in the early days of Chief 
Justice Marshall,456 contemporary Justices dissent regularly and loudly, 
but without ever suggesting a lack of shared commitment to the 
Court’s institutional integrity.  The persistent inability of the often-
strident acrimony surrounding individual cases to erode the Court’s 
essential authority is a stunning institutional achievement. 
Yet, as important a role as tradition has played in the Court’s suc-
cesses, the Court has also quietly and frequently changed its proce-
dures, including in drafting and revising opinions.  The Justices long 
ago abandoned the English tradition of issuing their opinions seriatim 
in favor of an “opinion of the Court.”  The Justices no longer delegate 
to a Reporter, as they did to a potentially unsettling extent in the 
Court’s earliest years, the drafting of the written opinion or the deci-
sion whether a ruling is sufficiently significant to warrant publication.  
Since the mid-nineteenth century, the Justices themselves have been 
heavily involved in drafting written opinions, and the Reporter’s sub-
stantive role has diminished.457 
The Court’s procedures for revising its opinions have likewise un-
dergone changes.  The Justices no longer routinely make extensive 
substantive changes after the opinion is first announced in Court, as 
they did during much of the nineteenth century.  Nor, on the other 
hand, do the Justices insist on publishing every modification as a for-
mal order in the United States Reports, as they often did during the 
1930s. 
The Justices also consistently release the majority, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions at the same time.  Happily, long gone are the days, 
underscored by the destructive institutional discordance in Dred Scott, 
in which Justices failed to provide each of their colleagues with draft 
opinions and fair opportunity to comment prior to formal release and 
publication.  The Justices all adhere strictly to basic norms of institu-
tional process regarding the drafting and release of their opinions.  
They do so no matter how deep and intense their disagreement about 
the results in a particular case. 
The Court nonetheless has retained practices regarding the revision 
of opinions that are long overdue for improvement.  Unlike any other 
domestic court, the nation’s Highest Court formally issues its opinions 
before they have been fully reviewed and checked for errors within the 
Court itself.  The Justices do so apparently because of institutional 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 456 Charles F. Hobson, Defining the Office: John Marshall as Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 
1421, 1431–35 (2006). 
 457 The practice of having the Reporter draft summaries of the arguments of counsel seems to 
have dissipated during the 1940s.  See Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis v. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 
318 U.S. 1, 1–2 (1943); United States v. Local 807 of Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521, 522–24 
(1942); United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 514–16 (1942). 
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pressures they feel to release opinions as quickly as possible, perhaps 
related to the desire to formalize an achieved majority before it might 
potentially change.  But, whatever the reason, the Justices have long 
embraced the odd, but by-now settled practice of routinely revising 
their initial opinions and justifying their doing so by asserting, in a 
largely ignored notice, that only the United States Reports volume 
published many years later constitutes the “final,” “official” version of 
the Court’s opinions. 
What reforms are warranted?  At the very least, the Court should 
end the fiction of labeling its initial, published opinions as neither “fi-
nal” nor “official,” and any specific changes should be subject to after-
the-fact public notice.  The latter reform in particular should mitigate 
electronic media’s tendency to perpetuate inaccurate versions of opin-
ions.  The mere fact of publication will also likely have positive effect 
on the Court’s procedures for determining when and what revisions 
are necessary and appropriate. 
As described above, the Court should also consider a series of 
changes in its current practices that would provide greater structure 
and coherence to the revision process.  Such reforms would extend to 
the possibility of notifying parties about certain categories of proposed 
changes prior to their adoption.  However, precisely how those reforms 
should, in distinguishing between types of categories of error, strike the 
balance between providing greater transparency and maintaining the 
essential confidentiality of the Court’s deliberative processes is less 
clear — at least to an academic on the outside looking in.  It is plainly 
not cost-free to invite overeager advocates to have another round of 
input.  And those within the Court are far better equipped than any-
one on the outside to determine how best to restrike that balance. 
Justice Jackson’s famous quip about the source of the Court’s “in-
fallibility” is no doubt true.  But the Court need not pretend to be in-
fallible to maintain its stature and authority.  The strength of the 
Court’s opinions is firmly rooted in the persuasiveness of its reasoning 
and, no less importantly, in the fairness and openness of its 
decisionmaking process.  The Court can both make mistakes and ad-
mit mistakes without placing its institutional integrity at risk.  And the 
Court need not compromise the confidentiality of the internal delibera-
tive processes that is essential to candid debate, careful reasoning, and 
the exercise of sound judgment.  The Court need only ensure that its 
process for acknowledging the need to make changes and for correct-
ing mistakes is no less fair and open than that used in producing its 
opinions in the first instance.  The current Court did not create the 
problems with its existing procedures, which find their origins in prac-
tices that can be traced back to the days of the Court’s first great 
Chief Justice, John Marshall.  But the Court today can easily fix them, 
and now should. 
